Imagery, cognitive penetrability and the location of content by Heywood, Charles
IMAGERY, COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY, 
AND THE LOCATION OF CONTENT. 
A Thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Arts in Psychology 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Charles Heywood. 






From Rationalism and Naturalism to Internalism 
and Externalism. 2 
I .The Contemporary Literature. 9 
II.The Theoretical Basis of Cognitive Penetrability. 26 
III. Intension, Extension and Symbolic Expressions. 75 
IV.Meanings are not in the Head. 96 
V. Summary and Conclusion. 117 
Bibliography. 123 
ABSTRACT. 
Recent results from the theory of meaning and mental content are 
applied to Zenon Pylyshn's criticism of the 'Analog' theory of quasi-spatial 
image representations on the grounds of the 'cognitive penetrability' of 
the purported image manipulation tasks. The latter condition asserts that 
if behaviour alters in such a way as to correlate with the 'meaning' or 
reference of sensory inputs, as is the case in imagery tasks, then the 
explanation of the underlying cognitive function must appeal to 
operations upon sentence-like 'symbolic ' representations, as opposed to 
the 'quasi-spatial medium' proposed by the Analog school. This follows 
from the assumption that relations between contentful semantically 
interpreted constructs like belief must be mirrored by, and thus explained 
in terms of, correlative changes at the physically instantiated, 
alogarithmic, 'symbol level'. Because the explanatory construct utilised at 
this level is symbolic content, cognitive processes identified as 'symbolic' 
by dint of their alteration in concert with environmental stimuli, or the 
objects of cognition, are thereby, allegedly, only to be explained in terms of 
symbolic processes, which are instantiated by but not equivalent to 
physiological processes. Counter-instances from the philosophical 
literature are recounted wherein the contents of physically constant 
mental states are seen to alter with environmental circumstance, in 
violation of the cognitive penetrability condition. With the latter invalid 
the weight of empirical evidence supports the Analog position. Stich's 
'Syntactic Theory of Mind' is suggested as a general theoretical and 
philosophical framework for the Analog Theory. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
FROM RATIONALISM AND NATURALISM TO INTERNALISM 
AND EXTERNALISM. 
What makes Cognitive Psychology cognitive is the centrality of 
intentional notions like representation, content, and information (in its 
non-technical sense) to the explanation of rational behaviour. For some 
time during the sixties and seventies it seemed as if Psychology had come 
full circle since the lean Behaviourist years to implicitly reaffirm 
Brentano's adage that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental'. But even 
as Fodor described "your standard contemporary cognitive psychologist" as 
wedded to the idea that "mental states are distinguished by the content of 
the associated representations" in 1980, he was calling for the 
abandonment of this kind of psychology in favour of a purely formal 
"Methodological Solipsism" which specifically disavows intentional 
idioms.1 
The problem is that whilst beliefs, desires, hopes, memories, attitudes 
and the like seem intimately tied up with what it is to be human and to act 
intelligently on the basis of evidence, none of those internal states of our 
heads which have been posited in order to explain cognitive behaviour 
seem to be the sorts of things of which intentional states can be predicated. 
My belief that 'snow is white' for instance, has truth conditions, - it may be 
true or false, - but those internal states whose causal efficacy is dependent 
upon their form, like computation, can be no more true or false than a 
pebble in my garden. As Fodor puts it: 
computational processes are both symbolic and formal. 
Yet, 
1 Fodor (1980 ), p.64. 
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Formal processes are the ones that are specified without 
reference to such semantic properties of representations as, 
for example, truth, reference and meaning.2 
However, if all cognitive processes are in the last analysis brain 
processes it would seem that all intra-personal theories of cognition must 
be essentially formal (= achieving their effect mechanically, by virtue of 
their form or structure). 
The result is a paradox; what we ordinarily think of as mental states 
seems incompatible with the best theories available to explain them. 
Mental states, so conceived, possess the quality of intentionality (meaning, 
content, semantics, representation or reference) which cannot be possessed 
(so the argument goes) by the scientific theoretical entities of Cognitive 
Psychology. Consequently these intentional states, like my belief that 'the 
world is round', cannot be 'in the head' where the theoretical entities 
presumably reside. 
Three resolutions seem to be available; either we bite the bullet and be 
prepared for the probability that 'Cognitive Psychology' as presently 
understood will be revised into a purely formal 'Methodologically 
Solipsist' discipline which concerns itself solely with what is demonstrably 
'in the head' and has little or nothing to do with what we ordinarily 
conceive of as thought, belief or desire, or indeed with the world outside 
the head (cf Stich (1978), (1983), Fodor (1980)); or we defend to the last 
Brentano's ideal by asserting that if formal-computational psychology is 
inconsistent with propositional attitude psychology (psychology which 
attributes beliefs and desires), then so much the worse for the former (cf 
Churchland (1979), Burge (1982), (1986)); or we can take the third path and 
assert either that the contradiction between formality and intentionality 
may be reconciled and a compromise reached (e.g. McGuinn (1989)), or the 
problem may be discounted with little discussion (Pylyshn (1984)). 
This issue has come to preoccupy that domain which is simultaneously 
the philosophical side of cognitive psychology and the practical, 
scientifically directed, side of the philosophy of mind. This comes as no 
surprise for representation, and thus mental content, are pivotal in 
modern Psychology. The question being asked above is the question as to 
whether content can be determinate in the head over and above 
dispositions to behave or relations to external objects, as opposed to the 
2 ibid . 
3 
thesis that psychological events can only be individuated in a way that 
makes necessary reference to external objects and relations, such that they 
constitute, in part, the psychological events in question, which is 
simultaneously the question as to where mental content is located, what 
mental content is , and thus what psychological events are. Yet as is so 
often the case in Science, the practising cognitive psychologist continues 
to use the concept of representation as his immediate situation demands, 
with little concern for the fate that may have been decided for him in 
journals he doesn't read. 
The idea that the mind is determinate and solely 'within the head' can 
be traced back to the Rationalist philosophy of the seventeenth century. 
Descartes founded this thesis with arguments that retain a great deal of 
persuasiveness today : Is it not possible that I may be deceived somehow 
about the deliverances of my senses ? Thus, all I can be certain of is what I 
am immediately aware of. It may be that nothing else exists apart from 
what I am immediately aware of - my Ideas - consequently my Ideas must 
be able to exist without the rest of the world, consequently they have an 
identity or nature independent of the external world. From an 
epistemological point:-
... The point is that in considering these arguments we come 
to realise that they are not as solid or as transparent as the 
arguments which lead us to knowledge of our own minds 
and of God, so that the latter are the most certain and evident 
of all possible objects of knowledge for the human intellect.3 
- comes an ontological point: 
the mere fact that I can clearly and dictinctly understand one 
substance apart from another in enough to make me certain 
that one excludes the other.4 
Thus the fact that the mind is better known than things beyond it leads 
into its being a different and distinct substance. Reed (1982) and Fodor 
(1980) are amongst those who have cited the tacit influence of Descartes' 
3 Descartes Meditations , p.75 Cottingham et al. 
4 Descartes Objections and Replies , p.146 Cottingham et al. 
4 
ideas on modern psychology. Even as the latter congratulates itself as being 
a 'new' science untainted by old philosophical dogmas, there remains a 
tendency, particularly in the psychology of perception, to view "all 
awarenessess (as) awarenesses of brain states ... as opposed to, say, 
awarenesses of objects ... ".5 A powerful rationale thus presents itself: if 
immanent cognitive activity has its own integrated and intrinsic form by 
virtue of being immediate and physical, the mind may be studied in 
isolation from the environment, and its intentional values recovered, by 
and large, from its own intrinsic principles. As Neisser has put it in 
connection with perception1 raw perceptual input is rendered meaningful 
by 'processing, processing and more processing'. Burge terms this 
sentiment 'Individualism': 
According to individualism about the mind, the mental 
natures of a person's or animals mental states (and events) 
are such that there is no necessary or deep individuative 
relation between the individual's being in states of these 
kinds and the nature of the individual's physical or social 
environments.6 
In a similar vein, McGinn characterises 'Internalism' as the idea that 
mental states are in the head where they are "essentially independent of 
the surrounding world".7 And such, according to Fodor, are the views of 
"all cognitive psychologists except Gibsonians".8 If one happens also to 
believe that Psychology is properly the science of consciousness - a 
dominant view until this century - rather than representation, the risk 
seems to be courted of removing Psychology from the physical world 
altogether. As James remarked in 1904: 
At first, 'spirit and matter', 'soul and body', stood for a pair of 
equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. 
But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the 
transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation 
has been very much off its balance.9 
5 Reed (1982), p.733. 
6 Burge (1986) in Silvers (1989) p.39. 
7 McGinn (1989), p.1 
8 Fodor (1984) in Silvers (1989) p.1 
9 James (1904), in McDermott (1967), p169. 
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James, along with Pierce and Dewey, deplored the Dualism of 
Rationalist philosophy and Introspectionist Psychology that set the core of 
human life so much apart from its worldly content. In the book which 
more or less founded modern Psychology James wrote: 
On the whole, few recent formulas have done more service 
of a rough sort in Psychology than the Spencerian one that 
the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, 
the adjustment of inner and outer relations. Such a formula 
... takes into account the fact that minds inhabit 
environments which act on them and on which they in turn 
react ... 10 
This is echoed by the predominant theme in American Naturalist 
Philosophy which emphasises the holism of man-in-the-world and the 
continuity of Science and Philosophy over the cerebral concerns of the 
Rationalism it replaced. Here Dewey reproaches the Rationalists for 
turning the virtue of subjective clarity into a vice: 
Philosophical dualism is but a formulated recognition of an 
impasse in life .. . refugee idealism based on rendering 
thought omnipotent in the degree in which it is ineffective 
in concrete affairs:- these forms of subjectivism register an 
acceptance of whatever obstacles at the time prevent the 
active participation of the self in the on-going course of 
events. Only when obstacles are treated as challenges to 
remaking of personal desire and thought, so that the latter 
integrate with the movement of nature and by participation 
direct its consequences, are opposition and duality rightly 
understood.11 
This picture is not difficult to understand: an organised taxonomy of 
consciousness and subjective mental content, if approached from 
Descarte's epistemological standpoint, can only really be achieved in an 
armchair with one's eyes closed, with all that this connotes for objectivity. 
10 James (1890), quoted in Fodor (1980), p.64. 
11 Dewey (1925), p.241. 
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However, the Psychology of the time which accompanied these 
suggestions - Behaviourism - went far beyond informed compromise and 
simply rejected mental constructs and Philosophical awareness to boot. 1 2 
Rather than allowing internalistic themes to participate in the gradual 
emergence of what at the time was a very young science, the 'Mind' was 
jettisoned as excess ballast. The semi-Philosophical area of 'High-
Theory'which might be employed in the study of content failed to 
determine subject matter, rather, it was determined - as irrelevant. 
The Behaviourist vision is altogether different from modern 
'Externalism'. For a start the latter can only be said to have existed in its 
present form since the late seventies. Secondly; unlike Behaviourism it 
does not forgo representation, but is itself an approach to representation. 
The sense of this is aptly given by a quote of Gibson's: 
there is no content of awareness independent of that (thing) 
of which one is aware.13 
Externalism is thus an individuative thesis for mental states which 
holds the individual's environment to be constitutative of the nature of 
his mental states. It is thus a broadly naturalistic approach to issues of 
content which eschews the extremes of Behaviourism whilst opposing 
Cartesian currents in modern psychological theory. Thirdly; it is 
sufficiently esoteric to be little voiced in the mainstream Psychological 
Literature. The evidence upon which this view depends will be presented 
at the appropriate point below. 
My interest is in the practical application of certain externalist 
philosophical themes to theoretical debate in Psychology, which their 
application may illuminate and decide. This brings us to the 'Imagery 
Debate'. 
This is, or was, a debate about mental representation in a given 
domain. Interest was aroused by a flurry of papers in the 1970's which 
seemed to support an almost naive or Lockean conception of images as 
'pictures in the head', which garnered a predictable reply. However by the 
mid-eighties most of the gambits had been played and the possibilities for 
new experimentation waned whilst the original protagonists simply 
retrenched their positions. Of course each side had 'conclusive' reasons for 
12 see Watson (1914). 
13 Gibson (1979), p.239. 
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assuming victory, but these were by-and-large partisan, and did not 
incorporate anything resembling a new result from outside the arena. 
I will be taking another look at these issues , for the question as to 
whether an 'image' is in fact something picture-like or something 
sentence-like is possibly the single most marked disagreement on 
questions of representation and content that can be conceived. Large 
differences in the competing forms of representation provide a prima fade 
leverage for a decision procedure given the independent merits of 
Internalism and Externalism. If images are literally pictures of-
themselves, then their representational characteristics and hence content 
are relatively unmysterious aspects of physical structure. If something like 
sentences or propositional representations are involved, however, like 
sentences of written English, they will possess something like 'meanings' 
which connect with their external objects by virtue of these meanings. 
'Dog' doesn't look like a Dog, it just means Dog. It has something of 
'Dogness' in it. It seems to possess a content-nature, and in no readily 
apparent physical way, which is of course internal 'to the head' on the 
grounds that the sentence itself is in the head A picture of a Dog, in 
contrast - scratched in the sand say - possesses its content by virtue of a 
relation to an object external to the picture itself. It has content in a 
physically palpable way; we don't feel the need to ascribe 'content-nature' 
to a section of beach. 
As I am primarily concerned with the theoretical overview I will 
concentrate my descriptions on a suitable exemplar for each school. The 
issues are in any case well known and well publicised. I will also forgo a 
historical introduction of disagreements about imagery over the ages for 
two reasons: Firstly the imagery issue is a vehicle, a case in point rather 
than an end in itself. Similar arguments to those I will deploy could 
perhaps induce theoretical change in various avenues of cognitive 
psychology. Secondly: The contemporary structure of the imagery issue is 
quite distinct. The image-phile has never before been able to allude to 
empirical evidence. The sentiments which, say, Ryle voiced in the 1940's 
are only incidentally similar to those voiced by Pylyshn in the 1980's. The 
arguments are discontinuous. Nothing much happened of interest to us 
until 1971. 
8 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE. 
There was little more than subjective evidence for the pictorial quality 
of mental images until Shepard and Metzler published their now classic 
report "Mental Rotation of Three Dimensional Objects" in 1971. Their 
findings, and reaction to their findings, established a precedent for 
academic discussion of this topic. In a series of experimental papers those 
influenced by Shepard and Metzler would continue to apply 
methodological ingenuity to the establishment and clarification of an 
autonomous domain of picture-like or "Analog" processes throughout the 
seventies and early eighties, whilst those influenced by certain 
foundational assumptions about cognitive representational processes 
would continue to author in the main purely theoretical rebuttals of the 
alleged significance of these experiments.14 
The central aim of this thesis will be to provide a theoretical response 
to these theoretical arguments. As my case does not depend upon a close 
scrutiny of the experimental evidence the review presented below is 
expository rather than comprehensive or critical. 
Shepard and Metzler had observed that: 
Human subjects are often able to determine that two-
dimensional pictures portray objects of the same three-
dimensional shape even though the objects are depicted in 
very different orientations.15 
With this in mind they set out to measure the time course of this 
processing function. Subjects were given some 1600 exposures to line 
drawings of pairs of tetrahedrons at different orientations with respect to 
each other . Each subject was asked to respond as quickly as possible as 
soon as he or she was able to ascertain that the two line drawings were 
different depictions of the same object. (A certain percentage of the pairs 
were un-matching distractors). Surprisingly, over a total of 12800 trials a 
remarkably consistent linear relationship pertained between the angular 
14 For comprehensive reviews of the Analog literature see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith and 
Shwartz (1979 ), Kosslyn (1980) and Shepard and Cooper (1982 ). For a full version of the 
contrary argument see Pylyshn (1984 ). 
15 Shepard and Metzler (1971 ), p. 701. 
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disparity of each pair of drawings and the amount of time it took subjects 
to make a positive match: 
Indeed this linearity (was) consistently found even in those 
subsets of the data that were obtained just a) for those pairs of 
objects differing by a rotation in depth or by a rotation in the 
picture plane, b) for the conditions in which the axis of 
rotation was held constant or was unpredictable, c) for each of 
the eight subjects individually and d), for each of the 
differently shaped isomeric pairs of three dimensional 
objects.16 
And so was the 'Mental Rotation' experiment born. These 
relationships and contingencies were interpreted as manifestations of a 
single phenomena and hence explained by giving credence to the subjects 
reports that in order to perform the required comparison they first had to 
imagine one object rotated into co-incidence with the other, as if mental 
movies were being projected onto an inner screen for the perusal of a 
'mind's eye' that has no prior knowledge of what the film is about and so 
must wait for events to unfold. If the 'speed' with which the image can be 
rotated in or on the inner screen is constant Shepard and Metzler's results 
seem to accord well with this common-sense proto-model. If it takes, say, 
half a second to verify that two drawings are in fact of the same object 
when they are rotated 30 degrees with respect to each other, and one 
second to verify that the same two depictions are identical when they are 
rotated 60 degrees with respect to each other, no other explanation seems 
motivated. No such result could be predicted a priori from the supposition 
that information about the shape and orientation of objects in the visual 
field is encoded in a discrete propositional or digital format. If the objects 
matched by the cognitive system were lists of sentence-like things -
propositions - which describe (in some sense) the position and shape of 
the line drawings we could perhaps anticipate an effect upon reaction time 
due to object complexity (number of vertices etc.) but not orientation; for, 
in any likely algebraic model all rotations of co-ordinates of less than 360 
degrees are of equal complexity. It doesn't take twice as long to multiply 5 
by 4 as it does to multiply 5 by 2. 
16 Shepard and Cooper, op. cit, p. 43. 
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With this theme a number of theorists concurred, foremost of whom 
in terms of experimental output and theory construction has been 
Stephen Kosslyn and his co-workers. Within a few years Shepard and 
Metzler's methodology had been expanded and generalised to include a 
wide variety of putative imagery phenomena. In almost all cases highly 
significant relationships pertained between reaction time and subjective 
'distance' within or between mental representations of visual objects, 
replicating and confirming the earlier results. As the erstwhile Myth of 
Mental Imagery became respectable in the eyes of modern Psychology, so a 
theory was required to make concrete the two distinguishable facets of the 
picture that seemed to be emerging from folklore and merging with 
Science: In the first case something manifestly spatially extended and 
picture-like seemed to be involved, thus requiring a non-circular 
formalisation of pictorial from any proposed theory; in the second case 
and not unrelated to the first, the picture-like representation is 
epistemically opaque to the rest of the cognitive system, otherwise no 
rotations or scannings of images would be required. 
Kosslyn's model, which we shall take as representative of its school, 
sticks fairly close to the common-sense idea of an inner screen. Taking as 
inspiration the spatially extended display of a cathode-ray tube which may 
be generated from abstract, non-pictorial, descriptions in computer 
memory, spatiality is maintained by supposing that what we call 'images' 
are: 
temporary spatial displays in active memory that are 
generated from more abstract representations in long term 
memory .... 
Such displays remain epistemically opaque as they require 
interpretation by a different part of the system prior to information being 
made available to that part of the system: 
Interpretative mechanisms work over ... and classify ... in 
terms of semantic categories ... as would be involved in 
realising that a particular spatial configuration corresponds 
to a dog's ear, for example .... 17 
17 Kosslyn et al, op. cit., p. 536. 
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Stipulating that imagery occurs in the form of 'spatial displays' is not 
however sufficient to comprise an unequivocal theoretical assertion, for 
we still don't know what 'spatially extended' means apart from 'picture-
like', and vice versa. Would not a propositional representation in the 
memory of a computer be spatially extended? Or are we to suppose that it 
would take up no space at all? But then how is a 'spatial display' different 
from a proposition? The issue thus devolves upon what it is exactly that 
spatial display cum imageshave that other forms of representation do not, 
an investigation which clarifies and defines the analog position in the 
course of justifying it,18 
The qualities peculiar to images according to Kosslyn are their 
'privileged properties' .It is these privileged properties that are the locus of 
disagreement as we shall see below. Certain other processes constitutative 
of the 'mind's eye' part of Kosslyn's model which work over the spatial 
display are from the perspective of critics of this position innocuous. It is 
the very idea of picture-like that has traditionally raised hackles, and 
continues to do so today. 
These then are the privileged properties of imagery; the spatial 
medium, abstract spatial isomorphism, and abstract surface-property 
isomorphism. 
The Spatial Medi um. 
Images are not things in themselves. Just as a painting is an 
arrangement of paint on a canvas so images must be supported by some 
sort of structure: 
Images occur in a spatial medium that is functionally 
equivalent to a (perhaps Euclidean) co-ordinate space 
locations are accessed such that the interval properties of 
physical space are preserved in at least two dimensions.19 
Thus whilst image-representations may not themselves have distance 
and locations within themselves, they preserve distance and location 
information (in an unspecified manner) just as a Lands and Survey map 
18 I will commonly refer to analog processes as "images". This is for ease of expression and is 
not meant to beg any questions. 
19 Kosslyn (1980), p. 33. 
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will preserve elevation information without itself possessing a range of 
elevations. Kosslyn gives the example of a two-dimensional array stored 
in a computers memory; the relevant hardware will not arrange itself so 
as to possess a visible resemblance to a particular scene, should anyone 
prise the cover off and examine the area with a magnifying glass, but each 
part of the memory matrix corresponds to a spatially defined part, - or 
portion, - of the depicted scene, preserving geometric properties such as 
distance in a fashion analogous to the properties themselves. 
Studies such as Cooper (1975) is typical of studies cited as illustrating 
this property. Cooper's subjects learned to distinguish standard versions of 
Attaneave polygons from reflected or mirror image versions at a single 
standard training orientation for each of the eight polygons used. 
Subsequently during the test sessions the same eight forms were displayed 
tachistiscopically at orientations differing by 0, 60, 120, 180 and 240 degrees 
from the training orientation. The subjects task was to identify as quickly 
as possible the target stimuli as either a standard or reflected form. 
Over the course of 620 test trials a highly significant linear relationship 
was found to pertain between reaction time and angular departure from 
training orientation for both matches and mismatches - the classical 
"mental rotation" effect. Results were significant for all subjects and all 
orientations. No second order effects were found between figural 
complexity and the slopes and intercepts of the reaction time functions. 
This latter finding implies that images are rotated at a constant rate 
irrespective of their figural complexity, which in turn suggests that they 
are contained within a medium which has the power to move or rotate 
it's contents as a whole. To use an analogy, the locus of encoding (what is 
encoded) appears to be not the words but the page upon they are writ. A 
mode of representation which proceeds by encoding ,elements of the 
drawings, - vertices, segments etc. - could not be expected to be unaffected 
by the complexity of the figures encoded. 
Again, the linearity of the reaction time function implies that the 
medium duplicates the isotropic interval qualities of Euclidean space. 
Furthermore, and most obviously, detailed information on the 
orientation of objects is preserved by whatever representation is being 
used. Such information is intrinsic to the nature of spatial representations, 
but must take the form of a postulated adjunct to more abstract forms of 
representation. 
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Abstract Spatial Isomorphism. 
Images are patterns formed by altering the state of local 
regions in the internal spatial medium. The pattern formed 
in the spatial medium is a topographic mapping from the 
represented object such that a) each local portion (set of 
contiguous points) of the image corresponds to a portion of 
the represented object as seen from a particular point of view, 
and b) the interval relations among the portions of the image 
implicitly represent ... the interval distances among the 
corresponding portions of the represented object. This 
property (is) 'abstract spatial isomorphism.'20 
Not only is the medium in which images occur hypothesized to 
possess certain geometrical properties, so are the images themselves. As it 
seems unlikely that mental images are literally constituted by two 
dimensional slices of the primary visual cortex we need the next best 
thing, what a crumpled map or a map wrapped around an unevenly 
shaped object is to the same map spread flat upon a table. What the 
grooves in a record are to the sound they can produce (Sellars (1963)). 
Here is one of the well known experiments that prompted Kosslyn to 
draw these conclusions: 
Subjects were shown a drawing of a fictitious island which depicted a 
number of simple features such as a well, a hut, a tree and so forth.21 They 
were then required to commit the map to memory in accord with a 
criterion of accurate reproduction of features to within 0.25 inches of their 
true location on a blank outline drawing of the island. Upon satisfying this 
criteria subjects were required to 'imagine' the map and 'mentally stare' at 
a named location. A word would then be presented which either did or 
did not name another location on the map. The subject was asked to scan 
across the image to the named location, if it was present, by imagining a 
flying black dot travelling from the one point to the other. 
Reaction time for 'true' responses was found to increase linearly with 
respect to 'distance' scanned on the image. No such linear relationship 
was found in a subsequent study in which subjects were not explicitly 
instructed to use imagery. If this study is accepted uncritically it seems 
20 Kosslyn, op. cit., p. 33. 
2l Kosslyn, Ball and Reisser (1978 ), experiment 2. 
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undeniable that the spatial metric of the map has been transferred to the 
internal representation in the course of memorization. This would appear 
to be the implication of the correlation found between reaction time and 
the distance between two points on the map, irrespective of what the two 
points may be and which particular portion of the map is transversed. For 
instance two points adjacent on the map are 'adjacent' but distinct on the 
image. Without being committed to supposing that the image is laid out 
in an island shape in the brain, it is clear that the interval relations of the 
map, which are themselves ultimately only definable in terms of 
relationships between velocity and time (a result of the theory of 
relativity), are recreated in terms of relationships between a constant 
'scanning velocity' and time in the representation. The existence of a 
'scanning time' also relates to the epistemic opacity we mentioned above; 
the location of all things on the island is not known at once. Position 
makes a difference to response latency, which seems explicable only if ones 
attention or 'mind's eye' has to move to a certain feature on the 
representation in order to make its nature available to the rest of the 
cognitive system. Access to an answer does not seem to be limited in this 
way when we consider purely abstract questions like 'what is 3 times 12 ?' 
and 'what is the capital of Zambia ?'. 
Abstract surface-property isomorphism. 
Images are also held to preserve information about the secondary 
qualities of the objects depicted, further emplacing the intuitive 'picture in 
the head' model: 
Images ... depict information about the appearance of surface 
properties of objects, such as texture and colour ... Thus, 
although the image itself is not mottled, or green, or bright , 
or faded, it can attain states that are interpreted as evincing 
these properties.22 
So, as Kosslyn puts it, "a portion of an image of a green thing ... is an 
image of a portion of a green thing".23 Possessing an obviously lower 
priority than the demonstration of the existence of representations with 
22 Kosslyn, op. cit., p. 34. 
23 ibid. 
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properties analogous to spatial extension - hence the term analog spatial 
medium -1 the literature directed at demonstrating the presence of this 
property in particular has not been copious. It is1 for instance, difficult to 
disassociate colour and texture from extension thus the demonstration of 
just the former is tricky, and perhaps not necessary if the latter has already 
been shown. Nevertheless Finke and Schmidt (1977) managed to elicit the 
McCollough effect of orientation specific coloured after-effects - such as are 
ordinarily due to exposure to a brightly coloured patterned stimulus - by 
means of a condition in which subjects were required only to imagine a 
certain colour on a black and white patterned background. They 
concluded: 
The present study demonstrates that weak feature-contingent 
colour aftereffects may be produced following adaptation 
procedures in which imagination instructions are substituted 
for the physical presence of colour and pattern stimuli.24 
Because the test for the presence of the McCollough effect involves a 
forced-choice discrimination procedure for which the effect-revealing 
responses are not intuitively obvious, the results obtained are well 
controlled for task demand biases. The clear implication is that colour 
information may be accessed from memory and 'displayed' at a stage 
which may share many of its functions with perception, as would be 
expected upon the supposition that imagery functions allow the perusal of 
an imaginal display in much the same fashion as an actual visual scene is 
examined. 
The Model 
The studies described above are representative of a substantial body of 
literature which may be interpreted as supporting the existence in 
cognition of a class of representations possessed of the privileged 
properties typical of what we would intuitively call 'mental imagery'. 
A model devised to account for these findings has been described in 
Kosslyn (1980), (1981), and Kosslyn et al (1979) and it is to this tradition that 
we will refer. Shepard and associates have developed a similar model (cf 
Shepard (1984)), but the issues remain fundamentally the same, so for 
24 Finke and Schmidt, (1977 ), p. 
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simplicity we will confine ourselves to the Kosslyn tradition, which today 
remains the most explicit and well described analog theory of imagery. 
Kosslyn has closely followed the intuitive distinction between images 
themselves and inspections of them in the construction of an explicit 
computer model of imagery and mental scanning processes, hence a 
division of labour is incurred in the model between media and data 
structures on one hand, and processes operating upon these on the other. 
In the first category we have the medium of image representation, the 
'spatial medium' or 'visual buffer', which is a kind of operationally 
defined or functional space where the operations concerned come under 
the headings 'formatting' and 'accessibility'. The format of a medium 
places restrictions on what sorts of data structures can be encoded within 
it, and its accessibility is defined in terms of what processes can access data 
structures within the medium. The format of the visual buffer, naturally, 
is appropriate for the support of 'surface images'. 
In the second category the images or 'surface displays' or 'surface 
representations' are data structures which "depict" information wherein 
"every portion of the representation must correspond to a portion of the 
object ... "25, in other words the image cum data structure possesses 'abstract 
spatial isomorphism'. Images are depicted in the visual buffer by virtue of 
being 'patterns of activation' in the medium itself, and this is mimicked 
in a computer simulation by the selective filling in of cells in a matrix data 
structure. Data structures of this form whilst not literally laid out in a two 
dimensional plane like a picture preserve the functional inter-
relationships between their 'regions' in the manner of their 
computational formatting and accessibility. 
In a sense the image medium is defined by limitations upon its 
accessibility so that, for instance, two patterns of activation cannot be 
identified as the same even if they are until a process called "Rotate" has 
operated upon the two so as to bring them into co-incidence. This in turn 
is necessitated by the inability of inspection procedures with the 
intuitively perspicacious names of 'Lookfor' and 'Find' to match objects 
unless their orientations are identical. In this fashion the basis of spatiality 
and image distance effects in the model is the permitted orderings of the 
processes acting upon the data structures and the degrees of freedom in the 
data structures themselves, which are not un-coincidentally the same 
degrees of freedom possessed by locations in a two dimensional plane. 
25 Kosslyn, (1981 ), p. 50. 
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The information to be displayed in the spatial medium is stored in list 
structures in memory in the computer simulation and accessed by name. 
Literal (appearance) and propositional information is stored such that the 
model can generate images of objects by name and answer questions about 
their constituent parts. Insofar as this part of the model is not supposed to 
manifest any of the privileged properties hypothesized as being 
characteristic of image representations, their format and structure is theory 
neutral. 
In the third category we have those processes which operate on the 
medium. These are interdefined with each other and by their access to the 
medium. For instance LOOKFOR is an executive routine which calls other 
processes such as ZOOM, REGENERATE, FIND etc. Each of these is a 
function which takes as input a set of co-ordinates or the name of an object 
or part of an object and produces as output either either an affirmative or 
negative response, or an alteration in the pattern of activation in the 
matrix data structure. There are numerous processes in the model of 
image generation, inspection, transformation and classification, each 
performing operations on image or memory structures aptly described by 
their names viz., PICTURE, PUT, PAN, SCAN, etc. 
Most of the explanatory work is done by three properties natural to the 
model. Firstly; it is postulated that image transformations take place 
incrementally, such that the time required will be proportional to the 
degree of the transformation. This accounts for a large number of results 
concerning image rotation and mental scanning phenomena. Incremental 
transformation is principled within the model because it insures that the 
target is not overshot, that the resolution and point of focus are 
appropriate for comparison, and that the image does not 'break up' as it 
might do if subjected to a single large transformation.26 Secondly; the 
medium is postulated to have a limited resolution, limited extent and an 
area of optimum resolution. In this manner the data concerning the 
necessity of imagining objects at a given size - not too large and not too 
small - is encompassed, as well as the mental scanning data wherein 
subjects apparently have to move their focus of attention in order to 'see' 
the different parts of a larger image.27 Thirdly; and in general, tasks will 
take longer to complete the more subcomponents have to be called. Thus 
it takes more time to inspect and generate an image with more nameable 
26 Kosslyn et al, op. cit., p. 542. 
27 cf Kosslyn, (1975 ), (1976 ). 
18 
parts, more time to find rotate and match than just to rotate and match etc. 
28 
With a great deal of interdefenition of component parts Kosslyn's 
model opens itself up to accusations of circularity. This is of the nature of 
functional and operational definitions, wherein one component or quality 
is defined in terms of the effects of something else upon it. For instance, 
the spatial medium is partially defined by its format, which is the format 
appropriate for supporting quasi pictorial data-structures, however "The 
surface representation is a quasi-pictorial representation that occurs in a 
spatial medium"29. If the 'analog medium' is circumscribed only by its 
interrelationships with the processes that operate upon it then there 
would seem to be little more to the model than a sort of abstract calculus 
with suggestive names attached to different parts of it. What claim, if any, 
is being made about image representation if to be a representation of a 
given format is simply to be accessed in a certain way ? The gist of the 
analog position so far seems to be that the representations we call 'images' 
behave as if they are spatially extended, but this is a) trivially true, and b) 
exactly the claim of the opponents of this view of imagery. Pylyshn claims, 
for instance, that we have tacit knowledge of the geometrical qualities of 
physical objects, which is however encoded in in a propositional or 
sentence-like format (see below, Ch. II). Given the above evidence;how 
can anyone deny that the representations involved in a certain kind of 
task, in the main, behave in a fashion analogous to an extended two-
dimensional plane? Thus if the analog theory is to be rescued from 
vacuity it is important, I think, that the interpretation of function implicit 
in functional definitions of the spatial medium is directed towards the 
functional properties of the brain as opposed to a response directed, input-
output sense of function. 
An analogy is to think of a black box with two slots on opposite sides. If 
a blank piece of paper is placed into slot A, after a short period of time and 
a few clicks and whirs a beautifully hand written letter of condolence will 
emerge from slot B. Now, to merely say that the box 'writes a letter' is to 
say nothing about the internal constitution of the box. Whilst 'letter 
writing' describes its function from outside, the letters themselves could 
perhaps be cleverly printed or faxed from elsewhere. If a theory of the box 
is to make substantive claims about its internal mechanisms it must 
28 cf Kosslyn et al, op. cit., p 542. 
29 Kosslyn (1981), p.49. 
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leaven its functional descriptions with some degree of mechanical (in a 
general sense) meaning, for instance; ' ... the computing unit chooses from 
amongst the handwriting styles of Jane Austen, Emily Bronte etc. and 
sends messages to the mechanical hand ... ' or ' ... the box contains a man 
with a telephone who is paid $20 an hour ... '. 
Thus whilst Kosslyn and his co-workers are frequently equivocal as to 
the sense of function, analogy and 'as-if' they intend, the theory relevant 
sense must be taken as given in Kosslyn's discussions of format and 'the 
functional capacities of the brain '. Here Kosslyn makes use of Nelson 
Goodman's theory of notation in order to remark that the imagery issue is 
a dispute as to the format of 'image' representation. The format of a code 
or type of notation according to Goodman concerns: 
the nature of the inscriptions used ... and how these 
inscriptions are mapped onto (used to represent) compliance 
classes.30 
'Inscriptions' are not tautologically described in terms of the functions 
of other things because not all inscriptions are members of a character 
class, consequently not all inscriptions have a function. Certain 
inscriptions are members of the same character class as 'b', for instance, 
but shapeless squiggles are not members of any class. If an inscription is an 
ink-mark then not every ink-mark will be a letter. 31 Keeping with this 
analogy, image "patterns of activation" are like inscriptions. They are not 
things which merely behave as-if they are spatially extended any more 
than some inscriptions merely behave as-if they are characters. In each 
case some part of their definition is intrinsic and non - functional. 
This is how Kosslyn sees his theory: 
A cognitive account of imagery is a theory about the 
functional capacities of the brain .32 
'Mental events' (are) events described at the level of 
functional states of the brain . These states arise from the 
brain but are not necessarily identical to particular 
30 Kosslyn (1980), p.30. 
31 Goodman (1969), Ch. 4. 
32 Kosslyn (1981), p.47. 
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configurations of neural activity ... it may well be that the 
only thing the different neural states that correspond to a 
'functional brain state' have in common is their role in 
promoting a particular kind of computation ... 33 
A computer program is: 
a description, at a particular level of analysis, of what the 
machine will do given specific inputs.34 
In each case the abstraction involved in identifying something by its 
function lies in the mode of description, not the thing described. It is clear 
from the above quotes that Kosslyn intends his theory to take the form of 
a generalized description of operations of the brain and neurological 
structures. Similarly, his concept of computer program is one wherein a 
computation is a generalized description of the operations of a mechanical 
object. In light of these considerations it is clear that the analog spatial 
medium is not merely something that occurs in between LOOKFOR and 
ROTATE which mimics (in some unspecified way) the behaviour of a 
representational structure which is in some manner extended; - it actually 
is, according to the analog theory, an extended neurophysiological 
structure which befits the display of visual information by being 
continuous, isotropic, and a fairly simple topological deformation of a 
two-dimensional plane. If Kosslyn is saying anything at all he is saying 
something almost physiological. His theory is like a simplified diagram of 
the actual physiological processes involved, because we simply don't 
know enough about brain physiology to put the hypothesis any more 
precisely. The diagram will be somewhat abstract and function-based, but 
the things diagrammed are quite concrete. (Theoretical models delimit a 
range into which the properties of the process modelled will fall. Theories 
never say that the subjects of the theory are exactly like the model, cf 
Sellars (1963) ch. 4, Nagel (1961)). 
These considerations are important in order to combat any suggestion 
that the analog medium is an abstraction, in which case the actual stuff 
which does the 'rotation' calculations could be a fine network of 
propositions which just behave as-if they are continuous and extended. 
33 Kosslyn (1980 ), pl 14. 
34 ibid. 
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Whilst we have not discussed exactly what the neurological basis of a 
sentence of mentalese, a list structure or a proposition might be like, they 
would certainly be nothing like the structures implied by the above model. 
Many criticisms have been levelled at this theory; I intend to 
completely ignore all but one, which is sketched below. Pylyshn's Tacit 
Knowledge argument, which makes significant use of his notion of 
'cognitive penetrability', is I feel the only argument which seriously 
threatens the analog hypothesis, and is the only argument of anything but 
local interest. I will not defend this contention here for it would take us 
too far afield. My argument below does not depend upon Pylyshn's thesis 
being demonstrably the 'most important' criticism of the analog theory. 
However, I show that this criticism is in fact fatal to the analog position 
unless shown to be invalid, and you can't get much more important than 
that. For a general review of the spectrum of arguments that have been 
levelled against imagery in recent years see Kosslyn (1980). 
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE. 
The most significant threat to a theory which treats images as 
functional representational formats and cognate to a particular 'capacity of 
thebrain'goes something like this: These are only two ways in which a 
given cognitive act or mental performance might be explained. The first 
type of explanation, the 'knowledge based', 'tacit knowledge', 'semantic 
level', 'symbolic' or 'cognitivist' account appeals to: 
symbolically encoded facts about the world and to rules for 
transforming representations and drawing inferences.35 
Cognitive tasks are performed by symbolic representations and rules 
for operating upon these, just as computers transform symbolic 
expressions according to the rules of a program. 
The tactic of positing representations in psychological explanation 
arises as a direct result of the plasticity of intelligent behaviour with 
respect to the environment. Human behaviour is in crucial respects not 
mediated by the objective features of the world, but by the way the world is 
35 see Pylyshn (1978), (1979a ), (1979b ), (1980 ), (1981 ), (1984 ). 
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'taken' or 'represented' by the individual. Thus someone might shout 
'Fire ! Fire !' and leave her office in a hurry even if there is no fire, merely 
a cigarette smouldering in a waste paper basket. And this one piece of 
information may be conveyed by a variety of objectively different features 
of the environment, such as a phone call, an acrid smell, or a crackling 
sound coming from the next room, all of which have nothing by way of 
'stimulus properties' in common. In short, intelligent behaviour is always 
mediated rationally on the basis of what a person knows, or thinks she 
knows, about the world, and by the meanings (roughly speaking) of 
external events. 
A further important consideration is that although it is trivially true 
that all thinking is done by and in the brain, the laws governing relations 
between representations are not reducible to laws governing physiological 
structures. 'Thoughts' may be defined functionally by their role in the 
cognitive economy, but just as a transfer of funds from A to B may be 
effected in a variety of physically different ways - by coin, cash, cheque, IOU 
or telegraphic transfer - and still be the same economic event, so two 
instances of a given representation governed cogitation may have nothing 
in common physically. In other words there will be token but not type 
reduction (cf Fodor (1975) introduction). 
Of course as materialists we suppose that representational thought is 
governed by the structure of the brain somehow, but by virtue of being the 
basic level operating principle of cognition - that which explains the basic 
links or syntax of symbolic inter-relationships - and by virtue of being 
physical, the hardware or 'functional architecture ' of the brain is fixed 
with respect to representation governed processes. This brings us to the 
second type of explanation, the 'functional architecture' or 'syntactic' 
account, which proceeds by appeal to: 
(the) intrinsic lawful relations among properties of a 
particular physical instantiation of a process.36 
If we accept this then it is to be expected that the fixed functional 
properties of the brain will not be susceptible to influence by the meaning 
of intellectual tasks, or by purely cognitive variables such as beliefs and 
goals. This provides us with a decision procedure for telling which 
processes are in fact instantiated in the functional architecture viz.: 
36 Pylyshn (1981), p.19. 
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A function that is alterable ... in a way that is rationally 
connected with the meaning of ... inputs ... is said to be 
cognitively penetrable.37 
Now, all of the transformations imputed to 'images' in the 'spatial 
medium' would appear to follow rationally from their initial states. For 
instance, that it takes longer to rotate an object through 180 degrees than 
120 degrees, elephants are larger than flys and so easier to see at a distance, 
it takes longer to traverse larger distances etc. 
A process which can be so influenced by beliefs and the semantic 
interpretation of whatever is the object of the process - in the present case 
physical objects and their transformations - will then be properly 
explained by appeal to representations and symbolic processes. The process 
itself will contain at least some representation or rule governed 
components, and so cannot be instantiated as a functional capacity of the 
brain, as Kosslyn's spatial medium is supposed to be. 
The moral then for a theory whose central claim is that images are 
functional representations which possess spatial properties themselves is 
that it has failed to distinguish between two domains, or two types of 
principal; the extrinsic semantic domain, and the intrinsic syntactic 
domain. Thus, what is allegedly confused are the properties of represented 
objects, - in particular their spatial extent, - and the properties of 
representations themselves. To do this, it is alleged, is to commit a kind of 
category mistake; 
This tendency ... leads to a way of stating the principles by 
which mental processes operate that deprives the principles 
of any explanatory value, because it involves principles 
expressed in terms of properties of the represented object 
rather than in terms of the representations structure or form. 
Yet expressing a principle in terms of properties of the 
domain represented begs the question why processing occurs 
in this fashion. The mechanism has no access to properties of 
the represented domain except insofar as they are encoded in 
the representation itself. Thus a principle of mental 
processing must be stated in terms of the formal structural 
37 ibid , p.20. 
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properties of its representations, not what they are taken to 
represent in the theory.38 
In other words, generalisations expressed in terms of concepts 
attributable to the objects of the external semantic domain, such as shape 
and orientation, are properly referred to the first kind of explanation we 
encountered above, the 'knowledge based account'. By virtue of this fact 
they are not to be accounted for in terms of the second type of explanation 
encountered, the 'functional architecture' account, empirical results 
notwithstanding. Given that the analog theory seeks to interpret a certain 
body of empirical evidence in terms of the "intrinsic properties of the 
representational medium",39 it is an explanation of this latter type, and is 
thus invalid, given what it seeks to explain. 
38 Pylyshn (1984 ) p.230. 
39 ibid. p.233. 
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II THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY. 
In order to effectively analyse the import of Pylyshn's argument against 
the Analog position we must first break it down into its constituent stages. 
Once his basic premises have been isolated and clarified it will be possible 
to assess whether they are well founded and whether his conclusions 
indeed follow. 
Such delving into the structure of arguments is not always to the point 
in Science, where it is to be expected that most questions are empirical or 
evidential. However, the present issue depends upon the interpretation of 
an extant, more or less complete and unchallenged empirical literature. 
This has been explicitly recognised by Richardson: 
Certain basic facts are not in dispute. For example, when 
subjects are instructed to perform a mental scanning task 
response times are found to be analogous to those obtained 
when performing the same task physically, in the external 
world. Objects, whether manually or physically represented, 
take more time to locate when they are more distant from 
each other. What is in dispute is the process postulated to 
account for these results.1 
Pylyshn's argument contains certain weaknesses in its use of the 
Cognitive Penetrability criterion as a theoretical principle for the 
judgement of imagery and related tasks. The rationale of this principle is 
such that it in turn depends upon some quite basic suppositions about the 
nature of cognitive explanation. It is to these concerns that we will now 
turn, beginning with the implications of Pylyshn's disavowal of any form 
of behavioural reduction. 
1 Richardson (1979 ), p.563. 
26 
TWO KINDS OF BEHAVIOURISM. 
Like Jerry Fodor before him (in his 1975 'The Language of Thought') 
Pylyshn finds that one of the first concerns of a sympathetic analysis of the 
foundations of Cognitive Psychology is to defend the integrity of the 
"explanatory vocabulary of cognition"2 - the intentional vocabulary of 
beliefs, desires, inferences, goals etc. - against behavioural and 
physiological reductions which would deny the scientific validity of these 
·mentalistic terms. 
The first of these reductions comes under the rubric of Behaviourism, 
and may be divided into two strands of argument; philosophical or 
'logical' Behaviourism, and methodological arguments for 
Behaviourism.3 
The first is characterised by a tendency due to the Ryle/Wittgenstein 
school of philosophical analysis to simply deny that there are such things 
as 'mental happenings' on the grounds that mental terms are no more 
than a sort of shorthand for varieties of behaviour: 
It is being maintained ... that when we characterise people by 
mental predicates, we are not making untestable inferences to 
any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness 
we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in 
which these people conduct parts of their predominantly 
public behaviour.4 
We can see from this that Ryle's argument has to do with the alleged 
conditions for the justified appellation of mental terms, as the title of his 
magnum opus 'The Concept of Mind' implies. We can form a working 
definition of this form of Behaviourism after Fodor; 
To qualify as a Behaviourist ... one need only believe that the 
following proposition expresses a necessary truth; For each 
mental predicate that can be employed in a psychological 
2 cf Pylyshn (1984 ), ch. 1. 
3 For this dichotomy see Shaffer (1968 ), plS. 
4 Ryle (1949 ), p.51. 
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explanation, there must be at least one description of 
behaviour to which it bears a logical connection.5 
'Logical connection' here means that at minimum it is sometimes 
possible to deduce the truths of mental ascriptions from the truth of 
behavioural ascriptions.6 As a logical connection is necessary, as opposed 
to contingent, it follows that mental states are logical constructions of 
behaviour: 
For those influenced by the tradition of logical behaviourism, 
(mental) phenomena are allowed no ontological status 
distinct from the behavioural events that psychological 
theories explain. Psychology is thus deprived of its theoretical 
terms except where these can be construed as nonce locutions 
for which behavioural reductions will eventually be 
provided. To all intents and purposes this means that 
psychologists can provide methodologically reputable 
accounts only of such aspects of behaviour as are the effects of 
environmental variables. 7 
The error behind the 'Cartesian Myth' of inner psychological events is 
said to be that of a 'category mistake' which: 
represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one 
logical type or category ... when actually they belong to 
another.8 
Just as we may make the mistake of assuming that there is some single 
thing which is the University of Canturbury over and above the sum of its 
staff, students, buildings etc., there is supposed to have been ingrained 
both into philosophical and common knowledge a taking of members of 
the categories of dispositions (to behave) to be of the category of 
occurrences, which are of a different logical type. For instance, we take the 
attribution of a particular motive to someone to be an assignment or 
5 Fodor (1968 ), p.51. 
6 cf ibid., p.56. 
7 Fodor (1975) p.1. 
8 Ryle, ibid, p17. 
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identification of a particular something 'in his head', whereas according to 
Ryle all we are doing is describing "the sorts of things he tends to try to 
do".9 
In a similar vein Wittgenstein pronounces that: 
an inner process stands in need of an outward criteria.10 
This is not intended as a simple epistemological point. The significance 
of behavioural criteria for psychological concepts is that we allegedly 
cannot mean a), just one process and b), an 'inner' process by a mental 
word such as 'understand'. The invisible something which is held in 
common by all examples of understanding behaviours, but which can 
never be detected over and above the detection of these behaviours, 
cannot be referred to except by referring to these behaviours, so we cannot 
say anything about it. If we can say nothing about a process then we 
cannot say that it is the same process on occasions a, b and c, - indeed, we 
cannot even say that it is a process, for there for there may be no one 
thing or essence in common on all three occasions. Wittgenstein's famous 
example is 'game'; there is no one thing that all things we call a 'game' 
have in common. They don't all have winners and losers (solitaire), 
teams (noughts and crosses), rules (a child playing), or even human 
participants (two computers playing chess against each other). There is 
nothing that it is necessary for every game to have, they have, rather, a 
family of resemblances: "phenomena have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same word for all".11Elsewhere he writes: 
Try not to think of 'understanding' as a 'mental process' at 
all. For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask 
yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, 
do we say 'Now I know how to go on'.12 
In light of this Wittgenstein's attitude to mental processes can be aptly 
summarised by his epithet: 
9 ibid, p.112. 
lO Wittgenstein (1953, section 580. 
11 ibid, section 65, My emphasis. For games see section 66. 
12 ibid , section 154. 
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a nothing will do as well as a something about which 
nothing can be said.13 
These denials of existence can be distinguished from the 
methodological themes which have been prevalent in psychology for 
much of this century. 
As a reaction against the ascendant methodology of the time, 
Introspectionism, Watson in his landmark 1913 paper defined Psychology 
as: 
a purely objective experimental branch of natural science (the 
goal of which is) the prediction and control of behaviour.14 
Consequently, amongst other things: 
the time honoured relics of philosophical speculation need 
trouble the student of behaviour as little as they trouble the 
student of Physics.15 
To the same ends B.F. Skinner was influenced in his early years by 
Bridgeman's Operationalism,16 a doctrine which sought to embed the 
validity of scientific concepts in their relationship to public operations. For 
S.S. Stevens, for instance: 
Science ... is a set of empirical propositions agreed on by 
members of society ... Only those propositions based on 
operations which are public and repeatable are admitted to 
the body of Science.17 
At this time the philosophy of science was dominated by a cluster of 
'isms'; Logical Empiricism, Positivism, Instrumentalism and 
Operationalism, which held in common three basic themes: 
a) there is a theory-neutral 'observation language' which is the 
incorrigible basis of all human knowledge. 
13 ibid , section 304. 
14 Watson (1913 ), p.158. 
15 ibid, p.166. 
16 see Skinner (1931 ), (1979 ), p.41. 
17 Stevens (1939 ), quoted in C.E. Buxton (ed.), (1969). 
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b) scientific knowledge, being empirical, testable and so on, must then 
be about these observables. 
c) talk of unobserved theoretical entities is only meaningful insofar as 
these entities can be translated or reduced into observation terms, or the 
public and repeatable operations of scientific intruments. These sorts of 
attitudes lead to statements like: 
Science is ultimately intended to systematise the data of our 
experience.18 
and; 
A scientific theory ... tells us no more than it appears to tell us 
about the experimental facts, namely that they may be related 
in a particular manner.19 
To this mood can be added two sound methodological principles; 
a) All things being equal, the simplest theory that accounts for the data 
should be preferred. 
b) All things being equal, the weaker more testable and hence more 
falsifiable theory that accounts for the data should be preferred, (the 
empirical content of the theory should be maximised). Thus the more 
directly the theoretical terms and intervening variables are related to the 
data the better the theory. 
If these points are coupled with a liberal dose of old fashioned 
emp1nc1sm the familiar dogmas of Behaviourism emerge; 
mental/ cognitive (i.e. theoretical) terms should be eliminated, or are 
irrelevant; Psychology should concern itself only with the relationship 
between environmental factors and behaviour (i.e. observables). 
Accordingly in his paper 'Are Theories Really Necessary?' Skinner hopes 
that even higher mental processes can be accounted for atheoretically: 
(they) ... appear to be susceptible to formulation in terms of 
differentiation of concurrent responses, the discrimination of 
stimuli, the establishment of various sequences of responses 
and so on. There seems to be no a priori reason why a 
18 Hempel (1959 ), quoted in Feyerabend (1981 ), p.17. 
19 Crombie (1953), quoted in Pears (ed.), (1962 ), p.69. 
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complete account is not possible without appeal to theoretical 
processes ... 20 
It is against this background that Pylyshn presents his case. Whilst 
Behaviourism is not a predominant influence nowadays the 
Behaviourist's arguments are the first fence to be crossed by any attempt to 
establish cognitive 'mentalistic' explanation from first principles. 
His tactic is to argue obliquely that a behavioural taxonomy of 
Psychology would fail to capture a class of generalisations, couched in the 
terms of a pre-existing cognitive vocabulary, which seem to constitute a 
domain appropriate for study irrespective of Behaviourism's greater 
methodological propriety: 
the problem in explanation in Psychology forces us to adopt a 
certain kind of taxonomy of behaviour. Specifically, it is 
because explanations attempt to capture generalisations that 
we find ourselves forced to resort to what I call a cognitive 
vocabulary in revealing certain fundamental patterns of 
intelligent, largely rational behaviour.21 
This point is conveyed by means of an example: 
Suppose you are standing on a street corner and observe a 
sequence of events that might be described as follows; A 
pedestrian is walking along a sidewalk. Suddenly the 
pedestrian turns and starts to cross the street. At the same 
time, a car is travelling rapidly down the street towards the 
pedestrian. The driver of the car applies the brakes. The car 
skids and swerves over to the side of the road, hitting a pole. 
The pedestrian hesitates, then goes over and looks inside the 
car on the drivers side. He runs to a telephone booth at the 
corner and dials the numbers 9 and 1.22 
Question: Why did the pedestrian go to the phone booth ? 
20 Skinner (1950 ), p.215. 
21 Pylyshn op cit. p.2. 
22 'b'd 3 l l I P· . 
32 
Presumably there will exist in principle a true explanation of these 
events in terms of Physics, Chemistry, and/ or an objective description of 
behaviour. However, notwithstanding the enormous practical difficulties 
inherent in any account of human action in these terms (sheer length 
being predominant amongst these), it is also true that explanation is 
relative to the explainer's interest, and to the sorts of questions asked 
before the investigation has begun. Thus truth is not a sufficient condition 
for explanation. Pylyshn conveys this idea in terms of the referential 
opacity of the word 'explains'.23 Roughly speaking, the modus operandi of 
deductive nomological explanation - the classical interpretation of 
theoretical explanation - is the subsumption of the 'facts' under a natural 
law or lawlike generalisation. But there are no a priori limitations on 
what can count as the initial fact, and you can generalise over anything 
that occurs more than once. Hence Pylyshn argues that as long as we are 
interested in the whys, whats and wherefores of rational human 
behaviour , explanation must use the intentional terms which are the 
initial explananda, i.e. belief, memory, knowledge, desire, recognition etc. 
It is only when described in these terms that regularities emerge to be 
generalised about. 
A thoroughly objective behavioural account of the above event would 
presumably amount to an exhaustive catalogue of movements in the 
presence of objects, down to the number of footsteps taken and which 
finger is used to dial, for this would seem to be the only level of 
description which is appropriately free of mentions of aims, goals, 
intentions and the like. This runs into difficulties when we consider that 
there may, for all we know, be 2000 ways of taking a step or dialling a 
phone number. What laws could the very unique and rare sequence that 
actually occurred be subsumed under ? Yet upon what grounds can a 
Behaviourist group together instances of behaviour in order to have 
something to generalise about without hiding teliological or intentional 
notions in the new description ? A telephone for instance is essentially a 
device with a certain use, - communication, - thus it has scant a priori 
bounds upon its physical structure. How then can behavioural 
interactions with telephones have anything in common without some 
notion of use, purpose or intention lingering in their description ? The 
cognitive vocabulary systematises an otherwise massively complex world. 
23 'b'd 4 l l I P• , 
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If a person knows how to get out of a building, and believes 
the building to be on fire, then generally he will set himself 
the goal of being out of the building, and use his knowledge 
to determine a series of actions to satisfy this goal. The point 
is that even so simple a regularity could not be captured 
without descriptions that use ... mentalistic terms ... because 
there is an infinite variety of specific ways of 'knowing how 
to get out of the building' of coming to 'believe that the 
building is on fire' and of satisfying the goal of being out of 
the building. For each combination of these an entirely 
different causal chain would result if the situation were 
described in physical or strictly behavioural terms. 
Consequently the psychologically relevant generalisations 
would be lost in the diversity of possible causal 
connections. 24 
By this token the pedestrian example would be related to a series of 
generalisations that went something like 'Generally, if a person believes 
he/ she has witnessed an accident, and infers that medical assistance has 
not already been summoned, he/ she will desire to call for assistance ... ' 
and so on. Unlike any physical law that it may be possible to formulate, 
the cognitive generalisation will be counterfactual supporting; for 
instance, the exact same accident physically speaking would not inspire the 
pedestrian to phone for help if he believed that he was on a movie set and 
that it was a harmless stunt. Conversely, an alteration in the physically or 
behaviourally described sequence does not necessarily change the 
cognitive sequence; for instance, it makes no difference if the pedestrian 
walks, runs or crawls to the phone box. Hence beliefs and desires predict 
where behavioural and situational facts will not. 
This is tied up with the stimulus independence of cognitive behaviour. 
It is granted nowadays that: 
virtually no candidate physical properties (for example 
particular physical features) are either necessary or sufficient 
for a person perceiving some situation in a certain way - for 
perceiving the stimulus as a something in the distal scene.25 
24 Pylyshn (1980 ), p.112. 
25 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.13. 
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To perceive-as is an epistemic state, thus we cannot be guarantied that 
our pedestrian will form a certain particular set of beliefs in a given 
situation on any two occasions, even if the stimulus conditions are exactly 
the same. The events may be 'taken' in different ways, to quote the adage, 
'perception is theory laden', which is another way of saying that 
perception depends as much upon pre-existent beliefs as it does upon 
stimulus conditions.26 To summarise: 
it is ... the environment or the antecedent event as seen or 
interpreted by the subject rather than as described by physics, 
that is the systematic determiner of actions, and ... actions 
performed with certain intentions rather than behaviours as 
described by an objective natural science like Physics, that 
enter into behavioural regularities.27 
The same argument applies to the fact that the sequence of behaviours 
are in principle predictable from the laws of nuerophysiology coupled 
with knowledge of the pedestrian's initial nuerophysiological state and 
certain assumptions about physiology and anatomy. Despite this the actual 
sequence of neural events which led to the dialling of 9's and 1 's in the 
above example are neither necessary nor sufficient for the act being an 
instance of dialling for help. In the first case we can imagine exactly the 
same sequence of events cognitively speaking being realised by a martian 
or an automaton with nothing physiologically in common with the 
pedestrian. In the second case we can imagine that the phone number of 
the emergency services is composed of 2's and 3's so that the given 
physiological sequence has a different effect. Consequently the 
physiologically described sequence is psychologically indeterminate. 
It might be replied to this that whilst the establishment of a cognitive 
vocabulary for the making of useful generalisations may have force 
against methodological behaviourism, the utility of certain descriptive 
terms does not imply that the things that they refer to actually exist as a 
separate kind of thing. It could be held that intentional generalisations are 
a sort of useful category mistake; that what we really mean when we say 
26 cf Fodor and Pylyshn (1981). 
27 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.9. 
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that someone believes or intends such and such is that he/ she is inclined 
to behave in a certain way (Ryle) does not deny that a large number of 
ways of behaving might be cogently summarised using the words 
'believes', 'intends' etc. 
That Pylyshn specifically disavows this interpretation is an important 
lemma in his argument. He is thus not merely saying that cognitive 
generalisations are useful and systematise an unruly domain, but also 
countenancing a class of entities to which the cognitive/intentional 
generalisations refer, and which are not even in principle reducible to facts 
about behaviour, the brain, or the environment, that is; 
the kind predicates of the special sciences cross-classify the 
physical natural kinds.28 
For a superior level of explanation to reduce a subordinate level the 
types of the former must reduce to the types of the latter. The physiological 
reductionist for instance argues for the identity of neurological and 
cognitive event types. That every cognitive event token is a neurological 
event is uncontroversial; this is the supposition that all cognitive events 
are brain events. But only type identity ensures the reducibility of 
cognitive laws to neurological laws.29 By the same token, Pylyshn is 
concerned to show that his cognitive level phenomena do not stand in a 
type-type relation with any other level of explanation: 
(the cognitive taxonomy) is not only more abstract than 
(Physics and Biology) it classifies events in equivalence 
classes whose boundaries typically do not coincide with the 
boundaries of classifications based on the other sciences. (In 
Psychology as in all the special sciences) in each case 
generalisations from each science are stateable only over their 
own special vocabulary; consequently, the lawlike 
generalisations of these sciences are not reducible to some 
finite combination of physical laws. Each category ... stands in 
a type token relation to categories of Physics, which means a 
28 op. cit., p.18. 
29 cf Fodor (1975 ), ch. 1. 
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category ... cannot be reduced to a finite disjunction of the 
categories of Physics.30 
COMPUTATION AND COGNITION. 
Given that people behave in accordance with their beliefs, desires, 
hopes, fears and so on, in what fashion can these entities enter into 
psychological generalisations when their objects may be non-existent, or 
not credibly in a causal relation with the psychological subject ? How can 
my behaviour be influenced by my beliefs about unicorns, future events, 
the north pole or Jupiter ? Certainly not by means of any causal 
relationship or disposition I may have towards these things. It becomes 
necessary to posit the existence of internal representational states: 
the causes of ... behaviour are not literally numbers, 
anticipated future events, or other 'intentional objects', but 
rather some physically instantiated internal representation of 
such things.31 
How can the state transitions (of a computer) depend both on 
physical laws and on the abstract properties of numbers? The 
simple answer is that this happens because both numbers and 
rules relating numbers are represented in the machine as 
symbolic expressions and programs and it is the physical 
realisation of these representations that determines the 
machine's behaviour.32 
There are two strands to this proposition, the first of which is the 
'proprietry vocabulary hypothesis'. This is the idea that there is a unique 
and exclusive level of description appropriate for the expression and 
explanation of cognitive phenomena, and that the vocabulary of this level 
of description is that of computational alogarithms: 
the privileged vocabulary claim asserts that there is a natural 
and reasonably well defined domain of questions that can be 
30 Pylyshn (1984), p.21. 
31 ibid, p.26. 
32 Pylyshn (1980 ), p.113. 
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answered solely by examining 1) a canonical description of an 
alogarithm (or a program in some suitable language ... ), and 
2) a system of formal symbols (data structures, expressions), 
together with ... a 'regular scheme of interpretation' for 
interpreting these symbols as expressing the representational 
content of mental states (i.e., as expressing what the beliefs, 
goals, thoughts and the like are about, or what they 
rep resent). 33 
Succinctly, this is the domain of "cognitive rule governed processes 
acting on semantically interpreted representations".34 
The second strand to the proposition is the tripartate organisation of 
explanatory levels which this necessitates. These levels are: 
1) the biological or physical level. 
2) the symbolic or functional level. 
3) the semantic or intentional level. 
Allegedly each level in ascending order instantiates and thus explains 
the basic working principles of the one above, whilst each level in 
descending order owes its existence to those generalisations which cannot 
be stated in or captured by the next level down. Pylyshn refers to this tri-
level organisation as "the basic assumption of cognitive science ".35 
Our first priority when confronted with a putative cognitive regularity 
is to explain it in the most parsimonious way possible. This is Occam's 
familiar methodological principle. Hence if a cognitive phenomena can be 
subsumed under physical or biological principles then we need go no 
further. 36 But as we have seen, a physical explanation of cognitive process 
is unlikely to pertain, in which case we must refer the explanation 
'upwards' to the symbol level. At this level formal symbols are thought to 
be manipulated by alogarithmic or computational processes. Those 
cognitive generalisations which cannot be captured at this level must be 
referred to the semantic or intentional level, which is also the level of 
33 ibid, p.116. 
34 Pylyshn (1981 ), p.25. 
35 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.131. 
36 cf ibid. 
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ordinary language, folk psychological ascriptions of beliefs, desires, hopes 
and the like.37 This is the 'instantiation hierarchy'. 
Conversely in top-down mode, we proceed from the epistemically 
proximate, - the ubiquitous beliefs, desires and behaviours due to these 
which are our immediate 'things to be explained', - and seek to explain 
these regularities by exhibiting them as the product of symbol level 
computational processes. This tactic is a refinement of the hypothetico-
deductive method of Theoretical Explanation, where we understand the 
latter as being in contrast with Genetic Explanation or Historical 
Explanation for instance.38 We can see this by considering two comments 
on this form of theory by Wilfred Sellars: 
theories about observable things ... explain empirical laws by 
explaining why observable things obey to the extent that they 
do, these empirical laws.39 
This is done by;-
explain(ing) the behaviour of objects of a certain domain by 
'identifying' these objects with systems of objects of another 
domain, and deriving the laws governing the objects of the 
first domain from the fundamental laws governing the 
objects of the second domain.40 
Compare this with Pylyshn's comments: 
As ... realists we propose as the next step exactly what solid-
state physicists do when they find that postulating certain 
unobservables provides a coherent account of a set of 
(observed) phenomena: we conclude that the (symbolic) 
codes are 'psychologically real', (and) that the brain is the 
kind of system that processes such codes ... 41 
37 ibid, p.131-2. 
38 see Nagel (1961 ). 
39 Sellars (1963), p. 121. 
40 Sellars (1967 ), p.321.. 
41 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.40. 
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In simple terms, 'heat is molecular kinetic energy', - molar properties 
are explained in terms of the properties of the unobserved microscopic 
particles of which they are composed. In the case of Pylyshn's model, 
symbolic processes, which are computational, instantiate the material basis 
for semantic level regularities, and thus explain the latter by allowing 
them to be derived from the principles of the former. In a sense semantic 
level regularities are what we call what are really the manifestations of an 
underlying symbolic level. Similarly, the symbol level regularities are 
explained and instantiated by the biological or physiological level. Thus 
the hierarchy proceeds 'downwards' something like this: 
Firstly: 
being the same thought entails having the same semantic 
content (that is, identical thoughts have identical semantic 
contents).42 
Then: 
to be in a certain representational state is to have a certain 
symbolic expression in some part of memory. That 
expression encodes the semantic interpretation.43 
or: 
symbolic codes ... reflect all the semantic distinctions 
necessary to make the behaviour correspond to the 
regularities that are stated in semantic terms.44 
This statement, we will see, encapsulates the essence of a view of 
cognition which I shall argue is false. 
Then we have at the physical level: 
42 ibid, p.43. 
43 ibid, p.29. 
44 ibid, p.39. 
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the primitive functions or fixed symbol manipulation 
operations of the cognitive system.45 
This is the 'Functional Architecture', the basic resources given in any 
particular programming language, which reflect all the symbolic 
distinctions necessary to make the system's behaviour correspond to the 
regularities which are stateable in symbolic/ computational terms:46 
Mental architecture can be viewed as consisting of just those 
functions or basic operations of mental processing that are 
themselves not given a (symbolic) process explanation. 
These are: 
instantiated in the biological medium.47 
In short: 
Just as physical level principles provide the causal means 
whereby symbol level principles ... can be made to work, so 
symbol level principles provide the functional mechanisms 
by which representations are encoded and semantic level 
principles realised. The three levels are instantiated in an 
instantiation hierarchy, with each level instantiating the one 
above.48 
STRONG EQUIV ALEN CE AND FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE. 
At the beginning of his 1978 paper 'Computational Models and 
Empirical Constraints' Pylyshn asks rhetorically: 
How close a connection can we expect between 
computational ideas and psychological theory? Is the relation 
between the two to remain at the level of exchange of 
4S Pylyshn (1980 ), p.126. 
46 cf e.g. Pylyshn (1984 ), p.259-62. 
47 Pylyshn (1980 ), p.126. 
48 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.132. 
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concepts and metaphorical focusing of attention or can it be 
more intimate ? In particular, can a program be a 
psychological theory ?49 
Pylyshn's answer is 'yes': like Physics, computational psychology does 
not claim that its subject matter merely behaves as-if it follows its laws. 
There is an ambiguity in the notion of computer simulation which 
reflects the relativity of theory to levels of description. For instance: 
When we simulate, say, the motion of planets, the only 
empirical claim we make is that the co-ordinate values listed 
on the print out correspond to the ones that will actually be 
observed ... Which alogarithm is used to compute these 
values is irrelevant to the veridicality of the simulation. In 
other words, for this purpose we do not distinguish among 
alogarithms that compute the same input-output function.50 
A relationship of this kind between computational model and domain 
modelled is called 'weak equivalence'.51 In Psychology Pylyshn wants to go 
beyond this and establish that not only may a computer program qua 
cognitive theory produce the same outputs from the same inputs in the 
domain so described, it may produce them in the same way. In 
computation this is to say that the same alogarithm is used by the brain as 
is presented in a true cognitive theory of that function. (As a first 
approximation, an 'alogarithm' is a completely specified procedure, or a 
mechanical 'recipe' for performing a particular task). This is the privileged 
vocabulary hypothesis again; cognition is alogarithmic and 'strong 
equivalence' is alogarithmic equivalence,52 the imputation being that if a 
computer simulation is strongly equivalent to a cognitive domain then 
that simulation has the status of a cognitive theory which is also true: 
two programs can be thought of as strongly equivalent or as 
different realisations of the same alogarithm or the same 
49 Pylyshn (1978 ), p.94. 
50 Pylyshn (1980 ), p.119-20. 
51 cf ibid, p.117. 
52 cf Pylyshn (1984 ), p.90-1. 
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cognitive process ... if they can be represented by the same 
program in some theoretically specified virtual machine."53 
The appropriate level of comparison is somewhere between weak 
equivalence and complete identity because, of course, brains are made 
from quite different material from computers. Thus whilst the most basic 
operations of the brain will differ, it is implicit in the combination of the 
privileged vocabulary hypothesis (the theory) and the criterion of strong 
equivalence (the degree of equivalence between theory and subject matter) 
that the alogarithmic level of comparison is supposed to specify cognitive 
process down to the level of the most elementary functions that make a 
psychological difference. Accordingly, the privileged vocabulary 
hypothesis serves as an implicit definition of what it is to count as a 
cognitive phenomenon. 
The alogarithmic level corresponds to what we have been calling the 
'symbol level'. Computation is symbolic and computations are described 
in terms of alogarithms. Thus, as we have seen, ontologically speaking 
these alogarithms are instantiated by the non-symbolic hardware of the 
brain, the functional architecture. 54 
To the extent that we have so far elaborated these concepts it would 
seem reasonable to suppose that the functional architecture determines 
the range of possible mental alogarithms, and since the functional 
architecture is instantiated in the biological medium it would seem that a 
piecemeal bottom-up description of the brain - from neurons to groups of 
neurons to functional structures - must carve nature at the same joints as 
would a top-down account where beliefs and desires are explained by 
symbolic computations and these are in turn accounted for in terms of the 
biological architecture. Do we not mean by 'functional architecture' types 
of structures individuated by their physiological or mechanical kinds ? 
Pylyshn cannot agree to this because if he allows that a bottom-
upanatomical taxonomy of the domain makes exactly the same 
distinctions as a taxonomy beginning with the intentional explananda and 
working 'downwards' he is in danger of granting the physiological 
reductionist exactly what he wants, and so endangering the privileged 
vocabulary hypothesis. As the precise relationship between physiology and 
53 op. cit, p.91. 
54 'Mental alogarithms are viewed as being executed by (the) functional architecture' 
((1980), p.123.), the latter being the 'primitive functions that are themselves not 
explainable in terms of symbol manipulation processes' ((1984 ), p.30.). 
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symbolic states is of some importance to my argument we will labour this 
point. 
Materialism. 
The fundamental attraction of the materialist idea that "mental 
processes are nothing but a certain sort of physical process in the brain"55 is 
almost to basic to state. A full analysis would perhaps begin by assimilating 
Truth to Rational Consensus, and then go on to characterise Science as 
more 'rationally consensual' than its competitors,- common sense, divine 
revelation, phenomenological scrutiny etc.56 This yields the idea that the 
true, or most likely to be true, picture of Man and the World is the 
scientific picture, and true realism is scientific realism, whereby: 
in the dimension of explaining and describing the world, 
Science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and 
of what is not that it is not.57 
This quote is revealing insofar as it implies that Science's being the 
measure of all things is equivalent to its arbitrating on questions of 
existence. The measurement is the measurement of what is and what is 
not. This makes substance the basic concept and ties it up with truth and 
knowledge. We can trace this notion back to Aristotle: 
of all these senses which 'being' may have the primary sense 
is clearly 'what a thing is' for this denotes substance, whereas 
nothing else is considered to exist unless by virtue of its being 
a quantity, quality, affection or other determination of 
substance.58 
And this is why materialists seek to account for mental events in terms 
of a level of explanation which refers to what is clearly substantial like 
Physics or Physiology. Note also the difference between this attitude and 
that of Pylyshn quoted earlier, that the task of Psychology is to capture 
55 Armstrong (1980 ), p.34. 
S6 see Armstrong, ch.3. 
57 Sellars (1963 ), p.173. For Scientific Realism see Smart (1963 ), Churchland (1979 ). 
58 Metaphysics, Book Z, I; Warrington (1967) p. 167. 
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generalisations (p25). Presumably Pylyshn would want to say that a theory 
which correctly 'captures the generalisations' is true, therefore we have 
two prima facie different attitudes towards truth, and goals of theory 
writing; to capture the appropriate generalisations, and to characterise 
what sorts of things the inhabitants of a given domain are. 
FUNCTIONAL AND SEMANTIC LEVELS. 
The denial of the reducibility of psychological generalisations to physics 
or physiology, and the necessity of an autonomous level of psychological 
explanation, is argued by Pylyshn in two ways: 
1) It is stated that physiological or biological accounts would fail to 
deal with the problem under the intended interpretation; that is, they will 
fail to address the why, what and how questions posed by such cases as the 
pedestrian example in the same vocabulary as these questions. 58 
This is not a decisive objection because it implies that no framework of 
regularities can be explained except in its own terms. If this were true it 
would ensure that the properties of everyday objects such as tables, cars 
and ice cubes can have no explanation in terms of microscopic particles. In 
fact Theoretical Explanation is usually taken to refer to just this sort of 
explanation, where the regularities in one domain or level of description 
are accounted for in terms of the properties of another domain. This is 
how Hempel describes theoretical explanation: 
... a theory construes (the phenomena to be explained) as 
manifestations of entities and processes that lie behind or 
beneath them, as it were .... by means of which the theory 
then explains the empirical uniformities that have been 
previously discovered.59 
So it is clear that if all phenomena can only be explained in terms of 
generalisations cast at the same level, then we cannot explain why I 
cannot pass my hand through my desk by referring to its microphysical 
structure. Nor can we explain why a burning object gains weight as it 
oxidises. As this is absurd it follows that it is quite appropriate to explain 
59 Hempel (1966 ), p.70. 
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molar psychological phenomena in terms of the qualities of a different 
category of objects. 
In fact if the argument for the autonomy of person level explanation is 
taken to its logical conclusion it removes any need for the postulation of 
inner processes at all, even if they are computational. Wittgenstein has 
shown that it is quite possible to talk about beliefs, for instance, without 
having to suppose that there is any process or object within the confines of 
the person that is a particular belief.60 
2) Pylyshn's main argument against reducibility is the need to capture 
generalisations ,"that is, that there be valid generalisations at one level 
that are not expressible at a lower level".61 This leads him to postulate two 
distinct levels above the physical level, a symbol processing or functional 
level and a semantic or intentional level .62Jn the first case Pylyshn wants 
to say that there are generalisations capturable at the functional level 
which are not capturable at the neurophysiological level because: 
there is multiple realisation of functional states as 
neurophysiological states (thus) functional generalisations 
cannot, in general, be captured in a finite neurophysiological 
description. 63 
Secondly, we cannot rest here with a functional psychology which 
identifies mental states by their function within a closed system (the brain) 
because we must refer to the representational content of these states, and 
generalisations couched in terms of content will not necessarily coincide 
with even functional level generalisations. 64 These points are made via a 
comparison of content governed cogitation with the non-contentful but 
systematic operations of a wristwatch: 
Suppose I wish to explain what I am doing at this moment as 
I sit here in front of my computer terminal, alternatively 
60 see, for instance, his (1953 ), section 578. 
61 cf (1984 ), p.35. 
62 ibid, p.24. 
63 ibid, p.32-3. 
64 Pylyshn equivocates between 'symbol level' and 'functional level'. Strictly speaking -
'generalisations expressible in terms of functional properties of the functional architecture 
are referred to as "symbol level generalisations"'. (1984 ), p.32. 
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typing these sentences and thinking about other things ... I 
think about the Santa Cruz mountains behind me and 
wonder why I didn't go for a walk after lunch instead of 
confining myself to my study. Clearly, my current behaviour 
(including writing this paragraph) is caused by my current 
thoughts and goals. They include the goal of having a 
completed chapter and the thought that there are walking 
trails in the hills behind me. If there is any sense in which 
this behaviour is caused by the non-existent completed 
chapter or by the hills, it is an entirely obscure sense of 
causation. Plainly what is going on is, my behaviour is being 
caused by certain states of my brain. Yet, - and this is the crux 
of the problem - the only way to explain why those states 
caused me to type the specific sentences about walking, 
writing, the mountains, and so on is to say that these states 
themselves are in some way related to the things referred to 
(writing, walking, mountains).65 
The relationship between brain states and mountains will, for familiar 
reasons, be quite anomalous. Intuitively, it seems highly unlikely that 
everyone who glances at the Santa Cruz mountains will immediately go 
into a specific brain state and write at the earliest possible opportunity 
exactly the above words. It is only likely to be a rule that upon glancing at 
such and such mountains one goes into brain state X and makes such and 
such marks upon paper ceteris paribus, where the latter involves an 
almost infinite statement of initial conditions. Moreover, there is nothing 
intrinsic to a brain state that makes it about mountains, as opposed to 
hamburgers, boolean algebra or anything else. So in order to be able to 
state the rules, and in order to have any regularities to state them of, the 
brain states in question must be identified by, and with, contentful 
representational codes, allowing higher order principles such as rationality 
to come into play: 
the brain states must be treated as embodying representations 
or codes for such things as walking and hills. In this way the 
behaviour can be seen as rationally connected to the 
65 ibid, p.27. 
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representational content of these codes by certain rules 
(logical, heuristic, associative etc.).66 
But Pylyshn's further point here is that generalisations couched in 
terms of representational content refer to things extrinsic to the brain 
system and this taxonomy captures different generalizations from a 
description of the system in terms of the operation of its parts relative only 
to the rest of the system. 67 
The operations of a wrist watch, for instance, might usefully be 
described at the functional level. In particular, we can interpret the 
functions of the various cogs and levers in terms of the concept of time. 
Yet in the case of watches nothing is gained by this interpretation because 
the extrinsic/representational description will be type equivalent to a 
physical description. '12.05' will always coincide with just one 
arrangement of levers and cogs. For each time of day there will be just one 
physical description and for each physical description there will be just one 
(or two, am and pm) time of day, hence: 
the semantic interpretation is gratuitous, since the set of 
movements corresponding to the 'interpreted' behaviour is 
co-extensive with, or type equivalent to, the set of 
movements corresponding to the physical description of the 
behaviour.68 
As watches don't have any other sort of behaviour apart from time 
telling, representational and functional descriptions of watches are co-
extensive, hence by the principle of parsimony the representational 
account is otiose. 
According to Pylyshn though, representational and functional 
taxonomies of brains and computers will only contingently coincide, i.e. 
they will often differ and thus capture different sets of generalisations. He 
has already stated that differences in content must always coincide with 
symbol level distinctions (p 40 above), and hence functional distinctions 
underlying these (and biological distinctions under these), so this 
contention rests on the assertion that: 
66 ibid. 
67 "generalizations can be captured by referring to the content of representational states 
that differ from those captured by referring to functional mechanisms." ibid, p.32. 
68 ibid, p.28. 
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a) a given semantic/ content level description may coincide with more 
than one functional level description, so that: 
There may be synonymous expressions - sets of codes with 
the same semantic content. Such codes might be functionally, 
but not semantically, distinguishable. 
b) merely ascribing representational content does not suffice as an 
explanation, for the interactions of the codes so ascribed are left 
mysterious: 
Merely possessing a certain symbolic expression that encodes 
semantic content is, by itself, insufficient to produce 
behaviour ... What is needed is a set of mechanisms to make 
the system run or, ... 'interpret' the symbols. It is because of 
these mechanisms that the symbolic expressions do not 
exhaust what we have informally been referring to as the 
'functional state' of the system.69 
These mechanisms are what Pylyshn refers to as the 'functional 
architecture'. They include the basic biological operations for storing, 
retrieving, sorting and comparing symbols, as well as 'control structure' 
which selects which rules to apply at a given moment. 
The implication of this last distinction is that the semantically 
interpreted symbols and thus the codes which they comprise are somehow 
discrete and autonomous, insofar as symbolic expressions seem to be able 
to maintain their identity despite different operations being performed 
upon them. It is as if each symbol were printed on a card, and thinking 
consisted of arranging them according to certain rules. So with the proviso 
that;-
the mechanisms themselves are not sensitive to the content 
of incoming information, since, by hypothesis, semantic 
content is precisely what is encoded in terms of the symbolic 
codes,70 
69 both ibid.,p.30. 
7o ibid, p.31. 
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-he is free to suggest that the architecture may vary in ways unrelated 
to content whilst the representations remain unchanged. For instance, two 
persons in the same mental state content wise may nevertheless differ 
functionally if they have slightly different memory capacities, or retrieval 
mechanisms of different efficiency, resulting in different response times 
on certain tasks and different patterns of error and competency. 
Consequently: 
generalisations can be captured by referring to the content of 
representational states that differ from those captureed by 
referring to functional mechanisms. 71 
The final inference is that the autonomous psychological level of 
description corresponds to the subject matter of the independently 
developed theory of alogarithmic computation which: 
a) charts a notion of process which is independent of physical 
instantiation, and, 
b) engenders all of the level distinctions within Psychology which 
Pylyshn wants to make. To complete an earlier quote: 
(computer) behaviour is caused by the physically instantiated 
properties of classes of substates that correspond to symbolic 
codes. These codes ... (or symbols (which) are equivalence 
classes of physical properties) ... reflect all the semantic 
distinctions necessary to make the behaviour correspond to 
the regularities that are stateable in semantic terms.72 
Thus brain and computational model are identified in the manner of 
theoretical explanation, viz., 
... the brain is the kind of system that processes such codes 
. ..73 
71 op. cit., p.32. 
72 ibid, p.39. 
73 ibid, p.40. 
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF PYL YSHN'S THEORY. 
Having stated that a semantic level regularity may correspond to more 
than one functional level regularity, there is a sense in which the logical 
next step would be to argue that a given functional level regularity may 
take part in more than one semantic regularity, thus ensuring that the 
semantic and functional domains are doubly cross classified.However, 
Pylyshn disavows any suggestion that there might be participation by a 
given regularity or generalisation at level n in more than one regularity or 
generalisation at level n+l: 
Effects can penetrate upward through levels, since each level 
is supervenient on levels below; that is, there can be no 
difference at level n unless there is some difference at level 
n-1, even though the converse is not true (because of the 
multiple - instantiation property of ascending level; 
supervenience of psychological states on biological states 
entails that there cannot be two different thoughts unless 
there are some biological differences between the two 
underlying brain events).74 
This reflects a consistent and important theme in Pylyshn's theory, 
that: 
differences in content always result in functional differences. 
75 
or more to the point, as the theory aims to explain externally applied 
differences in content in terms of functional differences rather than vice 
versa (beliefs in terms of brain functions as opposed to brain functions in 
terms of beliefs): 
differences in content always and only stem from functional 
(symbol level) differences. 
74 ibid, p.38, his emphasis. 
75 ibid, p,29. 
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There is a sense in which this position could be irenic; a given 
neurological structure may coincide with a subprocedure that is called by 
two or more different symbolic procedures on different occasions. For 
instance, it is quite likely that speech comprehension and speech 
production have procedures in common. Thus two different 'thoughts' 
may coincide in part at the biological level. However, by his emphasis of 
the word 'some' above the implication is that Pylyshn takes this sort of 
case into account. He is thus not saying that different psychological states 
may not have some biological component in common, only that a given 
series of biological events cannot, in its entirety, be taken as identical to or 
co-exstensive with more than one 'thought', symbol or semantic level 
regularity. Psychology is determined by, but not reducible to, neurology. 
This bears upon Hilary Putnam's distinction between 'narrow' and 'wide' 
psychological states. 
A narrow psychological state " ... presupposes the existence of (no) 
individual other than the subject to whom the state is ascribed"76, all 
other states are "psychological states in the wide sense". Thus 'x is jealous 
of y' entails that y exists and is a psychological state in the wide sense. By 
these standards theories of mind which confine themselves to narrow 
psychological states are said by Putnam to make the assumption of 
'Methodological Solipsism'. Insofar as Pylyshn is arguing that there can be 
no psychological distinctions without biological distinctions he is thus 
implying that narrow psychology is a complete psychology, i.e. that the 
organisms contribution - what is materially in his/her head - exhausts 
explanation in Psychology. But whilst this may be an aim of Pylyshn's, 
insofar as he also wants to say that psychological states possess 'of-
themselves' a symbolic content he is in error. His 'symbol level' is narrow 
qua alogarithm, but wide qua symbol. Beliefs require mention of the 
propositions believed and the goals sought, which in turn often require 
mention of individuals other than the believing/ desiring subject, -'John 
believes that the Eiffel tower is in France' etc. So to be precise, Pylyshn's 
attitude is that wide psychology is explainable by narrow psychology, or 
narrow-psychological facts, insofar as semantic level generalisations are 
explained by symbol level regularities, which in turn are equivalence 
classes of biological or neurological properties, which reflect all necessary 
semantic distinctions. 
76 Putnam (1975), p.220. 
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This contention is false. As I will show below, there may be semantic 
level distinctions which are reflected by no distinction in narrow 
psychological state. In other words there may be two different 'thoughts' 
with no biological differences between the underlying brain events. This is 
because the semantics of thought are determined in part by the state of the 
external world. To paraphrase Putnam, 'meaning is not (entirely) in the 
head'. Wide psychological states are underdetermined by narrow 
psychological states. This fact is significant because it is one of Pylyshn's 
central aims, and one of his central claims in opposing the analog school 
of imagery, that functional architecture can and should be determined by a 
chain of theoretical reasoning which begins with wide psychological, 
ascriptions. Witness to this is his contention that because response times 
vary in certain ways with informational factors in certain imagery 
experiments, because the tasks are 'cognitively penetrable', the functional 
architecture in question cannot be that of an analog data structure. 
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AS A CLOSURE PRINCIPLE. 
As we have seen, the assumption that psychological processes are 
alogarithmic amounts to the assumption that all genuinely psychological 
variability is alogarithmic,thus the privileged vocabulary claim amounts 
to an implicit closure principle. In similar fashion the hypothesis that heat 
is molecular kinetic energy implies that any genuine change in 
temperature is, or involves, a change in molecular kinetic energy . 
... the privileged vocabulary claim ... asserts that cognitive 
phenomena can be accounted for solely by appealing to the 
symbolic representations (i.e. the alogarithm and its 
associated data structures). Thus, any differences among such 
phenomena arise solely from the structure of these symbol 
systems - from the way the component parts are put together. 
Thus, no distinctions among phenomena that we would class 
as cognitive distinctions can be due to such things as 
differences in the way the primitive operations that 
constitute the alogarithm themselves function.77 
77 Pylyshn (1980), p.126. 
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In accordance with his strong equivalence claim, the hypothesis in 
question is not that cognitive processes are like alogarithmic processes, 
but that cognitive processes are alogarithmic processes. Consequently the 
claim that is being made is one of contingent identity - contingent because 
it is possible for the theory to be false; i.e. cognition may turn out to be 
only explainable as a neurophysiological function of the brain. Given that 
there are certain phenomena that are extra or pre-theoretically identifiable 
as 'cognitive' (mental arithmetic for instance), the general form of 
Pylyshn's argument for cognitive penetrability is something like this: 
If what is pre-theoretically judged to be an alteration in 
cognitive initial conditions - such as a change in the 
information the subject possesses - produces an alteration in 
output (with respect to previous outputs) then the function 
in question is not attributable to the fixed biological structure 
of the brain. 
The argument is at its most concise and complete in his 1981 paper. 
Firstly he defines analogue process: 
we would count (a) process as analogue if its going through 
particular intermediate stages were a necessary consequence 
of intrinsic properties of the mechanism or medium, . ..78 
Whereas the tacit knowledge account of imagery phenomena: 
claims that how the representation will behave is a function 
of what the person knows about the actual behaviour of the 
things represented, rather than of properties of the medium 
in which it is represented.79 
i.e. the subject knows that certain distance-time effects obtain in the 
world and so 'makes it the case' using some form of symbolic 
computation, that these relations will hold when he/ she imagines the 
events. In general, as we have seen, a large proportion of behaviour must 
be explained in terms of beliefs and goals, - rules and representations, -
78 Pylyshn (1981), p.20. 
79 ibid. 
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because the regularities of interest are physically and behaviourally 
anomalous. Pylyshn continues: 
A corollary of this explanatory claim is that if a certain 
behaviour pattern (or input-output function) can be altered 
in a way that is rationally connected with the meaning of 
certain inputs (i.e. what they refer to, as opposed to their 
physical properties alone), then the explanation of that 
function must appeal to operations upon symbolic 
representations such as beliefs or goal: It must, in other 
words, contain rule-governed cognitive or computational 
processes. A function that is alterable in this particular way is 
said to be cognitively penetrable.SO 
Again: 
A process that is sensitive to the logical content of beliefs 
must itself contain at least some inferential (or other content 
dependant) rule-governed process.Bl 
On the other hand if the analogue approach were true: 
... manipulation of such things as the form of the task and the 
instructions should not have a corresponding, rationally 
explainable effect (provided, of course, that imagery was still 
being used). Otherwise we would have to say that the 
medium changes its properties to correspond to what subjects 
believe about the world, in which case appealing to the 
existence of an analogue medium would serve no function.82 
In other words, if the analogue spatial medium proved to be 
cognitively penetrable it would ipso facto cease to be an analogue medium, 
but something more akin to a 'symbolic representation' in Pylyshn's 
sense, leaving the analogue theorist with the choice of either a), 
abandoning his model completely or b), admitting symbolic components 
so ibid, p.21. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid, p.23. 
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to the model so that it ceased to be analogue in anything but name - for 
Pylyshn allows that symbolic processes may have analogue components 
,83 hence any process which is symbolic in part is ipso facto not analogue. 
That is, cognitive penetrability is a sufficient condition for a process to be 
symbolic. A composite cognitive function is a symbolic process with an 
analogue component,, not an analogue process with a symbolic 
component. 
One point at which Pylyshn's argument is quite secure is his definition 
of an analogue medium. Once Kosslyn's point is taken, that the analogue 
claim refers only to a subset of the cognitive processes involved - the 
visual buffer- he shows no signs of disagreeing with Pylyshn's 
characterisation of the medium as having intrinsic properties, and accepts 
that this part of his model should not be cognitively penetrable.84 Whilst 
there is some uncertainty as to the intelligibility of a medium that is only 
functionally spatial, -i.e. possesses no literal spatial extent,-85 yet is not 
propositional, Pylyshn's use of the word 'intrinsic' seems to confer neither 
more nor less residual propositionality to the medium than Kosslyn's 
description of it as 'innate'. 
Pylyshn's general point against the purported significance of the 
imagery literature taken as a whole takes as its point of departure a 
distinction between two types of explanation, a distinction motivated by 
his conception of cognition as involving three discrete levels. 
The first of these consists in the appeal to "symbolically encoded facts 
about the world and to rules for transforming representations and 
drawing inferences." That is, explanation which involves just the 
resources of the 'symbol' and 'semantic' levels, whose biological 
instantiation is of no concern to Psychology. The second type of 
explanation adverts to "intrinsic lawful relations among properties of a 
particular physical instantiation of a process,"86 or what Pylyshn would call 
the Functional Architecture, which is the type of explanation relied upon 
in Kosslyn's (and others) accounts of mental scanning and image rotation 
effects.A distinction is then made upon this basis between two quite 
different tasks which, a priori, the subjects of imagery tasks could be seen 
as performing: 
83 ibid, p.21. 
84 Kosslyn (1981), p.56. 
85 ibid, p.50. 
86 Both Pylyshn (1981), p.19. 
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1) Using a mental image, focussing attention on a certain object in the 
image and deciding as quickly as possible whether a second named object 
is present in that image, or, 
2)'Imagining' yourself in a certain real situation in which you are 
viewing a certain scene and are focussing directly on a particular object in 
that scene. Then 'imagining' that you are looking for (scanning towards, 
glancing up at, seeing a speck move across the scene towards) a second 
named object in the scene. And then when you succeed in 'imagining' 
yourself finding (and seeing) the object ( or when you see the speck arrive 
at the object), performing a specified task.87 
Now inter alia, the performance of task two will require the accurate 
recreation of all the requisite response latencies, i.e. the image scanning 
and rotation effects detailed in chapter one, as part of the 'task demands' of 
the situation.88 But this does not necessarily require that the subject 
actually use images qua analogue mediums. Subjects are able to 
successfully perform the required tasks, in Pylyshn's view, because they 
possess tacit knowledge of the way things actually happen in the world: 
e.g. ... the subjects would know implicitly that, for instance, it 
takes a moving object longer to move through a greater 
distance, that it takes longer to shift one's attention through 
greater distances ( both transversly and in depth). 89 
This, in turn, is possible because we know independently that human 
subjects have the ability to generate time intervals corresponding to 
known events, and that this mechanism need not have anything to do 
with any purported imagery medium (see Fraisse (1963), Chapters 5 and 7). 
Thus the numerous studies which purport to demonstrate the 
existence of an inner picture-like medium come out as they do because 
subjects interpret their task as being the second one detailed above, and 
because they possess an independent ability to generate all the required 
response latencies. Consequently it is alleged that these studies do not 
87 Paraphrase of Pylyshn's tasks 2a and 2b, p.235, (1984). 
88 cf Newell and Simon (1972). 
89 Pylyshn (1984), p.236. 
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provide demonstrative proof that anything like a mind's eye or imagery 
medium is involved (cf Pylyshn (1984), p.235-7, Kosslyn (1981), p.61). 
Whilst this is a plausible counter-explanation of the phenomena in 
question, it is nevertheless just as non-demonstrative as the analog view. 
It is possible that subjects are performing task 2 instead of task 1, but how 
can we be certain that they are performing task 2? It is difficult to imagine 
what would count as proof either way. 
TACIT KNOWLEDGE. 
There are, I believe, serious problems with the tacit knowledge view as 
long as it is thought of as being an autonomous level of explanation. 
Insofar as it might be said that a sufficient explanation of a psychological 
function can be given just by citing the semantics of its domain, then this 
account is mistaken. The problem comes down to the fact that whatever 
we can cite as someone's tacit or explicit knowledge of something is 
something which we already know. Consequently it is not so much the 
explanation as the thing to be explained. 
Suppose we explained the fact that a very large proportion of the 
population will respond '5' to a request to add '3' and '2' by saying that 
they know that '2' and '3' are '5'. But if the semantics of mathematics 
were different, which is just to say that if normal (strictly speaking) 
human practice had evolved differently over the ages, then then the 
normal response to this question could be a number which sounds like '6' 
or '23'. Consequently the explanation that people respond with '5' because 
they know that 2 plus 3 makes 5 is not counterfactually supporting, an d 
as Pylyshn himself maintains, counterfactual support is a necessary 
condition for explanation as opposed to mere description (see p.6, (1984)). 
That what people 'know' is to a large extent relative to culture also shows 
that knowledge, whether tacit or otherwise, is not an individual capacity. 
Wh 
at a person can be said to know is relative to socially determined truths. 
TASK 1 OR TASK 2 ? 
Cognitive penetrability aside, there are no uneqivocal criteria for 
determining which of these two tasks a given input-output function may 
instantiate. 
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Even if there is no explicit coaching to 'imagine yourself in a certain 
real situation' any element of visual pictorial stimuli can be taken as an 
invitation to do similar. Indeed, the only relatively conclusive evidence 
that tacit knowledge is not behind a given experimental result is the 
demonstration of 'tacit ignorance', and the lack of any 'image scanning' 
correlations between time and distance. 
Kosslyn replies to the assertion that tacit knowledge is the appropriate 
account for putative imagery phenomena by insisting that a), subjects are 
not in any way exhorted to use imagery; b), imagery effects emerge just for 
those properties which are independently assessed as requiring imagery, 
and c), imagery and perception share certain counter-intuitive properties 
quite at odds with subjects expectations (cf Kosslyn (1981), p.61-3). But these 
points can all be countered: 
a) Pylyshn makes it clear that what is at issue is not the extraneous 
contamination of the experimental task by the experimenter's instructions 
to the subjects, but what we have come to know as the Task Demands, 
where "subjects (solve) a task as they interpret it".90 Nothing needs to be 
said to the subjects at all, they simply bring to bear the capacities they feel 
appropriate to the task. One does not have to be told or instructed to use 
one's chess knowledge when given a chess problem. 
b) In Kossl yn, Jolicoeur and Fleigel, 91 to take an example, subjects were 
asked to imagine an object and 'mentally stare' at one end of it. They were 
then asked if the object possessed a certain property. Verification times, it 
turned out, were proportional to the distance from focus point to the 
property on the image (the bee's head for instance) only for those 
properties that a separate group of subjects had rated as requiring imagery 
to verify. But if the use of tacit knowledge is regarded as self initiated in 
the face of appropriate stimuli, then the only significant factors are the 
nature of the stimuli and the kind of questions asked or tasks given. 
Instructions, or the lack of them, are of no consequence. It is a simple 
product of the fact that the tacit knowledge in question is tacit knowledge 
of certain geometrical principles and time and distance relationships that 
the familiar response latencies are elicited only by questions about 
properties that fall within this domain. On any account of cognition a 
90 't op. Cl ,,. 
91 Described in Kosslyn op cit, p.61. 
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question like 'Does the honeybee have a dark head?' will access a different 
kind of knowledge from 'Is the honeybee an animal ?' just because they 
are different kinds of knowledge. The response latencies are data-driven, 
hence it is the spatial extension of the bee itself - as opposed to 
representational media - which cause certain types of response delays in 
most people, and are thought of as requiring imagery by most people, 
including all the experimental subjects. 
c) The third strand of Kosslyn's objection rests upon the assertion that 
the sorts of results obtained when subjects 'consult their images' differ 
from their previously avowed beliefs and expectations. Thus in Finke and 
Kosslyn (1980) it is established that the point at which two dots merge, 
when subjects are asked to imagine them receding into the distance, is 
consistently misjudged by a group of controls who are set the same task 
but asked not to use imagery. Also the width of the imagery field was 
found to be 1.83 times larger than the estimate given by the control group. 
In another experiment summarised in his (1981) paper Kosslyn reports 
that when subjects are asked to imagine a grating of black and white stripes 
receding into the distance, vertical stripes will blur at a greater distance 
than oblique ones, an effect of which none of the subjects knew 
beforehand. How can the tacit knowledge account get around the fact that, 
in general, people's explicit beliefs and prior expectations will not always 
match the results achieved by 'image inspection'? 
The simple reply is that 'tacit knowledge' is tacit., hence implicit. This 
is how Fodor defines tacit knowledge in an early paper: 
if an agent regularly employs rules in the integration of 
behaviour, then if the agent is unable to report these rules, 
then it is necessarily true that the agent has tacit knowledge 
of them.92 
Tacit knowledge is by hypothesis not explicit, and so not accessible to 
consciousness or verbalisation. A good example of this are the rules of 
grammar; the linguistic competency of most people far exceeds their ability 
to state the rules which govern that competency. By the same token it is 
not in the least surprising that subjects verbally expressed prior beliefs and 
expectations do not always match up with the results they or other subjects 
92 Fodor (1968a ), p.636, his emphasis. 
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obtain when the tasks in question are actually performed. As far as 
reaction time goes this result is underlined by Fraisse's report that, in 
general, people are far more accurate when they reproduce a given 
duration (i.e. upon being asked to write for one minute) than they are at 
verbally giving the probable duration of an event (i.e. that 'writing this 
piece took one minute).93 Thus when Kosslyn argues that the regularities 
which appear in the experimental literature are often not known to or 
anticipated by the subjects, Pylyshn is able to reply that subjects are 
recalling and inferring from various past perceptions of actual objects, and 
that; 
It is true of recall in every domain that relevant facts 
frequently can't be accessed without going through some 
particular sequence or access cues. 94 
This is clearly related to the above report that duration reproduction is 
far more accurate than duration estimation. 
In general, there would appear to be no limit to the ability of access 
limited tacit knowledge to account for non-intuitive effects in imagery 
experiments. This is underlined by Pylyshn's comment that tacit 
knowledge,-
could obviously depend on anything the subject might know 
or believe concerning what usually happens in the 
corresponding perceptual situations.95 
On the other hand Pylyshn's criticisms of Kosslyn's position are just as 
easily met. Two of the formers most convincing counter examples are 
described in his (1979) and (1981), (1984). 
The first study involved two experiments very much in the tradition 
of Cooper and Shepard (1973) and Shepard and Metzler (1971). Subjects 
were required to rotate and match probes with a stimulus figure. 'True' 
probes, as opposed to distractors, varied in their goodness of fit in the 
gestalt sense (as measured by independent criteria) with the stimulus 
figure. The finding of significance was that the slope of the relationship 
93 cf Fraisse, op cit, p.210-13. 
94 Pylyshn (1984 ), p.246. 
95 ibid, p.34, his emphasis. 
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between the relative orientations of the figures to be matched, and 
reaction time, varied from probe to probe as a function of the gestalt 
'goodness' of the embedding. On the face of it goodness of fit should effect 
only the final matching stage of the comparison. Thus whilst we could 
expect variations in the y-intercept from probe to probe, we would not 
expect the slope or 'rate of rotation' to be effected. 
On the tacit knowledge view figural complexity and the difficulty of the 
post-rotation comparison task could constrain reaction time in any one of 
a number of ways, the theory having no particular prediction on this 
front. But in a model which relies upon an autonomous non-conceptual 
depictive medium, we would not expect any property of the image per se 
to effect the rate at which it is rotated. 
(this study) provides strong evidence that the process is not 
one in which a stage of holistic analogue rotation of the 
image is followed by an independent stage of comparison ... 
(these results) make it clear that if there is anything which 
might be called 'rotation' in this situation, the whole figure is 
not carried along rigidly. Rather, there must at least be some 
analysis of the original stimulus and some piecemeal 'rotate 
and compare' subprocesses.96 
Whilst a piecemeal rotation model lacks the purity and intuitive 
appeal of the holistic 'image as a whole conception', this is of course 
exactly the tactic Kosslyn uses to reply to Pylyshn's criticism: 
... perhaps the subjects did not encode the entire figure into a 
mental image but encoded only parts that they hoped would 
help in performing the task. If they guessed wrong, they 
fixated again on the figure and re-parsed it, encoding different 
parts into the image. In this case, when the test part 
corresponded to a 'bad' part of the figure (one that violated 
natural parsing procedures), subjects would have to encode 
the figure many times and encode it each time. Thus, the 
effects of angular disparity would be more pronounced for 
'bad' parts (and the difference in slopes would reflect the 
96 Pylyshn (1979), p.27. 
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number of times the figure was re-parsed to find the 'bad' 
part).97 
The second study involved two experiments which followed closely 
the design of Kosslyn, Ball and Reisser (1978). Subjects were asked to 
memorise a map containing a number of visually distinct objects - a beach, 
a castle, a church and so on. They were then asked to image the map and 
to concentrate their attentions on one of the named locations, whilst 
keeping the rest of the map in view in their 'mind's eye's'. Initially 
subjects were asked to scan to a second named location on cue, by 
imagining a speck moving across the map from the first location to the 
second. This of course resulted in neat correlations between imaginal 
distance and reaction time. Subsequently, however, subjects were simply 
asked to give the compass bearing of the second location, in which case all 
correlations between distance and time disappeared. This did not rule out 
the possibility though that subjects used a symbolic representation since 
even in the first experiment the subjects must know the direction of the 
second location if they are able to scan towards it. Thus in the second 
condition subjects were required to first focus on the second place after 
they heard its name, and from this vantage point give the orientation of 
the first place. The instructions stressed the need to see both places before 
making the orientation judgement. The results yielded no significant 
correlation between reaction time and distance between places, underlying 
the earlier result, and implying that subjects performed the task by 
consulting a symbolic representation of the scene, rather than scanning 
across the image.98 
Kosslyn's reply to this is to maintain that scanning need only be 
employed when the part of the object in question is depicted too far 
towards the periphery of the imagery field to be easily discerned: 
One ready account of Pylyshn's finding that subjects could 
judge relative orientation of imaged objects without scanning 
among them rests on the fact that one can 'see' more than a 
single location in an image at the same time. Image 
inspection is not like viewing an object through a small hole 
in a piece of cardboard that must be moved around to infer a 
97 Kosslyn (1981), p.58. 
98 cf Pylyshn (1984), p.243-4. 
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general shape. Thus, subjects conceivably could have 
performed the Pylyshn task without having to scan.99 
A second independent counter-explanation mentioned by Kosslyn is 
that it was found to be necessary to associate relative location information 
with any object or part of object imaged, because it was known that subjects 
could scan to locations off the imagery field. This being true of the objects 
in the Pylyshn experiment, it could well be that subjects performed the 
task without specific recourse to their images, so producing the results 
obtained. Kosslyn could also claim that subjects were using 'blink' 
transformations, a procedure allowed by the analogue model in which 
transformations are equally easy and fast over different distances.1°0 
With a plethora of ready replies to counterexamples at hand it is not 
surprising that Pylyshn remarks " ... it is hard to think of any result which 
could not be naturally accommodated (by the analogue model)".1°1 Yet his 
tacit knowledge account is equally ubiquitous as Kosslyn notes; 
... one can never be sure one has controlled for the effects of 
tacit knowledge in an experiment, in Pylyshn's view. In other 
words, whereas the demand characteristics account may be 
disprovable, Pylyshn's account, resting on implicit task 
demands, is sheltered from such a rude fate.102 
As it stands the issue is to all intents and purposes an impasse. The one 
genuinely powerful argument though is the cognitive penetrability 
criterion. Although the analogue imagery model is still adhered to by 
some, strictly speaking the penetrability argument cannot be met. 
THE STRENGTHS OF COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY. 
1) This criterion is a straight forward extension of the core principles of 
the dominant general theory of cognition in modern Psychology, thinking 
as symbolic computation. One of the most central distinctions in this area, 
from which the cognitive penetrability criterion is derived, is the 
99 Kosslyn (1981), p.59. 
lOO cf ibid, p.59-60. 
101 (1981), p.42. 
102 Kosslyn (1981), p.63. 
64 
distinction between hardware and software. If the symbol level is just that 
part of the system which varies in accordance with what we can roughly 
call the semantics or meanings of 'thoughts', and the functional 
architecture is just that part of the system which is fixed with respect to the 
symbol level, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that no putative 
psychological function which varies with the semantics or meaning of its 
inputs can be instantiated in the functional architecture. The analogue 
theory is not similarly motivated by a general theory of cognitive function. 
There is nothing like the analogue approach to concept learning for 
instance, whereas the computational approach has clear implications for 
this area. 
2) In many ways the case for penetrability is understated. On a strict 
reading of the criterion it is inappropriate to even consider an analogue 
model for imagery, regardless of the evidence, for the model postulates 
architectural functions which vary in accordance with the meanings of 
inputs. In the literature the argument has proceeded as if the central aim 
was to establish that certain subprocesses within the model such as 
scanning or rotation were penetrable or impenetrable but this is already to 
give all the ground that counts to the analog position. If any part of the 
analog model is provisionally allowed to retain cognitively penetrable 
architectural processes the theoretical motivation for showing that other 
parts of the model are penetrable would be lost. If the penetrability 
principle is anything less than exclusive Kosslyn has already won his case, 
for he is concerned to show that only part of his model is cognitively 
impenetrable, and his theoretical background makes no caveats against a 
mixed model: 
... the existence of non-analogue components in a given set of 
processes in no way bears on the truth or falsity of the claim 
that one component is an analogue spatial medium .. .103 
Pylyshn's theoretical position however demands that architectural 
structures play no active part in psychological theory, just as the chemical 
structure of genes plays no part in mendelian genetics. Hence the analogue 
model contravenes basic cognitive principles right from its conception. 
The only way to counter the force of this argument is to show that the 
cognitive penetrability criterion is theoretically ill founded, or is itself at 
103 Kosslyn op. cit., p.57. 
65 
odds with certain empirical results. No debate as to whether tacit 
knowledge has to strain to account for certain counter-intuitive results in 
imagery or perception, or whether the apparent penetrability of a given 
process may be localised allowing adjacent functions to remain analogue, 
is to the point if the principle itself is unchallenged. Given that there is no 
question that imagery phenomena qua input-output function are 
cognitively penetrable, all discussion is pre-empted and the debate is 
resolved. 
If on the other hand, as I will show, the cognitive penetrability 
criterion is seriously flawed, the debate is just as surely resolved in favour 
of the analogue camp, for by Pylyshn's own lights functional architecture 
is the preferred level of explanation for all cognitive phenomena as long 
as it can capture the relevant generalisations (cf p.38 above). So if Kosslyn's 
theory is a) preferred on these grounds, b) fully and specifically accounts 
for the empirical data and c) contravenes no general principles of 
psychological explanation, this view must prevail. If the penetrability 
principle is misguided the distinction between symbolic and architectural 
levels of explanation will break down, which must effect the integrity of 
any supposed domain of tacit, symbolic, knowledge. If we can say of 
imagery 'it isn't tacit knowledge it's an analog/ architectural process' then 
it becomes difficult to see what could count as a criteria to the effect that 
the explanation of such and such a cognitive domain must and can only 
be explained in terms of symbolically instantiated tacit knowledge of 'the 
way things are in the world'. All 'symbolic' cognitive explanation becomes 
provisional and liable to replacement by more parsimonious biological 
accounts as soon as they can be developed. 
A DIGRESSION ON THE FORCE AND SCOPE OF THE COGNITIVE 
PENETRABILITY CRITERION. 
Before continuing we must be clear on the applicability of the criterion. 
Two queries present themselves: 
1) Is not the mere intelligibility of Kosslyn's model a counter-example 
to the penetrability criterion, thus disproving it? 
In a sense yes, because it shows that in principle an erstwhile 'symbolic' 
process may be accounted for otherwise, thus showing that the symbolic 
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account is not necessary ( in the logician's sense of 'necessary') as its 
proponents argue. But arguing for a certain conclusion by presupposing it 
clearly begs the question, and so is an inappropriate tactic in the present 
discussion. 
2) The discussions in the literature point top the issue being as to 
whether certain cognitive functions qua 'processes in the head' are 
penetrable/impenetrable. Consequently the application of the label 
'cognitively penetrable' to a domain on the basis of behavioural evidence 
always leaves it open that certain processes underlying the behaviour are 
not cognitively penetrable even when the range of behaviours in question 
are manifestly and unequivocally penetrable. Pylyshn even explicitly 
accepts this possibility when he writes: 
It should also be noted that being cognitively penetrable does 
not prevent a process from having analogue components: It 
simply says that it should not be explained solely in terms of 
analogues with no reference to tacit knowledge, inference, or 
computational processes.104 
But given that Kosslyn allows such composite models ( page 65) there 
seems to be no reason left to decry analogue spatial media. 
Let us call the interpretation of cognitive penetrability which would 
allow us to judge a domain in general (such as 'imagery tasks') as 
penetrable on the basis of an observed co-variance between the semantics 
of the inputs and behavioural output, and thus having no significant 
behavioural part, the strong interpretation of cognitive penetrability, or 
'SCP'. Let us call that interpretation of the criterion which allows that a 
broad co-variance between input-output behaviour and the semantics of 
stimuli may be consistent with some significant theory relevant part of the 
process being analogue, the weak interpretation of cognitive penetrability 
or 'WCP'. Kosslyn obviously cleaves to WCP, but Pylyshn may be read as 
supporting either. Despite comments such as the one above there are a 
number of reasons for taking SCP to be the received interpretation. 
Firstly, the WCP interpretation makes the criterion toothless. If;-
104 Pylyshn (1981), p.21. 
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... the point of the cognitive penetrability condition is to 
provide a purely functional methodology for deciding 
whether a putative property qualifies as belonging in the 
category of architecture or in the category of cognitive 
process,105 
-then this aim cannot be achieved if every behavioural demonstration 
of penetrability is consistent with some significant part of the cognitive 
process being performed by an analogue or architectural component. The 
postulation of implausible but conceivable analogue components in 
cognitive processes would seem to be limited only by the imagination of 
the theorist. Thus we might suppose that reasoning and conceptual 
thought are achieved by the application of logical operations to sentences 
in English inscribed on some inner screen. Arithmetic could be performed 
by some sort of neural abacus. We feel sure that examples of this kind are 
nonsense but what is the difference in principle between these and 
sensible analogue using models such as Kosslyn's ? If the condition cannot 
preclude the existence of significant analogue components in models of 
cognitive process, then it is powerless against even the most ridiculous of 
analogue using theories. 
Secondly, in Pylyshn's own terms his equivocation stems I think from 
his acknowledgement that there are conceivable cognitive models which 
are nevertheless lacking in explanatory adequacy. This principle emerges 
from his discussions of Anderson's indeterminacy of representation 
claim: 
(the) general point is that it is not possible for behavioural 
data to uniquely decide issues of internal representation. The 
reason is that one cannot just test questions about a 
representation in the abstract. One must perform tests of the 
representation in combination with certain assumptions 
about the processes that use the representation. That is, one 
must test a representation-process pair. One can show that 
given a set of assumptions about an image representation 
and a set of processes that operate on it, one can construct an 
equivalent set of assumptions about a propositional 
representation and its processes. Or one can be given a 
105 't 42 op. Ct ,, p. . 
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propositional theory and construct an equivalent imagery 
theory. (In general) Given any representation-process pair, it 
is possible to construct other pairs with different 
representations whose behaviour is equivalent to it. These 
pairs make up for differences in representation by assuming 
compensating differences in the processes.106 
Anderson creates an existence proof for a cognitive model described in 
terms of processes E*, T*, and D*, by defining each of these processes in 
terms of another model described in terms of stimuli S, encoding 
functions E, internal representations I, internal representation 
transformation functions T and representation to response decoding 
functions D, which by hypothesis use different representations, yet map 
the same stimuli to the same response. Once a one to one mapping f is 
postulated which maps the encodings of stimuli in the target theory onto 
the encodings of stimuli in the mimicking theory - i.e. the internal 
representations of one theory onto the internal representations of the 
other - Anderson alleges that internal distinctions have been preserved 
such that the two theories assign corresponding representations to the 
same stimuli. With fin hand he also possesses the resources to define E*, 
T*, and D* in terms of the first model in such a fashion as to "prove" that 
the second model must map the same stimuli to the same responses as the 
first model. Thus: 
E*(S) = f(E(S)); 
for each T*, T* = f.TJ-1; 
and for each D*, D* = DJ-1. 
Pylyshn's point though is that: 
... even if some phenomena could be predicted equally well 
by either of two different representation-process pairs, one 
would not be licenced to conclude that the two systems were 
indistinguishable in general or ... that they would lead to 
equally explanatory theories. 
106 Anderson (1978), p.262-3. 
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He goes on to say: 
One of the things that makes a certain use of a model 
explanatory is that it appeals to general principles and 
mechanisms ... Unless the mechanisms posited in an account 
of experimental findings have some independent motivation 
other than to account for the data at hand, they can justifiably 
be accused of being ad hoc.107 
Thus whilst Anderson's feat of mathematical gymnastics is quite 
clever, it is not succinct, recalling that by the standards of strong 
equivalence the computational complexity of a model is psychologically 
real if that model is true. The most explanatory model of a cognitive 
process is the least complex and most principled one that fits the data. 
Anderson's model is needlessly complex and unconstrained by any 
psychological principles. By the same token a maximally explanatory 
model cannot countenance arbitrary analogue components. A given 
analogue representation and process pair may be made formally 
equivalent to a second non-analogue representation and process pair by 
compensating for the rigidity of the analogue representation (part of the 
functional architecture) with additional flexibility of its accompanying 
process. But such a tactic would violate the original reasons for postulating 
a fixed functional architecture with respect to the symbol level in the first 
place, which is to provide a mechanism for the manipulation of token 
symbols. Thus once the conceptual geography of a domain is mapped out 
the architecture is arranged around (as it were) the symbolic interactions 
posited in explanation. Thus we cannot allow the architecture/symbol 
balance to be continuously variable in order to prove some obscure formal 
point. The most principled interpretation is that all input-output 
behaviours judged as symbolic or involving meaning are performed 
(only) by the symbol level. 
Thirdly, and most significantly, to say that behaviour is representation 
governed in Pylyshn's theory is to apply to it the privileged vocabulary 
hypothesis, which states that 'cognitive phenomena can be accounted for 
solely by appealing to the symbolic representations (i.e. the alogarithm and 
its associated data structures)'(p.53 above). But the criteria for appealing to 
107 Both Pylyshn (1979) p.384. 
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a representational and thus alogarithmic account are precisely those for 
judging a process to be cognitively penetrable. We say that a behaviour 
pattern is cognitively penetrable if it may be altered in a way that is 
"rationally connected with the meaning of certain inputs" (p.55 above). 
But the regularities which we seek to capture with a symbolic 
computational theory, which cannot be captureed in behavioural or 
physiological terms are those of informed intelligent behaviour, acting 
upon beliefs, desires and deductive reasoning. 
Pylyshn gives three criteria for behaviour to be explained by rules and 
representations: 
... we would describe the behaviour as being governed by 
representations and rules if the relation between 
environmental events and subsequent behaviour, or the 
relations among functional states themselves, could be 
shown to be ... a) arbitrary with respect to natural laws, b) 
informationally plastic, or c) functionally transparent.108 
Now, an informational effect upon a cognitive process or behaviour, -
being an effect which is of course 'rationally connected with the meaning 
of the inputs' - will always be arbitrary with respect to natural laws. I can 
tell you to meet me at 7pm, or write you a note, or tap it out in morse on 
the table - and each of these in a different language. None of these will 
have sufficient physical commonalities to partake of the same natural law. 
Neither can there be any natural law relating what I say, when this is just 
described as a noise of a certain sort, with what you subsequently do, for 
that will depend upon your beliefs and expectations. 
The second condition of informational plasticity is so similar to 
cognitive penetrability that it needs no comment: 
... epistemic mediation ... is implicated whenever the relation 
between environmental events and behaviour can be 
radically, yet systematically, varied by a wide range of 
conditions that need have no more in common than that 
they provide certain information ... 
The last criterion of functional transparency,-
108 Pylyshn (1980), p.120. 
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reflects the multiple availability of rules governing relations 
among representational states. Wherever quite different 
processes appear to use the same set of rules, we have a prima 
fade reason for believing that there is a single explicit 
representation of the rules, or at least a common shared 
subprocess, rather than independent identical multiple 
processes,109 
This is on a par with the rational variability of cognitively penetrable 
processes, for each and every one of a set of processes which 'appear to use 
the same set of rules' is by hypothesis following or varying in accordance 
with some rule. We know from the context that the rules in question will 
be rules of symbolic computation, and thus that their variability will be, 
roughly speaking, 'semantic' or 'rational'. Consequently, the processes in 
question will vary in a way rationally or semantically connected with the 
meanings or semantics (etc.) of their inputs, whether these are sensory 
stimuli or other cognitive processes. 
Thus the conditions for a cognitive process or behaviour pattern being 
cognitively penetrable are identical to the conditions for a behaviour 
pattern or cognitive process being governed by, and thus properly 
explained in terms of, rules and representations. But once this is granted 
we are governed by the privileged vocabulary hypothesis which maintains 
"that cognitive phenomena can be accounted for solely by appealing to the 
symbolic representations" (p.53 above). And explanations are by their very 
nature general (we don't say that 'most heat is molecular kinetic energy, 
but some of it isn't'), thus all cognitively penetrable behaviour patterns 
must be explained solely by appealing to symbolic representations, and 
this is SCP. 
Thus the privileged vocabulary hypothesis is a closure principle, as is 
the cognitive penetrability condition; both engender a theory of cognition, 
but they also define what is to count as a cognitive process. This is not 
surprising because the principle of theoretical explanation is, roughly, to 
explain overt phenomena by hypothesis as to what the underlying 
processes 'really are' (cf p.39 above). 
Perhaps one could try to hold on to WCP by arguing a degree of 
indeterminacy or unavoidable error in the application of either the 
109 Both (1980), p.121. 
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cognitive penetrability criterion or the conditions for representationality. 
It could be allowed that unavoidable indeterminacies in the application of 
the conditions allow cognitive penetrability to be adjudged of cognitive 
processes which are in point of fact not 100% alogarithmic/symbolic. 
There are two ways of interpreting this charge: In the first case we could 
take it to engender a statement like 'conditions a-c above and the cognitive 
penetrability criteria are 100% acceptable, but they cannot be applied with 
100% accuracy.' This is an epistemological point which bears upon the 
problem of inductive indeterminacy which is shared by all scientific 
theories. It is always possible for more than one theory to be constructed 
which is consistent with any finite set of data. As Popper has arguedllO 
there is a sense in which no amount of evidence can conclusively verify a 
theory. No matter how many black crows have been observed it is always 
possible that there are white crows that nobody has seen. Although it has 
never been observed, lead occasionally turns to gold. But this 
indeterminacy should not effect the claims of the theories themselves (not 
at least since the demise of Logical Positivism). We say, 'all crows are 
black, though we are only 98% sure of this', from which it does not follow 
that 98% of crows are black. Similarly, once the appropriate conditions are 
satisfied, there will be no non-symbolic content amongst the underlying 
cognitive processes. Although the conditions cannot be applied infallibly, 
the theoretical claim is that if correctly applied, the underlying processes 
are determinately as the theory says they are. As Pylyshn notes in this 
respect Psychology is in the same boat as the physical sciences, thus the 
indeterminacy involved in ascribing mental representations is (allegedly) 
no more than that involved in ascribing hypothetical entities in Physics.111 
To conclude; it is clear that the interpretation of the Cognitive 
Penetrability condition which follows from a detailed examination of 
Pylyshn's conception of cognitive process is the strong interpretation, 
'SCP'. From this it follows that as long as the cognitive penetrability 
condition is valid, any domain judged as being cognitively penetrable 
(epistemological considerations aside) can have no significant 
architectural and hence 'analogue' component. In other words there is no 
way around cognitive penetrability - this having been the predominant 
tactic of the analogue school. One cannot leave cognitive penetrability and 
llO cf Popper (1929). 
111 Pylyshn (1979), p.383. 
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the associated criteria for 'representationality' uncriticised whilst trying to 
say that there is, nevertheless, room for analogue processes. Kosslyn's 
theory does not have any general conception of cognitive explanation to 
wield against the exigencies of Pylyshn's system; in this situation the 
systematic theory must inevitably prevail. The argument looks like this: 
What is cognitive is (identical with what is) alogarithmic. 
What is cognitively penetrable is cognitive (by the identity of 
conditions a-c above with the criteria for cognitive penetrability). 
Therefore, what is cognitively penetrable is identical with what is 
alo gari thmic. 
Therefore, if a process or behaviour is cognitively penetrable it can 
have no significant architectural or analogue component. 
Therefore, either the analogue theory of imagery is false, or the 
cognitive penetrability condition and the associated privileged vocabulary 
hypothesis are false or incoherent. 
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III. INTENSION, EXTENSION, AND SYMBOLIC EXPRESSIONS. 
INTENSION AND EXTENSTON. 
Let us go back to a passage quoted earlier; 
... if a certain behaviour pattern (or input-output function) 
can be altered in a way that is rationally connected with the 
meaning of certain inputs (i.e. what they refer to as opposed 
to their physical properties alone), then the explanation of 
that function must appeal to operations upon symbolic 
. 1 operations .... 
The crucial point as far as Pylyshn is concerned is that behaviour alter 
in correspondence with a change in the 'meaning' of the input, for the 
class of changes in behaviour due to changes in input will include 
instances where the behavioural change (change in output) is due to non-
symbolic, architectural functions. Hence we cannot say, for instance, that 
'large' alterations in output must be due to symbolic processing and 
'small' must be due to aspects of the functional architecture (unless we are 
prepared to define 'small' as less than 20 milliseconds).2 Larger response 
durations could well be due to iterations of basic architectural functions. 
Neither can symbolic processes be identified by means of the correlations 
obtained between input and output. Strong correlations involving large 
changes in reaction time or type of response may be due to purely 
architectural considerations in split brain patients or people under the 
influence of drugs, whilst very small and subtle changes may be due to the 
nature of the alogarithmic processes in question, such as the differences in 
reaction time that might ensue when mental division is performed by the 
trial and error multiplication of the divisor, as opposed to dividing a 
column at a time and carrying the remainder. 
1 seep. 55 above. 
2 see Posner (1978). 
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Neither can we isolate symbolic psychological functions by an 
examination of the inputs involved. Initially it may seem that response 
variance in a study where the experimental stimuli are undifferentiated 
expanses of colour must be due to just the physical properties of the 
inputs, and thus mediated by non-symbolic processes. However, the 
experiment could be an investigation into the psychological reality of 
propositional logic, where each colour stands for a logical symbol. 
Similarly, an experiment utilising mathematical formulae or passages 
from a learned text could well be just a test of perceptual discrimination 
where the subject has to count the number of x's or vowels on the page as 
quickly as possible. 
Inferences drawn about the nature of psychological processes from 
reaction timed data, or any other dependant variable, depend upon the 
validity of the ancillary hypotheses held. It is these hypotheses which 
shape the significance of the empirical data.3 Reaction time is seen as a 
potentially fallible and indirect measure of underlying cognitive processes, 
to be interpreted in the light of other assumptions: 
Whereas, often, there is a correlation between the duration of 
a physical event and such purely alogarithmic properties as 
the number of steps taken, (and) the particular steps taken .... 
that is not always the case. There are certainly cases in which 
time differences arise from properties of the physical 
realisation that are unique to the particular occasion or 
instantiation ... and therefore are, in general, irrelevant to the 
alogarithmic, or process, explanation. 
He continues: 
Using a computer as an example, we can see that some time 
differences might arise because a signal has farther to travel 
on a particular ... occasion because of the way the machine is 
wired or the way the alogarithm is implemented in it, or that 
some differences may arise from variable-delay effects unique 
to specific occasions. An example of the latter case is the 
delays caused by the distance a moveable arm must travel in 
making a disk access in some implementation and on certain 
3 Pylyshn (1984), p.126, 128. 
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occasions, unrelated to the content of the memory or the 
alogarithm used ... Consequently ... measuring the times 
involved does not help us distinguish different candidate 
alogarithms ... time measurement alone cannot be taken as 
measurement of the alogarithmic process.4 
Hence the important supposition that if behaviour alters in accord 
with the 'meaning' of the input, the input-output function is tapping 
alogarithmic or symbolic constituents of mental function, thus the 
appropriate explanation is cast in these terms. We would not for instance 
expect the amount of time it takes for a moveable arm to reach a particular 
point on a disk to depend upon the meaning of the input, although it may 
depend upon its length or intensity, - and the same can be said for the 
functional-architectural aspects of human memory. 
We can rephrase and simplify the cognitive penetrability criterion like 
this: 
When behaviour alters in correspondence with an alteration 
in the meaning of the input, we can infer that the 
behavioural change is due to a symbolic/ alogarithmic change 
(in state) as opposed to a non-symbolic architectural or 
physiological change. 
The supposition underlying this must be that changes in the meaning 
of inputs will be mirrored by changes in symbolic state, and this 
independently of any change in output that may occur. 
The first part of this statement reflects Pylyshn's contention that: 
symbolic codes ... reflect all the semantic distinctions 
necessary to make the behaviour correspond to the 
regularities that are stated in semantic terms.5 
This is a different assertion from the following, however: 
symbolic codes ... reflect all the semantic distinctions 
sufficient to make the behaviour correspond ... 
4 ibid, p.126, 127. 
5 cf p.40 above. 
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This is the significance of Pylyshn's rejection of behaviourism. His 
position is that mental states bear only a contingent relationship with 
subsequent behaviour .. To deny this is to allow that mental states bear a 
logical or necessary relationship to subsequent behaviour in the fashion of 
Logical Behaviourism, a move which must deny representational 
psychology of its domain. The criteria for representationality entail that 
the way cognitive or representational processes unfold have a high degree 
of independence from the organism's causal interactions with the world. 
Mental states would become synonymous with disjunctions of behaviour 
in given stimulus situations (see chapter II). But this is what would be 
entailed by saying that a given symbolic (mental) state is sufficient for a 
certain behaviour to occur. This is equivalent to the assertion that 'if 
mental state x occurs, behaviour y must invariably ensue', a logical 
entailment which would enable us to "deduce the truths of mental 
ascriptions from the truth of behavioural ascriptions".6 Mental states 
would become equivalent to the propensity to behave in such and such a 
way. Contrariwise, on the representational model of mind a particular 
psychological state such as the belief that the building is on fire, may lead 
to a diverse variety of behaviours which have nothing in common except 
that they all constitute ways of getting out of the building. This belief then, 
is only contingently related to any one of these behaviours. Given 
appropriate other conditions, such as the desire to immolate oneself, the 
same belief may lead to no behaviour at all. Thus, saying that a particular 
symbolic state is necessary to make behaviour correspond to certain 
semantic regularities is to say that, given certain initial conditions, a 
particular behaviour will ensue. But it remains allowable that the self 
same symbolic state will lead to a different behaviour, or to no behaviour 
at all. Consequently, we have the position, which is implicit in the concept 
of 'symbolic expression', that the identities of symbolic expressions are are 
not logically dependent upon the behaviours which they may cause or be 
conjoint causes of. They must therefore be determinate 'in the head' over 
and above dispositions to behave. 
Given that the 'meanings' of internal symbolic states are not 
derivative of subsequent behaviour, (although behaviour is evidence for 
the postulation of the presence of this or that symbolic state in a given 
situation), the cognitive penetrability criterion relies upon a construal of 
6 cf p.28 above. 
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the relationship between cognitive input and process which ensures or 
allows that changes in the meanings of inputs are mirrored by changes in 
inner symbolic states or expressions. (The condition would serve no 
purpose if one could infer a change in symbolic state merely from the fact 
that a change in input leads to a change in output. This may happen and 
the change 'in the head' may be just in the functional architecture. Strictly 
speaking, the input-output function may be exactly the same in both 
symbolically mediated and non-symbolically mediated cases, thus the 
crucial step in the argument is the inference that if the meaning of the 
input has changed, then the cognitive processes involved are symbolic, 
which follows from the supposition that all relevant semantic distinctions 
are mirrored by symbolic distinctions. Succinctly, a change in the meaning 
of the input is a necessary condition for the ascription of underlying 
symbolic processes). 
Of central significance then is the mirroring of semantic distinctions by 
internal symbolic states. In characterising these states Pylyshn allies 
himself with Fodor's language of thought hypothesis.7 According to this 
view symbolic states are internal physically instantiated states which share 
many of the properties of natural language. If we view the internal 
medium of representation in this way many of the pre-theoretic 
requirements upon mental representation fall simply into place. Foremost 
amongst these is the requirement whereby: 
it is typically under an opaque construal that attributions of 
propositional attitudes to organisms enter into explanations 
of their behaviour.8 
An opaque construal of a propositional attitude occurs when a belief 
that, desire for, intention to (X), (where Xis a sentence like 'Mark Twain is 
a witty author') is attributed to someone in such a fashion that existential 
generalisation and/ or substitutivity of identicals do not apply to the 
embedded attitude clause as in 'John believes that"Santa Claus has a red 
nose"'. 9 Consequently, in saying that John Smith believes that 'Santa 
Claus has a red nose', we are not committed to a), supposing that there is a 
real relationship between John Smith and Santa Claus, b) supposing that 
7 Pylyshn (1984), p.193-6. Fodor (1975). 
8 Fodor (1980), p.66. 
9 cf ibid, p.72. 
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there is such a thing as Santa Claus, or c) supposing that it must follow 
that John Smith believes that St Nicholas has a red nose. Thus in more 
typical situations wherein I may simply desire my neighbour's Porsche, 
this attitude does not consist in a relationship between me and the 
Porsche, - for my neighbour may not have a Porsche. Rather, my attitude 
is something like a cerebral inscription which reads 'want Porsche', and, 
just like a sentence of written English, seems to possess this sense of itself, 
intrinsically, as opposed to having its meaning by virtue of being in a 
specifiable relationship with an existent object, as would be implied by a 
Skinnerian analysis of language.10 
So opacity allows us to liken propositional attitudes to inscriptions of 
mentalese, or sentences in the head. We may have different beliefs about 
the morning star and the evening star even though they are, in actual fact, 
the same star. I may believe that 'Mark Twain is a witty author' yet 
vigorously deny that 'Samuel Clemens is a witty author', in which case it 
seems appropriate to suppose that, in some way, I have a token of the 
former sentence in memory, but not of the latter, even though construed 
transparently as designating the same object the two sentences have the 
same meaning. We say that 'Mark Twain is a witty author' and 'Samuel 
Clemens is a witty author' have different intentions, but the same 
extension, for they both refer to the same person. 
Pylyshn embraces the sentence analogy as we can see: 
the primary form in which the representations are expressed 
consists of discrete sentence-like symbolic expressions.11 
Now, I want to argue that Pylyshn is subtly guilty of an old mistake. In 
its most primitive form the idea behind the mistake is the traditional 
supposition that the meaning of a word or sentence is, in its psychological 
aspect, a mental image or experience. This tactic bears certain parallels 
with the mental sentence strategy. In both cases it is assumed that the 
semantic content of a mental state is a discrete or atomic property of that 
state. This is like the idea that the content is a thing (like a mental picture) 
or a penumbra surrounding the arrangement of neurons or sequence of 
expressions that constitutes the embodiment of that state. It suggests that 
the content is intrinsic to that small part of the system at a given time. 
10 cf Verbal Behaviour, (1957). 
ll Pylyshn op. cit., p.194. 
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A fanciful analogy is to take that bundle of neurons in my brain which 
(supposedly) correspond to my belief that 'flies are disgusting' and hold 
them steady in a 'spatial temporal stasis beam', then (somehow) change 
the nature of the world, change the causal history of the belief, change the 
organisation of the rest of my brain, and turn me into a creature which 
regards fly salad as haute cuisine. The idea we are considering is the 
suggestion that this belief of mine would remain unchanged by virtue of 
some immediate quality it possesses, regardless of its relations with other 
objects. This immediate quality is associated with what we informally 
think of as the 'meaning' of a sentence or belief, but which strictly 
speaking is its 'intension'. Bearing in mind that the 'extension' of a word 
or sentence is the set or domain of objects of which it is true (the extension 
of 'rabbit' is the set of rabbits), .here is a passage from Putnam which 
clarifies these distinctions: 
... consider the compound terms 'creature with a heart' and 
'creature with a kidney'. Assuming that every creature with a 
heart possesses a kidney and vice versa, the extension of 
these two terms is exactly the same. But they obviously differ 
in meaning. Supposing that there is a sense of 'meaning' in 
which meaning = extension, there must be another sense of 
meaning of a term is not its extension but something else, 
say the 'concept' associated with the term. Let us call this 
'something else' the intension of the term. The concept of a 
creature with a heart is clearly a different concept from the 
concept of a creature with a kidney. Thus the two terms have 
different intension. When we say that they have different 
'meaning', meaning = intension.12 
He goes on to note that 'Most traditional philosophers thought of 
concepts as something mental', and thus that meanings are mental 
entities. However, even those philosophers who rejected this picture, 
feeling that meanings must be public property and graspable by all, did not 
doubt that understanding a word (knowing its intension) was just a matter 
of being in a certain psychological state, that grasping meanings is an 
individual, autonomous psychological act.13 
12 Putnam (1975), p.217. 
13 cf Putnam op. cit. 
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The position we are trying to articulate then, at a first approximation, is 
the idea that the meanings or symbolic virtues of mental, 
representational states are intrinsic qualities of those states. 
On the basis of 'creature with a heart' type examples the traditional 
view of meaning allowed that two terms might have the same extension 
yet differ in intension. However, it was presumed that two terms cannot 
have the same intension but differ in extension. But 'knowing an 
intension' is a matter of being in a certain psychological state, thus 
psychological state determines extension. But the extension of a term or 
sentence is what it refers to and is true of, thus psychological state, where 
we construe this as a state 'of the head', determines intrinsically what it 
refers to, what it is true of, and hence, broadly speaking, its semantics and 
content. In short, intension determines extension, therefore psychological 
state (qua state of the head) determines itself its content and what it refers 
to. 14 
A brief terminological digression: an 'autonomous' or 'narrow' 
psychological state is a state of a kind which presupposes the existence of 
no individual apart from the subject to whom the state is ascribed (hence 
they are opaque). Consequently narrow psychological states are, as it were, 
completely in the head (see p. 52 above) .. Other psychological states are 
'wide' psychological states. Thus if we construe my belief that 'Bob Jones is 
bald' in such a way that it essentially involves Bob Jones himself (an object 
external to me), it is a wide psychological state. 
So to complete the above statement; traditionally, narrow psychological 
state determines intension, which determines extension, and thus 
determines itself its content and what it refers to. 
Pylyshn's view is analogous to the 'traditional' view, and both views 
are incorrect: 
Firstly; his 'symbolic expressions' are discrete sentence-like objects 
which are, implicitly, 'in the head'. 
Secondly; they are construed opaquely, hence they are narrow. By 
construing 'Mark Twain is a witty author' as different from 'Samuel 
Clemens is a witty author' we can explain why these two 'thoughts' might 
cause different behaviours, even though transparently speaking they are 
the same 'thought'. Representational psychology of the type Pylyshn 
advocates is almost by definition the psychology of opaquely construed 
psychological states. Opaque construals of propositional attitudes are not 
14 cf ibid, p.221. 
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liable to existential generalisation, therefore no individual apart from the 
subject to whom they are ascribed is presupposed in their ascription. 
Thirdly, just as in natural language two intensions may have the same 
extension (creature with a heart, creature with a kidney), so in Pylyshn's 
theory there may be 'synonymous' symbolic codes: 
There may be synonymous expressions - sets of codes with 
the same semantic content. Such codes might be functionally, 
but not semantically, distinguishable.15 
Fourthly, however, and crucially, one intension, - one token symbolic 
expression, - cannot have two extensions, for, as in the traditional view, 
intension determines extension, and symbolic expression determines (its) 
semantics: 
symbolic codes .. . reflect all the semantic distinctions 
necessary to make the behaviour correspond to the 
regularities that are stateable in semantic terms.16 
This dichotomy is apparent in a passage already quoted. Bearing in 
mind that autonomous psychological state being 'completely in the head' 
will be determined by neurophysiology: 
Effects can penetrate upward through the levels, since each 
level is supervenient on levels below; that is , there can be no 
differences at level n unless there is some difference at level 
n-1, even though the converse is not true (because of the 
multiple-instantiation property of ascending levels; 
supervenience of psychological states on biological states 
entails that there cannot be two different thoughts unless 
there are some biological differences between the two 
underlying brain events).17 
Cognitive penetrability follows from this supposition, for as long as a 
given symbolic expression can have only one extension, - refer 
15 above p.49. 
16 above p.40. 
17 above p.51. 
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determinately to only one class of things, - it follows that if 'a certain 
behaviour pattern ... can be altered in a way that is rationally connected 
with the meaning of certain inputs (i.e. what they refer to, as opposed to 
their physical properties alone)' then a symbolic change must be involved. 
That is, if reference changes, the symbolic code changes, hence by virtue of 
an observed change in the reference (meaning, semantics) of a given 
cognitive process we can infer that this process must involve the 
manipulation of inner symbolic codes rather than non-symbolic 
alterations of the functional architecture as supposed by the analogue 
theory of imagery. 
As it happens though, it can be shown that intension, - narrow 
psychological state, - does not and can not determine its reference, and 
hence its semantics, and hence its 'meaning' roughly speaking. It therefore 
does not follow that an observed change in the 'meaning of certain 
inputs', (which as we have seen may or may not need to be accompanied 
by an alteration in behaviour), need be accompanied by any change in the 
underlying symbolic codes. The sense in which these codes possess 
meaning more or less intrinsically thus dissolves, which destroys the 
integrity of the symbol level, which in turn allows us to consider purely 
architectural, physiological or analogue structures as undertaking 
procedures previously thought of as essentially symbolic. 
SYMBOLIC EXPRESSIONS. 
As our currency is the subtle and arcane it is necessary to go back and 
underline the sense in which Pylyshn intends his notion of symbolic code 
to be understood. Whilst articulating this conception we will criticise it, 
removing barriers to the interpretation of psychological process which I 
will eventually espouse. 
There are two senses in which cognition may be taken to require a 
level of articulated symbolic expressions: Firstly; it may be held that we 
require a level of symbolic expressions only in order to be able to state in a 
finite surveyable form, what a complex device such as a brain or a 
computer is doing. In this case the use of expressions is cognate only to the 
mode of description, the device or brain does not explicitly represent to 
itself the rules it is said to be following, they are only implicit in its 
operation. The knowledge the device or brain may exemplify in the 
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operations in question is then said to be procedural, as opposed to 
declarative. For instance , Dennet relates an instance where the designer of 
a chess playing program suggests that "It thinks that it should get its queen 
out early", yet as Dennet observes " ... for all the many levels of explicit 
representation to be found in that program, nowhere is anything roughly 
synonymous with 'I should get my queen out early' explicitly tokened". 18 
In this particular case then the expression 'get queen out early' or similar 
is only a way of describing the system 'from the outside' rather than an 
explicit representation the system has and uses. There is nothing in the 
system that is this expression. 
The second sense refers to those cases where there are expressions (in 
the language of Thought perhaps) which are explicitly tokened and used 
by the system. In this case the utility of expressions is not confined to or 
determined by the exigencies of description and explanation. In this case 
we would say that there is something in the system that is the expression 
'that p', and hence is the representation for the system (as opposed to just 
the observer or describer) 'that p'. 
Pylyshn's conception must be the second sense if our criticisms are to 
be pertinent, for unless symbolic expressions are determinate within the 
system it will naturally follow that a change in the meanings of the inputs, 
or any external change of circumstances relevant to the characterisation of 
internal 'symbolic states', will involve a change in those states much as 
suggested by the cognitive penetrability criteria. Internal states would 
necessarily mirror the external relations and circumstances which they are 
cited to explain. It is only if Pylyshn's symbolic codes are psychologically 
real in accord with the second sense above that it is an empirical question 
as to whether they mirror the semantics of their referents. 
And this is how Pylyshn argues; 
to be in a certain representational state is to have a certain 
symbolic expression in some part of memory. 
Immediately after making this claim he contrasts his position with that 
of Davidson and Geach, who allegedly: 
... insist that it is unnecessary to assume that something (an 
internal property or a symbol) corresponds to P to explain 
18 Dennet (1978), p.107. 
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how people can be in the state of 'believing P'. All we need, 
according to this view, are certain states of an organism 
which function in a particular way - namely, in a way 
correctly described (from the outside) as 'P - believing'. This is 
a kind of adverbial theory of intentional states which simply 
pairs functional states with belief (or other propositional 
attitude) descriptions without the step of positing any 
articulated substates or symbols that are the representations 
of P.19 
Elsewhere (of cognition) " ... we must view it as computing over 
symbols" where "the formal symbol structures mirror all relevant 
semantic distinctions".20 
The idea of a token sentence inscription seems well suited to the role of 
an item which possesses meaning of itself, yet which is subject to certain 
syntactic or mechanical alterations to its form which may also change its 
meaning, hence Pylyshn's eagerness to characterise his symbols as 
articulated, sentence-like expressions. 
There are many general reasons for assuming an explicit sentence-like 
medium of representation, the 'mental sentence' or 'language of thought' 
proto-model. The more informal of these I will discuss in the next chapter. 
I will now turn to a semi-technical rationale for this construal of 
representational symbols. This argument pertains quite closely to the 
theory of computation and so may appear to escape the criticisms I will 
develop below if not discussed separately. That is, whilst it will seem clear 
that something like the mental sentence which comprises the belief 'it is 
raining' (for example) cannot determine its extension, and thus does not 
have an intrinsic symbolic value (contrary to Pylyshn's theory), if the 
theory of abstract automata demands that potentially infinite behaviours 
(i.e. speech, counting) can only be accounted for computationally if 
recourse is made to a finite class of language-like expressions, - if symbolic 
expressions are computationally necessary,- then perhaps the former 
result is merely apparent. 
19 Pylyshn (1984), p.29. 
zo ibid, p.74. 
86 
FINITE STATE AUTOMATA AND TURING MACHINES. 
Pylyshn insists that semantic interpretation is required if we are to be 
able to say what computation is being performed by a particular sequence 
of physical states within a computer or brain: 
to explain why the machine prints the numeral '5' when it is 
provided with the expression '(PLUS 2 3)' (with the symbols 
given their usual interpretation) we must refer to the 
meaning of the symbols in both the expression and the 
printout.21 
Pylyshn makes a mistake of principle here. Whilst it is true that we 
must give some interpretation to the symbols in question if we are to be 
able to express the computation being performed, expressing the 
computation and interpreting the symbols are one and the same act, an act 
which is subsequent to or dependent upon the purely functional inter -
relationships of the numerals as mere marks on paper. Strictly speaking 
we do not say 'ah ! PLUS, therefore it will print out 5', but 'it printed out 5, 
therefore the function is PLUS'. What confuses us is that this regularity is, 
in our culture, almost invariably referred to by the term 'plus' (or 
'addition'), thus we tend to think that this word is associated with a nature 
of 'plusness' when in fact it is just a label for a type of regularity that may 
be found amongst mere physical states. If we were to visit some very 
isolated English speaking country where the word 'subtract' designated the 
function we refer to as 'plus', and the ten numerals we know were 
replaced by the first ten letters of the alphabet, our inability at first to 
interpret a computer's behaviour of printing out 'F' after being provided 
with '(SUBTRACT C D)' would not prevent the computer from 
performing additions, provided it maintained a consistent treatment (not 
'interpretation') for the symbols it used and that the regularities in 
question were in point of fact all formally isomorphic with what we call 
'addition'. In order to communicate what function the machine is 
performing to others, it is indeed necessary to interpret the computer's 
inputs and outputs, insofar as identifying it as a particular function also 
identifies the sort of roles the symbols in question will play. But this is not 
so much to explain the computation as to identify it. By citing the rules we 
21 op. cit.,p.58. 
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do not thereby explain the rules. Having a vocabulary of identifiable 
functions like 'addition', 'subtraction', 'division' and so on is like 
knowing that such and such a card game is either canasta or bridge or old 
maid; if someone asks 'why did such and such an exchange of cards take 
place ?' we can explain this fact by identifying the game as bridge or 
canasta or whatever. But the situation in cognition is like witnessing a 
card game in a strange land where the pack has a variable number of cards, 
and none of the games played are familiar. Suppose that we invented a 
notation for recording the movements of the game, calling this 
movement 'a3', that movement 'b4ing' etc. In this case nothing could be 
explained by interpreting the expressions or referring to the meaning of 
the symbols until the rules of the game had been empirically determined 
and given names. In this way it becomes clear that in the sense of 'explain' 
that Pylyshn uses above, we can only explain what we already know. 
More intriguing is the argument to the effect that the productivity of 
cognitive and computational systems, - that is, their ability to make, or be 
involved in, an unbounded number of distinctions, such as being able to 
utter a potentially infinite number of different sentences, - means that the 
regularities in question can only be captured if we regard the states as 
processing symbolic expressions: 
The regularities of a system with arbitrarily many functional 
states cannot be captured in a finite manner without some 
language - like combinatorial mechanism that ties together 
the systematic features of the set of state transitions ... 
to which he adds;-
... indeed, this is a primary reason for a computational model 
appearing to be the appropriate one for cognitive science.22 
The dichotomy here is the distinction between explaining the 
behaviour of a computer or brain in terms of its states, as opposed to 
explaining it in terms of the domain that the system operates upon,- and 
hence representationally. In automata theory this corresponds to the 
difference between a finite state automaton and a Turing machine. This is 
echoed by Pylyshn: 
22 ibid, p.29. 
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The difference between an extremely complex device 
characterised merely as proceeding through distinguishable 
states (but not processing symbols) and what I call a 
'computer' is precisely the difference between a device 
viewed as a complex finite state automaton and one viewed 
as a variant of a Turing machine.23 
FSA's are standardly described by either a state transition network or a 






Input set X = (0,1). 
Output set Y = (0,1). 





Essentially then, an FSA is just a set of conditionals of the form 'If in 
state ql and in receipt of input 1, produce output O and go to state q2', or 
generally, 'if in state 1 and in receipt of input x, produce output y and go to 
state 2'. 
As we can see, the output and change of state must be mentioned 
explicitly for each input, thus a device capable of receiving potentially 
infinite number of inputs, as would be the case if it could, say, multiply 
any natural number by ten, would require a description in this format of a 
potentially infinite length. The machine table would, as it were, extend 
indefinately to the right as we included in the table the machine's 
response to each individual input. Likewise, if the device possessed a 
potentially infinite number of different responses to a given input - such 
as the ability to 'count' a string of any number of x's or y's, - it would 
require the explicit mention of a potentially infinite number of states. The 
23 ibid, p.70-1. 
24 cf Arbib (1969), p.57. 
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machine table would, as it were, extend infinitely downwards. In the FSA 
format of description any open ended or productive behaviour such as 
language production and comprehension, mental arithmetic, the ability to 
play chess - and much, if not most, of human cognitive behaviour is of 
this kind - will require for its performance a machine of infinite 
complexity. 
A Turing machine (named after the mathematician Alan Turing) is an 
FSA connected to a reader /printer /mover device and a tape of potentially 
infinite length upon which is inscribed a series of symbols from a finite 
alphabet. The scanner reads a symbol at a time and either leaves it as it is 
or erases it and replaces it with another symbol from the alphabet. Then it 
either halts or moves to the left or the right along the tape. The symbol 
scanned and the state (or 'program') of the machine uniquely determines 
output, movement along the tape, and next state. Turing machines are 
generally considered to be an adequate formalisation of the notion of an 
effective procedure,25 consequently any computable function is Turing 
computable. Thus in the context of the computational theory of mind the 
Turing machine is the proto-model for the explanation of thought. Given 
that Turing machines essentially involve a vocabulary of symbolic 
expressions the implication seems to be that human cognition must also 
make essential use of such a vocabulary. 
The significance of the Turing machine for explanation lies in the 
addition to the FSA of specific strings of symbols on the tape and a 
reader /printer /mover device which alters these strings. The whole 
machine can thus be construed as manipulating expressions. Because the 
strings of symbols may be of arbitrary length the number of different 
inputs and outputs the machine can accept and make is potentially 
infinite even though the alphabet of symbols is finite. Because the 
alphabet is finite the machine's program, or set of states, can also remain 
finite, because we can define 'what happens' to each symbol, even if the 
computation goes on forever. And because we can construe the device as 
operating upon strings of symbols we can define the functions it performs 
recursively. The simple function mentioned on the previous page for 
instance can be defined as F(x) = TO, where T is any string of characters 
from the appropriate alphabet, in this case base ten integers. An FSA 
characterisation of the same function would in effect say '1-10, 2-20, 3-30, ... 
254-2540, ... 7653467897-76534678970, .. .'etc.for each input separately. 
25 This is Turing's hypothesis or Church's thesis, cf Arbib op. cit., ch. 4. 
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However the necessity for expressing open ended functions in terms of 
operations upon 'symbolic expressions' does not establish that the 
function in question is used by the device except in a procrustean sense. 
For instance, consider a turing machine capable of a function which can be 
informally called 'doubling numbers'. Less informally we could say that 
the machine computes the function 'f(x) = 2x' in decimal notation. Now, it 
is tempting to infer from the valid conclusion that this function requires 
'symbolic expressions' for its statement (for the above reasons) that the 
system must therefore 'think' with that expression, or a synonymous 
one. We think perhaps that if presented with a number to double we apply 
f(x) = 2x directly to it, so that the symbolic expression is not just a 
description of the computation in question, but the actual medium of the 
computation. This would appear to be the implication of statements such 
as: 
to capture the rule governed quality of computation the 
process must be viewed in terms of operations on formal 
expressions.26 
and, 
It is only when the computer is described as operating upon 
symbols ... that we can explain its input - output behaviour in 
semantic terms .. .27 
(The idea that the symbolic values of symbolic expressions are the 
actual medium of thought and computation naturally goes hand in hand 
with the idea that token thoughts have intrinsic meanings or semantics.) 
Here then is the program for a Turing machine that actually computes 
the function f(x) = 2x; 
26 Pylyshn op. cit.,, p.69. 
27 ibid, p.72. His emphasis. 
qO l l R ql 
qO 2 2 R q1 
q1 b 2 L q2 
q2 1 2 L q2 
q2 2 1 N q3 
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q2 b b R q4 
q4 2 b N q3 
Arbib (1969), p.131. 
This machine operates upon base two numbers using the digits '1' and 
'2' instead of the usual '0' and '1'. It is a complete and obviously finite 
program although it can in principle multiply by two numbers of any 
length, provided they are in the appropriate notation and the machine is 
started on the rightmost digit. The terms q0 - q4 represent the machine's 
states, 1, 2, b the input - output alphabet (b = blank), and R, L, N, refer to 
the machine's movements along its tape, one space to the right, one space 
to the left, and no move respectively. We can translate, say, the third and 
fourth into informal English as follows; 'If I am in state q1 and currently 
inspecting a blank space, write a '2' in that space, move one space to the 
left, and go to state q2'; 'If I am in state q2 and currently inspecting the digit 
'1', erase it, replace it with a '2', move one space to the left, and remain in 
the same state'. (This sort of exposition isn't too inappropriate because in 
Turing's original 1936 paper he introduces the idea behind the abstract 
device in terms of a person with a pencil and paper who performs 
complex functions by going through a sequence of basic operations such as 
rubbing out one symbol and writing another in its place. A similar account 
is given by Rogers (1959)). 
The firstly thing to notice is that nowhere in the program is there 
featured an expression synonymous with f(x) = 2x. Of course all seven 
instructions taken together exemplify f(x) = 2x, but at no point in the 
machine's operation will it ever follow this instruction, or even its base 
two analogue, f(x) = 21x. 
Secondly, it is quite possible for a human 'computer' to mechanically 
follow the step by step instructions, multiply a binary number by two and 
yet be quite unaware of its decimal equivalent. In other words, one may be 
able to correctly perform a computation without having any cognisance of 
the symbolic significance of the tokens used, thus it follows that they are 
not used as symbolic expressions. Furthermore, there may be many 
possible symbolic interpretations of this computation viewed as a 
manipulation of strings of symbols. It could equally well represent a 
game, a decimal function that varies from f(x) = 2x at very high values of 
x, or a simple monetary transaction. We can note here an example due to 
Fodor (1978) where he raises the in-principle possibility that at the 
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machine language level, where no English terms are used, a computer 
chess program and a simulation of the Six Day war may in fact be 
indistinguishable when compiled. 
So, in the case of the above device it is clear that no description of its 
behaviour more succinct than its actual program is actually used by the 
device and thus arguably is the medium of computation. Other renderings 
of its operation are molar, abbreviated descriptions and/ or interpretations 
which may have an arbitrary number of synonymous and non-
synonymous equivalents. Upon consideration this is exactly as we should 
expect, for the essential rationale of computation when performed by 
abstract automata is to break down complex 'intelligent' procedures into 
their most basic constituents and establish ways in which these elementary 
steps can be performed mechanically,- that is, without the intelligence that 
the task as a whole would seem to require: 
Let us imagine that the operations performed by the 
computer are split up into 'simple operations', which are so 
elementary that it is not easy to imagine them further 
divided.28 
Thus, in a sense, the computational theory of mind ( of which Pylyshn 
is obviously an adherent) is an atomistic theory of mental acts. Hence no 
intellectual act - nothing in the subject domain - will be achieved by mind 
or computer in the form in which it is presented for explanation. 
Turing machines are creatures of mathematical theory and are rarely, if 
ever, actually constructed. The level of abstraction at which a Turing 
machine's instructions are written, that of a series of quintuples of 
monadic symbols , corresponds to the level at which the machine is 
conceived of as operating. That is, the machine 'does' the quintuples 
which are written for it. In more complex machines though instructions 
are given to the machine in a different vocabulary from that in which the 
basic operations of the computer qua physical artifact might be described. 
This is the distinction between machine language and programming 
language. Hence my argument above seems to imply that all computers 
which involve a programming language - which certainly includes all 
those used for cognitive simulation - do not in fact do what they are 
programmed to do ! But this is quite correct. One way to see this is to put 
28 Turing (1936), quoted in Arbib op cit, p.14. 
93 
the question 'If a given computer actually computes in its programming 
language, why then must a program first be compiled into machine 
language before it can be run ?' This point has been partially recognised in 
procedural semantics insofar as in that field it is thought that the 
comprehension of utterances in natural language is analogous to 
compiling (into machine language) and executing programs expressed in 
high level programming languages.29 The implication is of course that we 
do not understand English in English, that the comprehension is actually 
effected at a more basic level. In this light it is natural to question the 
extent to which the 'symbolic expressions' Pylyshn adverts to inherently 
possess the 'meanings' or semantics which make them 'symbolic'. Which 
is the symbol level in our Turing machine example ? If it is at the level of 
the function f(x) = 2x or the informal expression 'doubling' then the 
symbol level is not the level at which machine or person actually 
computes - there are in fact other quite different alogarithms for 
performing 'doubling•.30 This is not to say that this level is not symbolic, 
or is meaningless, or that this level is not absolutely necessary for the 
expression of regularities in the course of explanation, or that the terms 
used are not language - like 'expressions' (these are all points of 
Pylyshn's). Rather, in this and analogous cases these expressions are non-
unique descriptions of what the system is actually doing; they denote and 
characterise certain regularities without comprising them. As such their 
metaphysical status is similar to that of emergent properties in Physics like 
'heat'. There isn't really anything called 'heat', there is only molecular 
kinetic energy, but in having a commonly understood use and descriptive 
meaning 'heat' subsists and only hard line reductionists quibble. (This 
comparison is doubly relevant given that Pylyshn allies himself to 
Theoretical Explanation (in the full sense of the term) as used in Physics 
(chapter II above). 
As modes of description the meanings attributed stem not in any 
essential way from the device in question, but in the expression having a 
generally known and accepted meaning in natural and theoretical 
language. That is, the meaning of 'doubling' is not derived from the set of 
computers and people it is attributed to as a 'symbolic expression' (as in 'it 
exists in peoples heads and then we discover it'), but in the general use of 
this word, like the general use of 'house', 'bird', 'run' etc. 
30 Arbib, op cit, p.131. 
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(It might be argued that because 'f(x) = 2x' is a formal expression it is 
the name for all those different alogarithms to which it is formally 
equivalent. The meaning of this expression then, unlike 'doubling' or 'P-
K4', is a set of goings-on in brains and computers. But, although it is 
possible to program a Turing machine to perform this function in base ten 
notation, this program would again require a series of quintuples and 
wouldn't look anything like 'f(x) = 2x'. Although a program is in a sense 
formally equivalent to a succinct rendering of the function it is 
performing ('f(x) = 2x'), the machine does not use the latter expression, 
and that is the issue here. If we say that all these alogarithms - expressed 
perhaps as Turing machine programs - are doing the same thing and 
therefore they are intrinsically of such and such a type,- then 'same' here 
is always relative to some standard of comparison.) 
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IV. MEANINGS ARE NOT IN THE HEAD. 
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY. 
As we have seen, the traditional view of meaning is at most that 
meanings are mental entities, and at least that grasping meanings is an 
individual psychological act. These 'inner meanings' or meanings qua 
'what is in the head' coincide with intensions, and are generally conceived 
to be determiners of extension. That is, something about whatever it is in 
my head that constitutes a thought about the Queen determines that it is a 
thought about the queen. The intension, it seems, has a kind of direction 
outwards towards its reference - what it is about and what it is true of -
which we call its 'extension'. Although 'The Queen' refers uniquely to the 
Queen, a given extension may be referred to by more than one 
'synonymous' intension. Hence 'the present monarch of the 
commonwealth', 'Charles Windsor's mother', and 'The head of the 
Church of England' are descriptions which express different intensions 
which share an extension. Traditionally it is thought that the converse 
does not occur; 'The Queen' does not refer to H.R.H. on some occasions 
and to nitric acid or the colour of snow on others. 
Extension is tied to semantics insofar as the extension of a noun phrase 
is what it is true of, if it is true. Thus there is a sense in which two items 
which have different extensions will have different truth conditions, be 
true or false of different things, and so have different meanings. 
This sort of account of meaning is implicit in that "loose network of 
largely tacit principles, platitudes and paradigms" which Stich and 
Churchland call "Folk Psychology",l(and also in Pylyshn's conception of 
'symbolic expressions' as we have seen). It is typified by, and exemplified 
in, such constructs as 'belief', 'desire', 'aim', 'fear', 'recollection', 
'anticipation', 'knowing', 'expecting', and simple generalisations couched 
in terms of them like 'If x desires y and believes that doing z will enable 
him to attain y, then in general, and all things considered, x will do z'. 
1 Stich (1983), p.1. Churchland (1979). 
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Because beliefs desires and the like are in the normal course of 
conversation ascribed with sentences it is a natural extension of the folk 
paradigm to view these constructs qua 'intensions in the head' as akin to 
token sentence inscriptions. Thus we might speak of a 'snow is white' as 
being that 'snow is white' which is instantiated by a state of my brain at 
this point in time , just as we can mention different tokens of the phrase 
'snow is white', of which this is the third in this chapter. We do not need 
to suppose, of course, that the propositional attitudes are realised in the 
brain in a form which might be read with a magnifying glass; only that the 
token phrases correspond in some way to instances of kinds of 
psychological state, where the precise nature of the correspondence is a 
philosophical and scientific question of no direct significance to the 
ordinary conception of these attitudes. 
There are a number of reasons for this propriety. Foremost amongst 
these is the ease with which the almost common-sense idea of the 'mental 
sentence' is able to bridge the gaps between mental representation, the 
attribution of mental representations, and the 'ordinary' objects which 
these representations, in the main, refer to. What follows is closely based 
upon Stich (1983) p31-40. Briefly, using belief as an exemplar: 
1) Beliefs are standardly attributed and named by linguistic 
constructions involving an embedded sentence, i.e. 'James believes "that 
p"'. The embedded sentence represents the most precise instrument 
available to the ordinary person for specifying the belief that James 
possesses. 
2) The fact that beliefs and other attitudes ostensibly express two place 
attitudes is easily accounted for in ordinary language. We are able to 
distinguish James' belief from the object of that belief. A person may 
believe something which has no real object for instance, like 'unicorns are 
white'. People may have different attitudes with respect to the same object: 
Mary may believe that there is a god, whilst John may hope that there is a 
god. 
3) The semantic properties of beliefs, their objects, and the sentences 
embedded in belief ascriptions all coincide. That is, if my belief that the 
world is round is true, the content sentence 'the world is round' is true, 
and the world is in fact round. It would be nonsense, for instance, to claim 
that John's belief is true, though what he believes is false. If, again, my 
belief entails John's belief, (I believe that the prime minister is a man, he 
believes that the prime minister is mortal), then the content sentence 
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(embedded sentence) for my belief entails the content sentence for his 
belief. 
4) If, following Stich, we call sentences of the form 'S believes "that p"' 
belief sentences and the embedded sentence p the content sentence, then 
we can note that in both beliefs and in ordinary language, the semantic 
properties of belief sentences are independent of the semantic properties of 
content sentences. Hence it may be that S believes 'that p', but 'that p' is 
false (James genuinely believes that the moon is an alien spacecraft). 
Alternatively, it may be false that S believes 'that p', whilst 'that p' is 
true (Ceaucesceau believes that Stalinism is a repressive political system). 
The truth value of the content sentence tells us nothing about the truth 
value of the compound. We cannot conclude from the truth of 'that p' 
that 'James believes "that p"' is either true or false. Also from the truth of 
'S believes "that p"' and p entails q, we cannot infer the truth of 'S 
believes "that q'". 
This is related to the opacity and non-extensionality of beliefs and belief 
sentences. Because one extension may be referred to by a number of 
intensions a person may be privy to one description of a person or object 
without being privy to others, consequently there is an equivocation in 
the senses of belief sentences as illustrated by this example; 
S believes that Fa 
a=b 
S believes that Fb 
(i.e. Frank believes that David is 
a communist) 
(David is the university proctor) 
(Frank believes that the university 
proctor is a communist) 
This sort of inference is not generally valid. This relates to Brentano's 
thesis that 'intentional inexistence' is the mark of the mental (Brentano 
(1874)). This is the idea that mental phenomena are characterised by an 
immanent objectivity, an inclusion of an object - the thing thought of -
"that is short of actuality but more than nothingness"2, unlike the simple 
actuality of physical relations. Thus 'John is thinking about a sports car' 
does not imply that there is a sports car, like 'John is driving a sports car'. 
Consequently, failure of existential generalisation and referential opacity 
are seen as important indicators of mental phenomenon. 
2 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 201. 
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5) The logical relationships of beliefs mirror the logical relationships of 
their content sentences. For instance, if I believe that all a's are b, and that 
all b's are c, I will typically, though not invariably, come to believe that all 
a's are c. This provides folk psychology with a ready-made network of 
rough generalisations pertaining to content sentences to serve as a 
framework for subsequent folk generalisations pertaining to beliefs, goals, 
desires etc. 
This marriage of language and folk art gives a theory-like presence to 
Folk Psychology. Insofar as beliefs, desires etc. exist primarily within this 
theory there becomes something resembling a truth of the matter in cases 
of folk-psychological ascription and explanation. What common sense and 
intuition tell us becomes authoritative when the issues and constructs in 
question are by their very nature 'common-sense'. If there is a scientific 
sense of belief (e.g.) then it is not synonymous (except accidentally) with a 
concept that each generation has learnt at their mothers' knee. The 
scientific correlates of belief may or may not have much to do with the 
ordinary person's concept of belief, but even if science should supercede 
folk psychology, it has no power to deny that within folk psychology rules 
and concepts take a certain form. It is not always appreciated that the 
common-sense framework of the world, Sellars' (1963) 'Manifest Image', 
has an existence that is substantially independent of scientific fact. Most of 
us know nowadays that 'solid' objects are not really solid; as Eddington 
would say, 'Physics tells me that my desk is mostly empty space', but this 
does not show that when the ordinary man says 'solid' he really means 
'mostly empty space'. By the same token, when we use terms like 'belief', 
'aim', 'desire', etc. in non-scientific contexts, we do not 'really' mean 
'symbolic state number 3289'. Thus folk psychology and common sense 
have their own standard of psychology, to which scientific psychology may 
either rise, oppose, or reconcile itself with. 
Some matters of definition; 'autonomous' psychological states are 
those that would be shared by a person and his atom-for-atom replica. This 
follows intuitively from our previous discussions of 'narrow' and 
'autonomous' states. Stich (1983) presents autonomy of psychological state 
as a fundamental regulative principle for a genuinely explanatory 
psychology. This serves to eliminate a number of erstwhile psychological 
99 
properties, such as 'remembering my fifth birthday', for my replica cannot 
remember my fifth birthday, although he may seem to remember it. 
A principled way of putting the principle of autonomy is in terms of 
the supervenience of properties. Stich borrows from Kim (1978) here 
saying: 
The family S of properties supervenes on the family W of 
properties (with respect to domain D of objects) just in case, 
necessarily, any two objects in D which share all properties in 
W will also share all properties in S.3 
So autonomous psychological states are those states which supervene 
upon the current internal physical properties and relations of the 
organism, and the Principle of Autonomy is the principle that 
psychological theories should confine themselves to these states. But if 
this is true Folk Psychology and its attendant propositional attitudes seem 
to be invalidated, for beliefs, hopes, desires and so forth seem to be 
intrinsically associated with their objects in the world, the things believed, 
hoped for and desired. 
From this it is clear that 'formal', 'syntactic', 'functional' and 
'computational' states of the organism are also autonomous in Pylyshn's 
model, for they are instantiated in the biological architecture, and thus 
supervene on the physical state of the organism ("supervenience of 
psychological states on biological states entails ... ", p.51 above). ('Syntactic' 
and 'formal' are two ways of saying the same thing; both are specified 
without reference to such things as meaning, semantics, reference etc.). 
We have seen that the broad thrust of Pylyshn's position is that 
semantic level (belief and desire) generalisations are to be explained in 
terms of formal 'symbol level' regularities. Given that the former are, by 
definition, contentful and the latter syntactic, this makes Pylyshn an 
adherent of what Stich (1983) calls 'The Weak Representational Theory of 
Mind', which holds both that; 
the generalisations of cognitive science will be purely formal, 
applying to mental states not in virtue of their semantic 
properties, but rather in virtue of their syntax. 
3 Stich (1978), p.575. 
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and; 
semantic features are correlated with the syntactic type of the 
token 
(the 'correlation thesis'), that is; 
mental states which are 'functionally identical' ... must have 
the same content.4 
For, as we have seen, Pylyshn asserts that; 
each level is supervenient on levels below (p. 51) 
and; 
.. . differences in content always result in functional 
differences(p51). 
The last quote does not imply that functional (syntactic) differences 
always result in differences in content, but this is not necessary for my 
argument; there may be different functional states with the same content. 
The counter-thesis to the correlation thesis is the supposition that a given 
formal, functional, syntactic or 'symbolic' state, insofar as it is 
supervenient upon the physical properties of the organism, is associated 
with, or has, more than one content. 
The correlation thesis clearly underlies the cognitive penetrability 
criterion: It is only on the supposition that each functional or syntactic 
state type maps onto a separate content (has a separate content) that we can 
infer a change in autonomous state from a change in content. Content 
being what it is, a generic term for that which is possessed by states or 
objects to which truth conditions may be applied, the implication is that 
autonomous psychological states must alter in concert with their external 
objects. A change in the 'meaning' of an input is deemed a sufficient 
condition for change in narrow psychological state (as long as the input is 
apprehended, i.e. as long as it is not just a possible but an actual input to 
4 All Stich (1983), p.185-6. 
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the system), for the correlation thesis rules out the possibility of a given 
state having more than one content.5 
Since Putnam's landmark paper 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' in 1975 a 
number of examples and 'thought experiments' have been described in 
the literature which conflict with the two central components of the 
traditional view of meaning which Pylyshn uncritically accepts in his 
cognitive theory, via the influence of the ubiquitous mental sentence 
proto-model. It is natural for a theory informed by this model to accept a), 
that each token 'symbolic expression' has its own determinate and 
intrinsic content but b), only one such content. The first thesis is required 
by the necessity that the codes have a symbolic value if this quality is to be 
cited as a theoretical quantity in explanation. The second follows from this 
on the grounds that this quality must be the same quality (for each token 
expression) on separate occasions of its use if it is to have the generality 
required of an explanatory construct. Both of these contentions are false: 
there exist well formed and normally ascribed psychological states which 
have no clear or intrinsic content, and equally well formed states to which 
may be attributed more than one content. These examples violate the 
correlation thesis and the traditional 'mental sentence' proto-model of 
meaning, and by so doing strip the cognitive penetrability principle of its 
force, and place Scientific Psychology in opposition with Folk Psychology 
to the extent to which the former seeks formal, alogarithm-based 
explanations of behaviour. 
5 There is an element of vagueness here: The canons of anti-behaviourism ensure that 
cognitive changes may take place in the absence of any overt change in behaviour - I may 
perform image manipulations in the absence of any eliciting stimuli, and emit no subsequent 
response upon completing my manipulations. There is clearly a sense in which the system 
may cognise or register data without the necessity of prior or subsequent stimuli or response. 
Informally speaking, there is a difference between noticing a pun on words (say) and not 
noticing it, even when initial conditions are the same and no change in behaviour ensues in 
both cases. This is inherent in Pylyshn's system for the symbolic codes reflect all the 
semantic distinctions necessary to make the behaviour correspond to the regularities that 
are stated in semantic (belief and desire) terms, consequently there may be symbolic 
changes which are unaccompanied by any change in externally ascribed semantic state, 
such as would occur if there had been no change in overt behaviour. The prospect of 
cognitive change in the absence of behaviour is not explicitly recognised by Pylyshn, but it 
is clearly consistent with his theory, and this possibility is all that my argument requires. 
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES WITH NO CLEAR CONTENT. 
These may be divided into three categories. The rationale for discussing 
each in terms of 'conceptual schemes' will become apparent as we work 
through the examples, most of which are taken from Stich (1983). In each 
case we will take belief as an exemplar, but all examples may be 
generalised to hopes, desires, goals, intentions etc. We will assume, for the 
sake of the argument, that belief states are instantiated as token 'mental 
sentences'. The criteria for possessing a certain belief state then is the 
possession of a token of the appropriate content sentence in the 
appropriate. memory register. As one discrete token is sufficient for 
possession of a belief state, a simple avowal or utterance of the relevant 
sentence should be sufficient evidence for its ascription. 
It is not necessary for us to suppose that there is a one-to-one 
relationship between sentences of English and symbolic expressions for 
the argument to be relevant to Pylyshn's theory. It follows that if one 
symbolic expression possesses a unique and intrinsic correlative symbolic 
value, then a set of n symbolic expressions must also possess a unique 
symbolic value or content. If there are any higher order group effects then 
these are ipso facto not accounted for in terms of the association of 
component symbolic states. If it is Pylyshn's idea that the symbolic codes 
explain beliefs, then there can be no indeterminism here.6 
If it does seem that the content of a given belief state qua content 
sentence ('snow is white') varies from one environmental situation to 
another (as I will argue) Pylyshn could perhaps say that it is not the 
symbolic values of the expressions which have changed, but the 
differential individuation of those expressions involved on different 
6 This is to skirt very briefly over some profound issues. Douglas Hofstadter in his Godel, 
Escher, Bach (1980) alludes to a sense, derived from Godel's incompleteness theorem, in 
which a complex formal system, such as a brain may perhaps be, may have molar 
properties which amount to more than the sum of its parts, but which are not as it were 
'applied from the outside'. (There may be theorems of a formal system which cannot be 
proved in that system). Perhaps there is a route here for Pylyshn to explicate some sense in 
which a given symbolic expression or set of such codes may possess both a 'basic' and an 
emergent content, and so escape the criticisms below. These considerations are however far 
beyond the usual ken of computational explanation in psychology, and are nowhere 
mentioned in Pylyshn's (1984), his central work, thus if there is any escape route here it is 
incumbent upon Pylyshn to explicitly formulate the manner in which this might be 
achieved. Having said this, I doubt that there is any way out for him in this direction, for 
he explicitly associates changes in content with functional, and hence physical, 
changes,(see previous page above) whilst the levels of meaning envisaged by Hofstadter 
are not created by any physical change, but are inherent within complex structures. 
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occasions - the difference being that 'snow is white' = expressions (a,b,c,d) 
on occasion one, and (b,c,d,e) on occasion two. But if the semantic level 
belief sentence remains the same, and each level is, by hypothesis, 
supervenient upon the level below, then we must be talking about the 
same physiological structure on both occasions; hence this tactic may 
succeed only· at the cost of discarding a material basis for symbol level 
structures. 
Impoverished conceptual schemes. 
'Mrs T' according to Stich was a person who was at one time employed 
by his family. She was well over 80 at the time and remembered the 
assassination of the U.S. president William McKinley in 1901, an event 
which deeply shocked her at the time. If asked for instance 'was president 
McKinley assassinated ?' she would reply 'yes', and thus could be 
attributed a psychological state, or symbolic expression, or set of symbolic 
expressions, with the content 'McKinley was assassinated' by any 
reasonable criteria. In fact we can simply stipulate evidential 
considerations aside and say ex hypothesis that Mrs T has the appropriate 
sentence-like symbolic expression(s) in the appropriate memory location, 
sufficient, on the account we are investigating, for her to be imputed the 
content sentence 'McKinley was assassinated'. However, in the later years 
of her life her memory began to fade, and shortly before her death Stich 
recorded a conversation with her which went something like this; 
S; Mrs T, tell me, what happened to McKinley ? 
T; Oh, McKinley was assassinated. 
S; Where is he now ? 
T; I don't know. 
S; I mean, is he alive or dead ? 
T; Who? 
S; McKinley? 
T; You know, I just don't remember. 
S; What is an assassination ? 
T; I don't know. 
S; Does an assassinated person die? 
T; I used to know that, but I just don't remember now. 
S; Do you remember what dying is ? 
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T;No. 
S; Can you tell me whether you have died? 
T; No, I just don't remember what that it. 
S; But you do remember what happened to McKinley ? 
T; Oh yes, he was assassinated.7 
This example demonstrates the holism of belief. That is, in order to 
have a certain belief one must necessarily also have certain other beliefs 
(desires, hopes etc.) and attitudes. Davidson remarks: 
Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and 
mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and 
attendings, without limit.8 
To believe something is never to believe one thing, but to apprehend a 
conceptual scheme. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, that one can never 
believe just one thing 'is not a more or less arbitrary point of departure ... 
but belongs to the very essence of what we call a belief'. Specifically: 
If we believe something at all it is not a single fact or a single 
proposition, but a whole system of propositions. 9 
Possessing a certain belief cannot consist in merely having a particular 
mental sentence in the appropriate memory register, as is clear from the 
example above. Although she avows the sentence 'McKinley was 
assassinated' she has no conception of what assassination or death are, and 
thus can hardly be credited with the belief-sentence 'McKinley was 
assassinated' as we would understand it. Similarly, whatever symbolic 
expression or set of such expressions underlies Mrs T's belief, they do not 
appear to possess of themselves the content 'McKinley was assassinated'. 
To possess a belief one must have (at least) the appropriate sentence in 
the appropriate register and a network of further beliefs which interpret 
the first belief. The simple avowal of a single sentence like 'the house is 
on fire' is sufficient in normal circumstances for the correct imputation of 
a belief because of the ideological similarity of the population in question: 
7 Stich, op. cit., p.55. 
8 Davidson (1970), in Honderich and Burnyeat (eds.), p.228. 
9 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, quoted in Brand (1979), p.9. 
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their concepts are similar; everyone knows what a house is, what a fire is, 
and so on. But this is an entirely normative fact about a population, a fact 
which tells us less about the nature of thought and belief than it does 
about the objects of thought and belief. 
Suppose that at some future date Science develops a new set of 
concepts and technical terms. Suppose that the following sentence 
represents a deep strand of this new doctrine: 
Hydrogen atoms are single-petalled superheterodyning 
negentropy flowers. IO 
Suppose that a contemporary individual called Paul somehow comes 
to possess a mental sentence of this form. Thematically, it would be as if 
both Paul and certain future scientists all had a mental sentence of this 
shape - these English words and letters - inscribed on some internal belief-
screen. By concentrating on 'shape' rather than 'content' or 'meaning' we 
are limiting ourselves to psychologically autonomous, syntactic, formal or 
functional states, so by the lights of Pylyshn and the WRTM Paul and the 
future scientists have, in this mental sentence or symbolic structure, a 
belief with the same content. But this is scarcely credible. Even if Paul 
comes to avow this sentence he will not, as it were, 'know what it means', 
for the theory from which it comes is unheard of today. A similar 
situation would be engendered by an eight year old saying 'E = MC2'. 
Unless the child is a genius his mere possession of this equation as a belief 
token will not confer upon him an understanding of the General Theory 
of Relativity. 
One more example: Stich reports that his six year old knows that the 
Star of David has 'six' points, however her command of addition is such 
that she is not aware of what six plus three is.11Can we adequately attribute 
to her any belief involving the number six ? Exactly the same 
circumstances could be true of a mentally retarded or senile adult, stroke 
victim or psychotic; anyone whose conceptual scheme or 'world view' is 
impaired or incomplete compared with the norm. Because beliefs and 
propositional attitudes are attributed with tokens of a shared language 
there is a normative element which, insofar as it ensures a commonly 
understood meaning for the median 'snow is white' (say), will fail to 
10 Stich, op. cit., p.57. 
11 ibid., p.143. 
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render any clear or intelligible content for unusual cases such as those 
cited above. Deprived of a complete context the possession of the 
autonomous correlate of a single token inscription is not sufficient for the 
attribution of the conceptual content that is normally associated with that 
inscription. 
Idiosyncratic conceptual schemes. 
There is a body of literature on the subject of belief perseverance. which 
suggests that if a subject is duped into believing a spurious fact about him 
or her-self in an experimental situation, he or she will continue to exhibit 
a residual belief in the putative fact after being informed that his/her 
results in the psychometric test or personality measure were in fact faked.1 2 
This I mention only to indicate a kind of non folk-psychological, counter-
intuitive, and hence scientifically interesting generalisation which 
personal beliefs of the form 'I am extremely intelligent' , 'I have 
leadership qualities' and 'I have homosexual tendencies' might be 
involved in. 
Suppose someone comes to possess a belief we would attribute with the 
content sentence 'I have homosexual tendencies'. In most cases this 
person will share with his contemporary English speakers of sound mind 
and disposition a substantial number of beliefs about sex and 
homosexuality, such that tokens of this belief will mean much the same 
thing when attributed to members of the community. But being an adult 
co-linguist of sound mind does not ensure a unanimity of sense amongst 
all possessors of belief tokens of a single type. Suppose that our subject, 
quite sanely, possesses an idiosyncratic understanding of the notion of sex 
as follows: 
What sex a person is, is not a function of anatomy. Maleness 
and femaleness are basic, irreducible properties of people. 
These properties are often correlated with anatomical 
differences, but sometimes they are not ... It is no easy matter 
to determine what sex a person is. You have to know quite a 
lot about their personalities, their goals and aspirations, the 
way they interact with other people etc .. .13 
l2 Ross, Lepper and Hubbard (1975), Ross (1977). 
13 Stich, op. cit.,p.138. 
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If we convince this person that he has 'homosexual tendencies' in a 
belief perseverance experiment, the belief which he comes to hold will be 
quite different from that which most of his community would come to 
hold in the same situation. He may, for instance, judge as 'homosexual' 
the relationship between Jane and John, whilst viewing David and John's 
relationship as perfectly heterosexual. But how then can we characterise 
this person's residual belief as 'I have homosexual tendencies' ? And to 
the extent that this characterisation of his belief state is indeterminate, any 
substitution of this content sentence in scientific generalisations which 
include sentences of the form 'S believes "that p"' will render these 
generalisations similarly indeterminate. 
This point is generalizable to any concept or subject matter about which 
we have something resembling a theory. Is my concept of 'introversion' 
the same a yours ? Quite possibly not. If certain people may have different 
concepts of homosexuality or free enterprise then others may have 
different concepts of bread, walking, or furniture. The mere possession of a 
discrete belief sentence or set of 'symbolic expressions' will not confer a 
similarly discrete or univocal content. 
Incoherent conceptual schemes. 
Suppose that ... a Mr Binh, is a recent immigrant to the 
United States whose mastery of English is rather shakey. A 
bright and attentive man, Binh is anxious to learn as much as 
possible about his adopted country. On his first day off the 
plane he overhears a conversation about a Mr Jefferson, 
whose exploits are of obvious interest to the people on whom 
he is evesdropping. Unknown to Binh, the people whose 
conversation he overhears are avid TV fans, and they are 
discussing the most recent travails of (a) fictional black dry-
cleaning magnate ... The next day Binh begins citizenship 
classes and he hears that Jefferson was a statesman, an 
inventor, and a major figure in the early history of America 
.. . On the third day Binh hears some discussion of a Mr 
Feferman, a brilliant logician. However, with his ear not well 
attuned to spoken English, Binh hears 'Feferman' as 
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'Jefferson'. Finally, on the fourth day, Binh meets an old 
friend and has a long chat about what he has learned of 
his new country. 'I am' he says, 'very anxious to learn more 
about this fascinating fellow Jefferson, the black patriot and 
statesman who made significant contributions to logic whilst 
building a dry cleaning empire'.14 
With confusions of reference we have a type of ostensibly well formed 
sentence-like mental state which admits of no intelligible content. 
'Jefferson, the black dry cleaning magnate ... ' because it conflates the 
identities of three people, either fails to refer or has no clear extension. If 
intension determines extension then, ipso facto, it has no clear intension, 
and thus no clear 'symbolic value' if it corresponds to a 'symbolic 
expression' or set of 'symbolic expressions'. Examples of this type may well 
be common in everyday life. It is easy to conceive of confusing Old Man's 
Beard and Ivy, Madras street and Barbados street, primary and secondary 
qualities, the victor of Austerlitz and the father of Napoleon III. 
AUTONOMOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES WHICH ADMIT OF 
MORE THAN ONE CONTENT. 
This is the area in which the traditional conception of meaning breaks 
down most explicitly. Consider these examples: 
Tom is a contemporary of ours, a young man with little 
interest in politics or history. From time to time he has heard 
bits of information about Dwight David Eisenhower ... Let us 
.. . assume That each time Tom heard something about 
Eisenhower, Eisenhower was referred to as 'Ike'. Tom knows 
that this must be a nickname of some sort, but he has no idea 
what the man's full name might be, and doesn't very much 
care. Being little interested in such matters, Tom remembers 
only a fraction of what he has heard about Ike: that he played 
golf a lot; that he is no longer alive; that he had a penchant 
for malapropisms; and perhaps another half dozen other 
14 op. cit.,., p.145-46. 
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facts. He has no memory of when or where he heard these 
facts, nor from whom. 
However: 
Dick ... is a young man in Victorian England. Like Tom, he is 
bored by politics and history. Dick has heard some anecdotes 
about a certain Victorian public figure, Reginald Angell-
J ames, who, for reasons that history does not record, was 
generally called 'Ike'. And ... in all the stories that Dick has 
heard about Angell-James, the gentleman was referred to as 
'Ike'. Angell-James and Eisenhower led very different careers 
in different places and times. However, there were some 
similarities between the two men. In particular, both were 
involved in politics and the military, both liked to play golf, 
and both had a penchant for malapropisms. Moreover, by a 
quirk of fate, the few facts Dick remembers about Angell-
James coincide with the few facts Tom remembers about 
Eisenhower. What is more, of course, Dick would report 
these facts using the very same sentences that Tom would 
use, since the only name Dick knows for Angell-James is 
'Ike'.15 
We can then suppose that the mental sentences or symbolic codes 
underlying Tom and Dick's beliefs are identical autonomous psychological 
states. But they do not have the same content. For instance, the belief that 
'Ike liked to play golf' may be true of Eisenhower but false of Angell-
James. We feel strongly inclined to say that Tom and Dick's beliefs are 
about different things, and so will possess different truth conditions. But if 
they possess different truth conditions they cannot possibly be the same 
belief. As semantics just is the question of truth and truth values their 
autonomous states have different semantics, and so are different 
representations. 
Any suggestion that there must be some causal difference which 
distinguishes the beliefs of Tom and Dick is difficult to motivate, for 
neither has either met or seen 'Ike', and their immediate contacts with 
written or verbal information about 'Ike' can be stipulated to be the same. 
15 op. cit.,, p.60-61. 
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An analogous situation is found in another example due to Stich: 
Apparently the vegetables known as 'chicory' and 'endive' in America are 
known in the U.K. as 'endive' and 'chicory' respectively. Suppose then 
that we have an Englishman, Robin, and an American, John, who who 
both dislike vegetables and are woefully ignorant of the appearance of all 
but the most common species. Both are invited to a dinner party in their 
respective home towns. Both have heard, whether truthfully or falsely, 
that 'chicory' is bitter. Both are asked if they would like a 'chicory' salad 
and both tactlessly refuse saying 'no thanks, chicory is bitter'. Now, even if 
we stipulate that by hypothesis the symbolic states underlying the beliefs 
expressed by these two men are identical, it seems doubtful that this 
identity of autonomous psychological state ensures identity of belief 
content. Suppose that the vegetable the Americans call 'endive' is bitter 
whilst 'chicory' is in fact sweet. In this case John's belief is false and 
Robin's belief is true, and they surely can't be the same belief if they have 
different truth conditions. Here the content of belief states seems to 
depend upon the proximity of the subject and object of the belief, for if 
Robin and John were attending their respective dinner-parties at the same 
time and were teleported into each others seats just prior to being offered 
the salad, John's belief would become true and Robin's belief would 
become false. But at what point do their beliefs change in truth value, 
when John is halfway across the Atlantic, or when he swoops in over the 
Shetland islands ? 
A similar phenomenon is exhibited by indexicals. The ubiquitous 
mental sentence proto-model suggests that if both you and I believe that 
the sky is blue then we both possess a token of 'the sky is blue' in 
mentalese in some mental register. However, if two different people both 
possess a belief or attitude which contains an indexical expression like 'I', 
'you' or 'this', the content of the sentence in question will change 
depending upon who instantiates it. If I am being attacked by a bear and 
you are observing then 'I am being attacked by a bear' does not adequately 
characterise the content of both of our beliefs. Mental sentence identity 
then, does not confer content identity. Ipso facto, the 'symbolic expression' 
account which seeks to correlate with and explain beliefs qua 'semantic 
level regularities' does not possess the resources to account for variation 
in belief contents except at the cost of allowing variations in 'symbolic 
values'. 
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Stich makes the same point in his 1978 paper: Suppose that it is 
possible to create atom-for-atom replicas of human beings. Physical 
replicahood will then confer identity of autonomous, and hence syntactic, 
formal and/ or functional states. Suppose that a replica of Stich has just 
been created. Stich believes that he has tasted a bottle of Chateau d'Yquem 
1962. The embodiment of this belief in 'symbolic expressions' will be 
amongst the causes of his behaviour, such as remarking 'I have tasted a 
bottle of Chateau d'Yquem 1962', and being able to infer that 'I have tasted 
a French wine vinted in the 1960's '. If we ask Stich's replica if he has 
tasted a bottle of Chateau d'Yquem 1962 he will answer affirmatively, and 
so we may feel that this belief is amongst the causes of his utterance. Yet 
this cannot be the same belief that Stich possesses for Stich's belief is true 
whilst Stich's replica's belief is false, for Stich's replica has, by hypothesis, 
only just been created. If the alogarithmic embodiments of this belief are 
identical in both cases and lead to identical behaviours, they do not 
achieve this effect by virtue of their content. 16 
With the aid of conceptual tools borrowed from Science Fiction, the 
scope of this kind of example is completely general. Moving from self 
referential belief to beliefs about one's surroundings, we can imagine that 
in a time when the art of cryogenics has been perfected a person with 
certain true belief about his surroundings might be quick frozen, 
transported to another location and kept on ice for a century or two. 17 
From our previous discussions it is clear that this person's narrow, 
autonomous, symbolic states will remain constant from the moment he 
is frozen to the moment he is unfrozen. Just prior to being frozen he may 
believe that his car is parked outside, there are many strawberry farms 
nearby, the weather is good and so on, and each of these beliefs has the 
potential to influence subsequent action. But upon defrosting his beliefs 
may be false, whilst the symbol level structures which are supposed to 
account for the content of these beliefs remain unchanged. Beliefs cannot 
be assimilated to these autonomous structures, hence beliefs cannot be 'in 
the head'. Any number of our beliefs about our spatial and temporal 
surroundings may be slotted into examples of this kind. 
Similarly for beliefs about other persons: Suppose that I have a 
doppelganger on a planet far away that is virtually identical to Earth. This 
planet is so similar to Earth that there is a country there which goes by the 
16 Stich (1978), p.580. 
17 ibid. 
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name of 'New Zealand', and an ex-prime minister called 'David Lange' 
who is resident in this country. Now I believe that David Lange has five 
fingers on his left hand (four fingers and a thumb), and my doppelganger, 
being an atom for atom replica of myself, will exemplify all of the 
autonomous psychological properties that I do, and prima fade will have 
the same beliefs that I do. But David Lange on this far off planet has six 
fingers on his left hand, hence my belief is true and my doppelganger's 
false. The conclusion is familiar. 
Which brings us to natural kinds and the thought experiment which 
initiated the debate in 1975. In 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' Putnam asks 
us to suppose that somewhere in the galaxy there is a planet called 'Twin 
Earth', which is exactly like Earth down to and including an atom-for-
atom replica of each of us. We can also suppose that on Twin Earth they 
speak 'English', which is identical to our English. The only difference 
between Earth and Twin Earth is that the liquid referred to as 'water' on 
Twin Earth - the liquid which fills lakes and rivers, quenches thirst, falls as 
rain and so forth - is not H2O but another substance which has a very long 
and involved chemical formula which we can summarise as 'XYZ'. 
Furthermore, XYZ is indistinguishable from H2O in all but the most 
esoteric laboratory circumstances. Now, were a spaceship from Earth to 
visit Twin Earth, and were its occupants to learn that the local 'water' is in 
fact XYZ they would be inclined to say: 
On Twin Earth the word 'water' means XYZ. 
Symmetrically, if a spaceship from Twin Earth visited Earth they 
would be inclined to say that: 
On Earth the word 'water' means H2O.l8 
In other words, the sense, concept or intension of the word 'water' has 
the extension H2O on Earth and XYZ on Twin Earth. From our perspective 
what the a Twin Earthians call 'water' simply isn't water, it is something 
else. At this point in the argument it may still be possible to maintain that 
there is something in the individual's concept of water which 'controls 
for' water's idiosyncratic reference to XYZ on Twin Earth, for by 
hypothesis, at least some people are aware that 'water' refers to two 
18 Putnam (1975), p.223-224. 
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different things on these two different planets. Putnam's point though, is 
that no-one on either planet need be aware of this variation in extension 
for it to be the case. If we went back to a time prior to the development of 
chemistry or the atomic theory of matter on Earth and Twin Earth no-one 
would know that Twin Earth water was undetectably different from Earth 
water. In particular, my doppelganger on Twin Earth could be my exact 
duplicate in feelings, interior monologues, thoughts and psychological 
states insofar as these are constituted by my physical, bodily and 
behavioural state or history - i.e. at least my functional architecture and 
symbol level. Thus there can be no differences in our concepts or 
intentions or symbolic states, nor between any pair of duplicates on our 
respective planets, yet we still each mean something different by the word 
'water': 
Thus the extension of the term 'water' (and, in fact, its 
'meaning' in the intuitive pre-analytical usage of that term) 
is not a function of the psychological state of the speaker by 
itself.19 
Although my doppelganger and I are both in the same autonomous 
psychological state, our 'thoughts' have a different content. Our symbolic 
states are exemplifying neither an intrinsic and determinate symbolic 
value (there could be hundreds of Twin Earths each with a different 
substance going under the name of 'water', leading to there being as many 
different contents for the symbolic expression concerned as I have 
doppelgangers) nor the same symbolic value in different circumstances. 
Tyler Burge makes an analogous point by allowing extension to vary as 
a function of understanding, within a linguistic community. In a by now 
familiar fashion he works from the premise that: 
On any systematic theory, differences in the extension - the 
actual denotation, referent, or application - of counterpart 
expressions in that-clauses will be semantically represented, 
and will, in our terms, make for a difference in content.20 
19op. cit., p.225. 
20 Burge (1979), p.75. 
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A second premise is that, as we have seen, it is is specifically oblique 
construals of propositional attitudes which serve to characterise the 
contents of mental states. If I think that 'water is not fit to drink' it does 
not follow that I think that 'H20 is not fit to drink', for I may not know 
that water is H20. (A transparent or de re construal would class these two 
beliefs as equivalent because they refer to 'the same thing'). 
Technically, the mark of an opaque (oblique) construal of a 
propositional attitude is either that the noun in the content clause is not 
substitutable with co-extensive expressions salva veritate, (hence when 
content clauses are not so substitutable they indicate different contents), or 
existential generalisation for this term is not a straight-forwardly valid 
transformation (Santa Claus). 
Burge's point centres upon a thought experiment in which we, at first, 
consider a person who has a large number of beliefs and attitudes about 
'arthritis', where the latter occurs obliquely in content clauses: 
For example, he thinks (correctly) that he has had arthritis for 
years, that his arthritis in his wrists and fingers is more 
painful than his arthritis in his ankles, that it is better to have 
arthritis than to have cancer of the liver, that stiffening joints 
is a symptom of arthritis ... (and) In addition to these 
unsurprising attitudes, he thinks falsely that he has 
developed arthritis in his thigh.21 
But suppose (counterfactually) that this person had exactly the same 
life history, thoughts, internal monologues, sensations, behaviour, 
autonomously described mental states and so on (say he has a 
doppelganger on Twin Earth, or is himself quick frozen and taken to Twin 
Earth), yet the meaning of 'arthritis' was broadened to be inclusive of 
various other rheumatoid ailments, including those to be found in the 
thigh. That is, the only difference between the actual and counterfactual 
case is the subjects social environment; the accepted use and definition of 
the word 'arthritis". Burge then contends that: 
we cannot correctly ascribe any content clause containing an 
oblique occurrence of the term 'arthritis'. 
21 op. cit.,, p.77. 
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because; 
'arthritis' in the counterfactual situation, differs both in 
dictionary definition and in extension from 'arthritis' as we 
use it.22 
In other words, as in the Twin Earth examples, two different 
occurrences of the one term denote phenomena with two different 
extensions, thus they connote different contents. Because the extensions 
differ, content clauses containing 'arthritis' in the counterfactual situation 
are not freely substitutable salva veritate with arthritis - they are thus at 
the same time opaque, intensional, and constitutive of an individual's 
subjective representation - as opposed to an objective relation to an actual 
item or phenomenon in the world. The representationalist's tactic of 
using opaque construals of propositional attitudes in order to capture 
differences in the way a set circumstance may be 'taken' or 'interpreted' 
thus ensures that the mere correct attribution of a content sentence (or 
corresponding 'symbolic expression(s)) of the form (or 'shape') 'I have 
arthritis' does not thereby confer uninamity of content - and this on the 
relatively down to earth and non science-fictional understanding that 
different sectors of the community may take certain terms to have 
different extensions. If a determinate set of symbolic codes do not by the 
integrity of their identity (their intension) determine a discrete semantics, 
then we cannot suppose that the meanings of inputs are except 
contingently an indicator of 'symbolic' change, and thus of non-
architectural change, and thus of the absence of architectural change, and 
thus of the absence of analogue process. 
22 ibid., p.79 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 
The above results impugn the qualities of a determinate and intrinsic 
content upon which Pylyshn's criticism of the analog theory relies. As the 
semantics of a mental representation have to do with what it is true of, so 
the alterations of reference whilst holding autonomous psychological state 
state constant ensures that the latter changes in its content. If it were a 
belief, for instance, in the counterfactual situation it would become a 
different belief. In the case of sententially attributed beliefs with no clear or 
determinate content it is seen to be difficult to credit particular content 
sentence tokens with the full meaning their English language 
counterparts possess. In this we see a holism of belief content which 
contradicts the discrete sentence (or 'expression')content paradigm 
implied both by Pylyshn's theory and the Folk Paradigm to which it is 
wed. 
The opacity of belief sentences is seen to connote representationality 
and the differential subjective 'takings' of sentences and situations 
necessary for the explanation of behaviour in these terms, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that a change in reference of a representation is 
thereby a change in extension and so a change in content. In short, 
representationality engenders indeterminacy of content and thus 
indeterminacy of representation. This, I think, is the fundamental paradox 
of representational psychology. To individuate belief states transparently, 
of course, is to say nothing, for my belief that my next-door neighbour is a 
nice man could become synonymous with the belief that a murderer and 
rapist is a nice man, which would fail to explain my friendly behaviour 
towards him. But to instantiate that belief in a tangible physical structure 
such as a mental sentence inscription or computational state is 
simultaneously to allow for variations in the content of that state which 
are ipso facto unexplained by that state. But the moral here is clearly to 
view representations as things which can possess contingent properties -
so that they can be objects of scientific study - and a symbolic or intentional 
quality which varies over and above changes in the physical state of the 
organism is not a contingent property, being determined necessarily by 
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whatever the actual reference of that state might be. It is for instance a 
contingent question as to whether physical structure x can adequately 
represent for the organism domain y (e.g. the geometrical inter-
relationships of physical objects ), but not that structure x has semantics y, 
or reference y, for the semantics of a representation just are what it refers 
to. 
Extrapolating from the thought experiments we can see that in the 
paradigmatic situation where one autonomous psychological state is 
attributed two or more different contents, by the non-equivalence of each 
mental-state extension pair with the other pair, the content of neither state 
is equivalent with the autonomous state. Autonomous states then, whilst 
they may be attributed contents 'from the outside', do not themselves 
have contents. If such states are alogarithmic and hence formal and 
syntactic we can follow Stich (1983) in terming the picture that emerges for 
representation the Syntactic Theory of Mind: 
The STM views mental states as relations to tokens of purely 
syntactic objects. Generalisations detailing the interactions of 
mental state tokens describe them in terms of their syntactic 
types. On the matter of content or semantic properties the 
STM is officially agnostic. I 
Content is thus not excluded, but it is precluded as an explanatory 
factor of itself. Kosslyn's model is a paridigmatic syntactic theory. This is 
clear both from the explicit computational form in which the theory is 
expressed, and the almost implicit and by-the-way manner in which he 
seeks not to use the content of representations in explanation, but to 
reconstruct such content as the processes postulated may be ascribed, in 
terms of their quantifiable information processing qualities. The Turing 
machine example is a parallel: the actual function attributed to the 
machine qua mechanism is not present 'in' the machine in the form 
attributed. Quite how I don't know, but as long as the psychological moral 
remains of studying tangible alogarithms at the expense of blanket content 
ascriptions like 'tacit knowledge' then this is a mere philosophical 
question. The function of Philosophy in Cognitive Psychology we might 
say, is to do it - then set it aside, for only once it has been done does one 
become aware of how infected with philosophical prejudices one's 
1 Stich (1983), p.185. 
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previous 'a-philosophical' position was. Having put aside the deflationary 
theme of cognitive penetrability, the empirical imagery literature may be 
judged in terms of its ability to predict and integrate a domain unhindered 
by a priori counter-arguments. 
If we reason this way however,the question emerges as to the 
interpretation of Pylyshn's apparently sound arguments for representation 
and the utility of mental content above. It is fairly easy to understand that 
aspect of the STM which renders the above examples innocuous: If mental 
states are individuated formally by physically instantiated 
computational/alogarithmic states then identity of narrow or 
autonomous state confers identity of psychological state. The unruly 
construct of content ceases to be cited as an explanation, thus ensuring 
that the philosophical minutae of content variations due to strange 
circumstances are no longer of significance to the psychological theory 
itself, except insofar as they militate against a particular construal of the 
computational model. But the question remains, do we not lose essential 
generalizations by adopting such a restrictive ontology of mental states ? 
It simply will not do as an explanation of, say, why Mary 
came running out of the smoke filled building, to say that 
there was a certain sequence of expressions computed in her 
mind according to certain expression transforming rules. ... 
The only way to both capture the important underlying 
generalizations .. . and to see her behaviour as being 
rationally related to certain conditions is to take the ... step of 
interpreting the expressions in the theory as goals and 
beliefs.2 
For familiar reasons, would not the formal/syntactic descriptions of a 
number of people in the 'help, the building is on fire' situation have 
nothing in common and so fail to explain their behaviours as instances of 
the belief state in question ? But Pylyshn, I think, begs the question, for 
there may well be nothing properly psychological in common amongst 
all occasions of fire avoidance behaviour. Our clue here is Theoretical 
Explanation as characterized above. Upon the construal of explanation I 
wish to emphasise, theories explain epistemologically immediate 
phenomena by, roughly speaking, characterising what the latter really are 
2 Pylyshn (1980b), quoted in Stich (1983), p.171. 
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hence the fallibility of the immediate folk conception of psychological 
states is implicit in the attempt to explain them. It is not incumbent upon 
scientific theories to duplicate the categories of common sense. In fact, 
according to Science, common-sense is radically mistaken about a number 
of things; the solidity of every-day objects, their possession of colour, the 
'gravitational attraction' between the Earth and a pencil tossed from the 
window.etc. (cf Churchland (1979)). To take an example, the folk-
psychological state of 'remembering my fifth birthday'; I may remember 
my fifth birthday in a number of psychologically distinct ways. I may bring 
to mind a single image of a particular scene which occurred that day. I may 
recall a number of distinct but fragmentary images. I may recall certain 
sounds or smells. I may assume a state in which I can answer questions 
about what happened that day with out any accompanying fragmentary. 
Or I may simply make an appropriate one or two word verbal response to 
a question like 'did it rain on your fifth birthday ?' This is of course a very 
Wittgensteinian point. What reason do we have to take it for granted that 
all instances of what the ordinary man-in-the-street may choose to identify 
as 'reading' or 'understanding' must have a cognitive element in 
common? This is an empirical question which cognitive psychology may 
eventually settle. But the direction of informed consequence should be in 
favour of Science rather that Common sense. Thus whilst it is likely that 
most instances of running in fear from a burning building will turn out to 
share certain belief-like formal structures which could be interpreted along 
ordinary lines as something akin to sentences of mentalese, if psychology 
fails to find any such convergence then so much the worse for 'common 
sense'. 
Pylyshn continues: 
What in the (syntactic) theory corresponds to this common 
interpretation ? Surely one cannot answer by pointing to 
some formal symbols. The right answer has to be something 
like the claim that the symbols represent the belief that the 
building is on fire -i.e., it is a semantic interpretation of the 
symbols as representing something. Otherwise even the 
relevance of the other symbols stored in memory would 
have to be gratuitously stipulated. If they were interpreted, on 
the other hand, we would see that they are relevant because 
they constitute premises which sanction the inference from 
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such conditions as the smell of smoke to the belief directly 
responsible for the action. 3 
But this is a curious remark, for at the 'folk' level the content - which 
is incommensurable with physical or formal structure, as we have seen -
of whatever belief and desires we may ascribe, manifestly relevant. But we 
do not thereby have to ascribe a specific content to each 
syntactic/representational 'symbol' any more than we must ascribe a 
distinct colour to each of the atoms which make up this tomato, or a 
distinct solidity to each of the atoms which compose this table, or a distinct 
gravitational attraction between each part of this ball and the Earth (cf 
General Relativity), despite the fact that the constituents of these things 
explain their overt qualities. 
Beliefs, desires and Folk Psychology are a product, I think, of what 
Dennett calls 'the intentional stance': 
a particular thing is an intentional system only in relation to 
the strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict 
its behaviour.4 
One predicts behaviour in such a case by ascribing to the 
system the possession of certain information and supposing 
it to be directed by certain goals , and then by working out the 
most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these 
ascriptions and suppositions.s 
However; 
the definition of intentional systems ... does not say that 
intentional systems really have beliefs and desires, but that 
one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing 
beliefs and desires to them.6 
3 Pylyshn, quoted in Stich, op. cit. 
4 Dennett (1978) p.3-4 
5 ibid, p.6 
6 ibid, p.7 
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The question, then, of 'where and what is mental content?' is, I think, 
the wrong question. It is like asking 'where is the solidity of this desk ?' 
Treating it as solid certainly explains its effect upon my foot if dropped on 
it, and at the everyday level this is enough. Treating cognition as a formal 
computational process has specific scientific virtues. It manifests, roughly 
speaking, the best approximation we have at the moment of what 
cognition 'really is'. 
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